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Abstract
Web systems have become an integral part in daily life of billions of people,
with social web applications taking on an increasingly important role among
them. Social is a key characteristic modern web projects need to feature in
order to be successful in the social age. To benefit from an improved user
experience, individual persons are continually invited to reveal more and
more personal data to web systems.
With a rising severity of attacks on web systems, it becomes evident that
their security is inadequate for the amount of personal data they accumulate.
Numerous risk and threat reports indicate that social media has become a
top-ranking attack target, with climbing impacts, with ramifications beyond
individuals and with a booming black market to trade compromised user
accounts and leaked personal data. Attackers hereby profit by a poor
consideration of information security during design and runtime of web
systems and involved applications and services. There is great uncertainty
and low transparency about protection, circulation and use of personal
data by third parties.
Motivated by the positive developments a solution to this problem would
imply for individual persons, companies and governments, the purpose of
ix
the dissertation is to enhance information security in managing personal
data by web systems. Five research questions and a set of objectives opera-
tionalize the purpose. To holistically address these objectives with respect
to the suitability of state-of-the-art technologies, the dissertation proposes a
solution architecture and three dedicated research contributions. While the
solution architecture establishes the foundation for a more secure manage-
ment of personal data by web systems, the research contributions represent
complementary components for protecting personal data against unwanted
data disclosure, tampering and use without the actual data owner’s intent
or knowledge. These components enable seamless integration and combi-
nation, and contribute to assure quality and maintainability through relying
on preexisting artifacts only. By conducting an objectives-based evaluation,
this dissertation verifies to what extent the proposed solution as a whole
has 1) achieved the purpose, 2) attained answers to the research questions,
and 3) contributed to the overall objective of an increased protection of
privacy and a reduction of personal data disclosures through attacks on
web systems. The dissertation concludes with interpreting the evaluation
results and providing an outlook towards future work.
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1Introduction
To introduce this dissertation, the first chapter begins with describing to-
day’s landscape of web systems with a particular emphasis on the social
web in Section 1.1. Having situated this work through presenting the
general domain our research focuses on, Section 1.2 then shows preva-
lent issues existing in this context and consolidates them to the central
problem statement. On that basis Section 1.3 illustrates the impact of the
central problem in order to highlight our motivation for finding a solu-
tion. Section 1.4 condenses the motivation to define the purpose of this
work, which is further operationalized by a set of research questions and
a set of anticipated research contributions. Finally, Section 1.5 outlines
the organization of the work to achieve the purpose.
1
1.1 Situation
Web systems1 have become an integral part in daily life of billions of people,
with social web applications taking on a more and more important role
among them in the last couple of years (Nielsen and NM Incite, 2012).
Supporting a broad spectrum of user activities from social networking
and self-presentation over content and opinion sharing to collaborative
editing and crowdfunding, social web applications enable people to express
themselves, communicate and team up with each other (Appelquist et al.,
2010; Kietzmann et al., 2011). No matter whether dealing with products,
contents or activities, social is a key characteristic modern web systems
need to feature for being and remaining successful in the social age (Azua,
2009; Bell, 2009). With more data stored in the cloud and accessible online,
it is required for individual persons, businesses and governments to handle
massive quantities of personal data securely (Verizon, 2014). Personal
data includes any information relating to a (human) entity, where this
particular entity is either identified or identifiable without unreasonable
effort (European Parliament, 1995; FRA, 2014).
With the advent of e-mail almost forty years ago, social application software
started its triumph and steadily gained more ground down to the present
day (Porter, 2008). The World Wide Web (WWW or Web) is a paragon
of social software that laid the foundation for a multitude of applications,
which are running on web servers and are accessible over networks via
standardized interfaces by heterogeneous agents including web browsers
and other services. Holding onto its original intention of being a facilitator
of information exchange among users (Kaplan and Haenlein, 2010), the
WWW completed its shift towards a platform whose applications foster
1Throughout this dissertation, we use the term web system to denote an orchestration of
entities, like web applications and web services, to provide one or multiple more complex
services with extended functionality.
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the creation of new content whilst taking account of how well content
is received and shared with others (Kietzmann et al., 2011). Driven by
the Web 2.0 movement, essential building blocks have been provided to
facilitate both user participation and contribution rather than mere infor-
mation consumption, which was the de facto standard before (Appelquist
et al., 2010; Kaplan and Haenlein, 2010). With a significant and lasting
impact on the way people inform themselves and acquire knowledge, user-
generated content (UGC) emerged out of this movement as a prevalent
and omnipresent element that deeply shaped the media landscape (Daugh-
erty et al., 2008; Webster, 2010). Deployed on the technological basis
introduced by the Web 2.0, social media applications serve more and more
people to create and exchange UGC at a global scale (Nielsen and NM
Incite, 2012). By increasing accessibility and lowering entry barriers for
contributing and consuming UGC, the rise of the mobile sector largely
accelerated this trend (Kaplan and Haenlein, 2010).
Beyond serving as a necessary mean for recognizing content contributors,
a user’s identity took on a special place in the developments towards
the social web (Kietzmann et al., 2011). While user profile pages were
first meant as a place to store personal data needed to use services more
efficiently, e.g., auto-completion of address data, a growing number of web
systems focused on identity data of individual persons as a central theme.
Enabling to identify and establish relationships between people over the
web, the social web provided a hotbed for many new applications in recent
years (Appelquist et al., 2010). Through linking identity with activity,
content and products, social web applications allow for user recognition,
attribution and building trust (Bell, 2009). A prime example are online
social networks (OSNs). Founded on the identity theme, the IT companies
behind centralized OSNs gained high market coverage, manifested their
business position through initial public offerings and rank among today’s
most valuable global players (Appraisal Economics, 2014; Winkels, 2013).
1.1 Situation 3
Judged by their ability to attract and retain individuals, both the current
size and the growth potential of the user base determine the high valuations
of social media companies (Anders, 2014; Appraisal Economics, 2014).
Rather than selling physical products, this so-called invisible economy or
attention economy, i.e., the economy constituted by social media companies,
adds their value primarily from the amount of social capital it acquires and
binds (Chayka, 2014; Webster, 2010). Social capital originates from the
social connections between individuals, their access to resources, and their
positions in a social network gained through self-presentation and inter-
actions with other users, e.g., messaging and sharing (Burke et al., 2011;
N. B. Ellison et al., 2011). Analyzing the consumption habits of their users
enables to steadily provide them with new custom-tailored content, which
is often generated by the users themselves (Daugherty et al., 2008). In
order to benefit from more relevant content and, hence, an improved expe-
rience, individuals are invited to reveal further personal data (Delo, 2014;
Krishnamurthy and Wills, 2008). Not only does this include information on
their social capital, their opinions and their sentiments, but also personally
identifiable information (PII), i.e., any information that allows for detecting
the identity of an individual person. Along with content customizations, this
assists in creating appealing advertisements that properly factor in the user’s
individual characteristics disclosed to or inferred by web systems (Baden
et al., 2009; Webster, 2010). Seeking to rise the average revenue per user,
social media companies accumulate personal data of their users (Appraisal
Economics, 2014; Krishnamurthy and Wills, 2008). In particular young
people provide web systems with large amounts of information relating to
them as individuals (EC, 2011; Nielsen and NM Incite, 2012). The more per-
sonal data individuals expose, the more accurate the recommendations and
the higher the expected revenue will be through targeted advertisements
or through a potential acquisition of the company (Bria, 2012; Webster,
2010). Although the worth is not distributed equally among individual
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persons, each active user contributes to the overall social capital managed
by social web applications (Appraisal Economics, 2014).
Striving for keeping the valuations high through preventing the drain of
up-to-date information on social capital and other personal data, especially
social web applications did not pay much attention to data portability and,
thus, largely evolved as personal data silos (Bojars et al., 2008; Darwell,
2012). Marked by the heterogeneity of web systems flourished on the
social media landscape, individuals were encouraged to create new identi-
ties based on more or less the same main identity and enter related data
over and over again (Appelquist et al., 2010; Webster, 2010). In the past,
individual persons received real identity cards primarily from a modest
number of organizations from the public or private sector, like government-
issued or corporate identification cards, after providing solid proof and
close examination of personal attributes. Today’s users, however, have to
cope with numerous digital identities specific to particular web systems.
In consequence of establishing many redundant, distributed, application-
specific stores for information like name, address or account data, users are
repeatedly asked to provide credentials for their identity data in order to
enable protection against unauthorized access and use. Most modern web
systems rely on authentication via username/password pairs for this pur-
pose and burden individual persons with the task to either remember their
credentials or keep them safe from unwanted parties respectively (Florên-
cio and Herley, 2007). By consolidating user identities at a central place
and enabling controlled access for web systems, federated identity tries
to mitigate that matter (Hackett and Hawkey, 2012). This is particularly
attributed to the option of enabling users to plausibly legitimize to a feder-
ation of multiple web systems through a single authentication, known as
single sign-on (SSO). Social login solutions, as a variant of SSO, dominate
today and gave further leverage to global players in the social media sector.
1.1 Situation 5
While many developments towards more sociality in the web are
positive, they did not come along without negative implications
as explained in the next section.
1.2 Central Problem
With a rising severity of attacks, it becomes evident that the security2
of today’s web systems is inadequate for the amount of personal data
they accumulate. Numerous risk and threat reports, including (Horacek,
2013; Symantec, 2014; Verizon, 2014), show that social media has be-
come a top-ranking attack target, with climbing impacts, with ramifications
beyond single individuals and with a booming black market for trading
compromised user accounts and leaked personal data. Accompanied by
an increasing accumulation of personal data, we argue that an insuffi-
cient consideration of protective measures by web systems at design time
and runtime is a major cause for the growing number, extent and impact
of successfully orchestrated attacks. Not only do these attacks affect a
couple of individuals over a short period, but a plethora of users with
hard to foreseen consequences in the long-term.
In order to substantiate the problem statement, the following para-
graphs give reasons for our claim by 1) illustrating the particular
target characteristic of web systems caused by an accumulation of
personal data obtained from their users, by 2) describing resulting
attacks in terms of magnitude, scope, distribution, impact, spatial and
physical independence, and by 3) showing that protective measures
taken by web systems are only insufficient.
2Unless otherwise noted, we refer to information security when using the term security.
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By analogy with banks that deposit monetary capital for their customers3,
web systems store information on the social capital and other personal data
their users entrusted them with. Promising customers to make payable
investments by utilizing provided resources and capabilities, e.g., multiply
their capital or expand their social network, both banks and web systems
accumulate a specific type of capital on behalf of their customers. Like
banking federations and major banks, also federations among web sys-
tems offer a number of benefits for their customers, e.g., unified access
to a larger product portfolio, but bear risks associated to an increased
accumulation and centralized management of capital.
An accumulation of capital, whether it is money or information, can rep-
resent an attractive as well as lucrative target for attacks as soon as the
potential reward outweighs the necessary effort (Horacek, 2013). In the
context of information security, an attack represents “any kind of malicious
activity that attempts to collect, disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy informa-
tion system resources or the information itself” (CNSS, 2010). Similar to
the real world, where bank robbers target the monetary capital customers
committed to a bank, criminals target personal data, including information
on social capital, web systems manage for their users through exploiting po-
tential infrastructural, organizational or personnel weak points of the entity
the capital is entrusted to (Müller, 2008). Due to specially focusing on their
users’ personal data, social web applications present a top target in this
context. The number of incidents relying on social tactics to expose data are
steadily climbing since several years and are only surpassed by malware and
hacking as of this writing (Verizon, 2014). In line with a growing amount of
attacks on web systems, security companies discovered a rapid increase of
breaches with more than 10 million identities revealed, including data on
real names, birth dates, government-issued identification numbers, home
3Although characterized by domain-specific usages, we treat customer and user as synonyms
in this work.
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addresses, medical records, phone numbers, financial information, email
addresses, user names and passwords, and insurance data (Verizon, 2014).
Information services like DataBreaches.net, LeakedIn or ’;–have i been pwned?
provide an overview of an alarming extent of attacks (DataBreaches.net,
2016; Hunt, 2016; LeakedIn, 2016). Trying to make individuals aware
about the risks of data loss and identity theft, such information services
also show the sheer magnitude of breaches affecting both users and web
systems (McCandless and Evans, 2013). The latter service, for example,
lists breaches which altogether entailed more than 170 million publicly
available data disclosures as of this writing.
While the motivation of criminals to enrich themselves or to harm entities
holding the capital stays the same independent from the type of capital,
transforming this very motivation into concrete actions is largely supported
by the characteristics of the web. According to (Verizon, 2014), a signifi-
cant share of attacks on web systems is chiefly driven by financial motives
intending to convert disclosed data to money. Here, external threat actors
are dominant, but internal ones do not play an inconsiderable role (Verizon,
2014). Criminals typically target user credentials for this purpose, i.e.,
user names, email addresses and passwords, by utilizing techniques like
phishing, brute-force password guessing or application-level attacks that
aim at breaking into the user management or bypassing authentication
routines of web systems (Bogart, 2013; Reisinger, 2014). Among other
things, attackers are assisted in their malicious practice of finding suitable
victims by deeply exploiting information on identity and connections avail-
able within user profiles (Horacek, 2013; Verizon, 2014). Even though
individuals are informed to mitigate risks by restricting the amount of
personal data they make publicly available, it is doubtful whether web
systems are also taking sufficient protective measures to safeguard personal
data entrusted to them (EC, 2011; Verizon, 2014).
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Attackers often benefit from a poor consideration of information security
during design or runtime of web systems, e.g., storing email addresses and
password hints as unencrypted plain text in databases (Hunt, 2014), using
unsalted password hashes (Finkle and Saba, 2012), granting operators too
many privileges (Ilyin, 2014), or missing to sustainably address known
vulnerabilities, such in the case of cross-site scripting (XSS) (Brandom,
2014). While the high heterogeneity among web systems can be considered
as positive, the associated lack of knowledge about underlying design
principles and employed models does not help to ensure individual persons
that their data is kept safe against exploitation they do not comply with.
There is an insufficient awareness of the significance to ensure availability,
confidentiality and integrity of information (systems) by protecting them
against unauthorized access and exploitation (CNSS, 2010; Venter and
Eloff, 2003). That is, security is often treated only as an afterthought and
not as a first thought during design time and runtime of web systems and
involved web applications and web services. The conduct of a considerable
number of companies to encourage individuals to disclose as much personal
data as possible via web systems is not in line with the frequently cited
laws of identity principles published in (Cameron, 2005). There is great
uncertainty and low transparency about the protection, circulation, and use
of personal data by third parties (EC, 2011). Contrary to the perspective
described in (Jordan et al., 2003) a decade ago, we think that 1) the
absence of both physical and local presence of attackers, 2) an attack
magnitude beyond a single unit, and 3) a fast and global distribution
and exploitation of insights on latent weak points are additional support
factors compared to other type of attacks, which entail further leverage
that directly originates from the characteristics of the web.
Taking a more detailed look at the support factors for attacks on web sys-
tems, it is apparent that in comparison to bank robberies, where timing
and location are critical factors, cybercriminals typically do not need to
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have physical access or be present in person nearby the server(s) that are
running the web system in question (Müller, 2008). Both the spatial in-
dependence of attacks and the freedom of locality for attackers allow for
a more concealed preparation, execution and escape as well as a reduc-
tion of the attacker’s inhibition level through an increased distance in a
psychological, physical, geographical and legal sense.
The continuous evolution of computer systems and networks facilitates
utilizing computational capabilities also for malicious purposes. This cre-
ated a competition against the human will and capability to remember
things, which results in increasingly challenging knowledge-based authen-
tication. For example, as of writing this dissertation, specialized tools like
hashcat (Steube, 2016) enable attackers to crack common passwords in
half a day4 using conventional hardware (Lystad, 2013). Hereby, they
profit from both central processing unit (CPU)- and graphics processing
unit (GPU)-accelerated computation. The means thus provided assist in
attacking multiple targets in parallel (Horacek, 2013), instead of one single
target after another as in the case of bank robberies (Müller, 2008).
Today’s possibilities for rapid and global distribution of information further
contribute to potentially play knowledge on latent weak points of web
systems into the wrong hands. According to (Horacek, 2013), the value
associated with gaining access to social media accounts created a black
market. Enabling attackers to monetize social media vulnerabilities as well
as compromised user accounts, black market prices vary depending on the
type of data disclosure, starting from basic identity data over health records
to newly leaked credit card information (Holt and Smirnova, 2014).
4Eight character long passwords consisting of letters and numbers. Verification of 3,67 billion
Secure Hash Algorithm (160 bits) (SHA-1) hash values per second.
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The impacts of attacks on web systems are not limited to their particular
domain, but potentially bear negative implications for both affected indi-
viduals and companies with respect to reputation, trust and finance (Dane,
2012; Horacek, 2013). Leaked PII can be matched and combined by crimi-
nals with existing data sets and exploited for further attacks involving pene-
tration of protection phrases or social engineering tactics like impersonating
users. Notwithstanding the non-materialistic character of knowledge fed by
data disclosures, it can seriously impair other types of capital when used in
the wrong hands, e.g., cause financial losses or persecution of minorities due
to conflicting views or beliefs (Krishnamurthy and Wills, 2008; Reisinger,
2014). It is not unusual that the consequences of a declining reputation and
trust in web systems manifest in a drain of users as they fear ramifications
in the offline world (Horacek, 2013). While public relations (PR) managers
were responsible yet reluctant on reporting incidents of web systems in a co-
ordinated way in the past, today’s social media allows for a more direct, fast,
and uncoordinated spread of information by users of affected web systems
and, therefore, reinforces implications of bad news (Shalal-Esa, 2012).
Unlike the protection of physical values, which is an intrinsic part of hu-
man nature, the measures to prevent personal data and, especially, social
capital from unwanted exploitation lag behind the ones that are in place
for safeguarding other types of capital like monetary capital or human cap-
ital. Further complicated by the fact that personal data is non-anonymous,
non-physical and bound to the individuals it relates to, there is currently no
proper mean to compensate affected people once personal data is leaked,
copied or exploited for malicious purposes – it is inappropriate to create
new identities, as it would greatly interfere with recognizability. Individuals
are aware of this problem to some degree (EC, 2011), but they seem to
resigned on that matter, probably due to the fact that they cannot fully
anticipate the consequences the problem entails for their future. Not only
are user data sets especially valuable for advertisement, marketing and
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insurance companies to generate potential leads (Bria, 2012), but also
for criminals following more dubious business models.
In conclusion, personal data including information on social capital has a
particular value that needs to be protected adequately both by individual
persons and by the web systems the data is entrusted to. While this problem
description represents the starting point and the connecting link for the
research and highlights the importance of the matter (Creswell, 2012;
Leedy and Ormrod, 2010), the motivation statement presented in the next
section shows why the central problem is worth addressing.
1.3 Motivation
The motivation to approach the central problem manifests in the positive
developments a potential solution would imply for individuals, web com-
panies and democratically elected governments5. The relevance for them6
becomes apparent, once we have outlined how the problem impacts them:
Individual persons are primarily challenged by the problem in the sense
that their personal data can fall into wrong hands and used for purposes
they do not agree to, like monetization by criminals on black markets (Holt
and Smirnova, 2014; Horacek, 2013). The uncertainty about circulation
and exploitation of leaked personal data makes it difficult for individual
persons to anticipate the aftermaths of data disclosures with respect to
moment, location, type, extent and involved people (EC, 2011; Müller,
5For the sake of brevity we just use the terms company, when referring to an information
technology (IT) organization that provides certain services over the web in exchange
for a compensation, and government, when referring to a government with democratic
attributes.
6These groups have been identified through a stakeholder analysis with results detailed in
Subsection 2.2.2.
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2008). Organizations, which are formed by groups of persons to pur-
sue collective purposes, are secondarily affected by the problem. On the
one hand, there are companies that have created their business models
around potential users. Not only can data disclosures cause a loss of hard-
earned trust in companies and damage the reputation of brands, but also
induce a decline of users and earnings through missing returns on ad-
vertisements or falling stock prices (Dane, 2012; Gangewere, 2013). On
the other hand, there are governments of states or state unions, like the
European Union (EU). They are challenged by the problem because data
disclosures through attacks on web systems increasingly cast doubt on
established legal frameworks and legally enforceable rights of individual
citizens (EC, 2012). While governments are responsible for represent-
ing and protecting their population, a not inconsiderable ratio of citizens,
e.g., 58% of Europeans, does not see alternatives to disclosing personal
data to third parties when they want to use services or obtain products,
regardless of associated risks (EC, 2011; WEF, 2011).
When the thus described impacts of the problem are not approached in
time, the current negative trend of insufficiently taking account of infor-
mation security in the design of web systems and during their runtime
is expected to continue with negative effects rising in severity and pro-
vide further leverage for criminals.
Aiming at inverting these negative impacts, an ideal solution would offer
individual persons control about use and safekeeping of their personal data,
i.e., enabling them to decide whom exactly they want to make their data
available to and detect who is actually accessing their data. Consequently,
such solution would also enable individuals to regain ownership of their
personal data. Relieving web systems from the need to store identity data
they do not own would allow companies for refining their business models
to convince individuals mainly by a useful and unique feature set rather
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than the mere fact that many acquaintances are already using a certain
application, probably due to missing migration options. Reducing the ac-
cumulation characteristic of web systems would therefore make them less
attractive for criminals as they cannot retrieve such large amounts of infor-
mation on social capital anymore. This is also in line with the ambitions
of governments, like the European Commission (EC), to make companies
accountable for dealing with personal data and to urge them to immediately
inform users as well as authorities on incidents of web systems that compro-
mised rights on personal data of their citizens (EC, 2012). Beyond notifying
affected entities after a breach, the EC, for example, strives for enforcing
the principles of “privacy by design” and “privacy by default” in order to
prompt companies to build mechanisms to safeguard personal data into
their products beginning from the earliest stage of development (EC, 2012).
Such ideal is difficult to reach in practice, yet it indicates the direc-
tion for possible endeavors to meet the challenges arising from the
problem and it is therefore the leitmotif for this dissertation, which
is formalized in the following section.
1.4 Purpose
Based on the motivation, we set the purpose of this work in enhancing
security in managing personal data by web systems for the mutual benefit
of individual persons, companies and governments. With this tangible
target, we aim at approaching the central problem stated in Section 1.2,
whilst taking into account the principles of managing personal data estab-
lished in the privacy framework (OECD, 2013) by the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) as well as the vision
of the World Economic Forum (WEF) to value personal data of individu-
als similar to their monetary capital (WEF, 2011). Treating the security
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of personal data as a core idea, protection has to be applied holistically
by web systems at design time and during runtime. While security is a
broad discipline with multiple dimensions, realms and layers, we set the
scope of this dissertation by solely focusing on security-related aspects
of web systems concerning personal data.
To operationalize the purpose, as suggested in (Creswell, 2012), we narrow
it using five hypotheses to be answered by this dissertation:
Hypothesis 1: Modeling. There is an appropriate, interoperable, inter-
pretable and supportive way to model web systems at different abstraction
levels that also puts a strong emphasis on security involving trust and
invocation relationships.
Hypothesis 2: Description and Identification. It is practicable to de-
scribe and identify web systems, applications and services, as a basis for
applying protective measures, by means adequate to describe and identify
other entities like individual persons.
Hypothesis 3: Ownership. There is a way to enable individuals to main-
tain ownership about their personal data, especially personally identifiable
information, and allow controlled access for third parties incl. other users,
web applications and web services.
Hypothesis 4: Delegation. It is feasible to authorize entities, including
individuals as well as web applications and web services, to use web appli-
cations and web services within a defined scope on behalf of other entities
in highly distributed environments.
Hypothesis 5: Protection. There is a way to protect personally identifiable
information against data disclosure without the corresponding individual’s
knowledge or intent, against tampering and (identity) theft, and against
misuse by third parties including users, web applications and web services.
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While hypotheses are suitable for making predictions about expectations
to be verified through quantitative research, research questions allow for
raising issues to be addressed also through qualitative research (Creswell,
2012). A hypothesis deals with the mere possibility of the matter (a question
of what). In contrast, a research question focuses on the exact attainment (a
question of how). As a consequence, we can build a research question upon
a hypothesis. That is, we will implicitly prove the underlying Hypotheses 1
to 5 by answering the following five research questions:
Research Question 1: Modeling. How to model web systems at different
abstraction levels in an appropriate, interoperable, interpretable and sup-
portive way that also puts a strong emphasis on security involving trust
and invocation relationships?
Research Question 2: Description and Identification. How to describe
and identify web systems, applications and services, as a basis for applying
protective measures, by means adequate to describe and identify other
entities like individual persons?
Research Question 3: Ownership. How to enable individuals to maintain
ownership about their personal data, especially personally identifiable
information, and allow controlled access for third parties incl. other users,
web applications and web services?
Research Question 4: Delegation. How to authorize entities, including
individuals as well as web applications and web services, to use web appli-
cations and web services within a defined scope on behalf of other entities
in highly distributed environments?
Research Question 5: Protection. How to protect personally identifiable
information against data disclosure without the corresponding individual’s
knowledge or intent, against tampering and (identity) theft, and against
misuse by third parties including users, web applications and web services?
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To attain answers to above research questions, this dissertation
provides a set of four complementary research contributions.
They are summarized below:
Research Contribution 1: Enhanced Security in Managing Personal
Data. Enhancements to the security of personal data management by web
systems, web applications and web services at design time and during
runtime.
Research Contribution 2: Context-Aware Control. Increased awareness
and control during identity creation, during identity use and in delegation
scenarios.
Research Contribution 3: Tamper-Evidentness. Detection of a) identity
theft, b) forgery of identity data and c) tampering of personally identifiable
information.
Research Contribution 4: Fine-Grained Filtering. Creation, manage-
ment and utilization of customized views on personal data depending on
requesting entities.
These research contributions will assist in achieving the purpose of this work
and, thus, contribute to increase the protection of privacy and to realize the
secure by design vision, as further detailed in Chapter 2. The next section
completes the first chapter by briefly introducing the research contributions
and putting them in context with the other parts of this dissertation.
1.5 Outline
Chapter 1 introduced the subject of this work and, thus, the general domain
our research focuses on. It showed our motivation for dealing with the
central problem of web systems treating security only as an afterthought for
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the amount of personal data they accumulate. Building on the motivation
for solving the central problem, we set the purpose to hold out a tangible
target for approaching the secure management of personal data by web
systems, web applications and web services as a first thought throughout
their entire life cycle. Not only did we operationalize the purpose by
five hypotheses and five associated research questions but also by four
dedicated research contributions. For organizing this dissertation, we
employ renowned works on research methodology, including (Creswell,
2012; Leedy and Ormrod, 2010). We proceed from this point as depicted by
Figure 1.1 and as indicated by the planned course of action in the following.
Chapter 2 clarifies the challenges this work has to meet. It therefore provides
the necessary background and lays the foundations in order to ensure both
an appropriate level of understanding and a systematic discussion within
the dissertation. For analyzing the central problem, we first illustrate it by di-
verse scenarios and then divide it into more manageable units representing
subproblems. Similar to the subproblems, which constitute the central prob-
lem, we present a set of corresponding objectives for achieving the purpose.
Chapter 3 analyzes the suitability of state-of-the-art technologies for solving
the problem. For that reason, we transform the objectives into assess-
ment criteria and verify their degree of fulfillment through the specific
technologies. To reduce the verification effort and be prepared for fu-
ture developments, we establish a categorization of relevant technolo-
gies which share similar characteristics.
Chapter 4 proposes a novel approach to enhance the security in managing
personal data by web systems. In consideration of the analysis results
obtained in Chapter 3, we devise a design that aims at addressing the
challenges discussed in Chapter 2. Using the design we provide our main
Research Contribution 1 in terms of the solution architecture and pro-
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Figure 1.1: Organization of Dissertation
cess. On that basis we introduce three Research Contributions 2 to 4, each
representing a particular component that extends the architecture by com-
plementary facilities for enhanced information security. In order to create
a technological foundation to implement, integrate and verify all research
contributions, we present the proof-of-concept platform, on which we will
rely on and build upon in the remainder of this work.
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Chapters 5 to 7 substantiate the proposed solution by providing further
explanations to Research Contributions 2 to 4. Each chapter describes a com-
ponent encapsulating a research contribution with regard to domain-specific
requirements and related work. For the development and the evaluation of
each component, we take account of requirements as well as assessment
results. Although all three components contribute to enhance security on
their own, they allow for combination and complementation in order to
increase their usefulness through exploiting synergies (cf. Chapter 8).
Chapter 8 evaluates to what extent the entire solution including all research
contributions (Chapters 4 to 7) has achieved the objectives outlined in
Chapter 2. To retrieve plausible evaluation results, we do not only define
criteria to be validated and carefully select an appropriate procedure, but
also consider all proof-of-concept implementations within a prototypical
system that demonstrates the capabilities for enhanced security in managing
personal data. Moreover, we examine how well all research questions have
been attained and how well we innovated beyond the state of the art.
Chapter 9 concludes this dissertation by interpreting the evaluation re-
sults. Not only do we summarize the main research contributions and
review what has been accomplished, but also offer an outlook towards
the direction future work has to go.
Appendix A compiles the logical framework approach (LFA) arti-
facts we considered as necessary for conducting a logical analysis
of the challenges in Chapter 2.
Characteristic for a clear, systematic and scientifically sound procedure, we
catalog relevant terms used in the course of this dissertation in a glossary
on page 283. In support of our argumentation, we furthermore give an
overview of all underlying works in the bibliography on page 289. To distin-
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guish between different levels of quality assured through methods such as
peer review, we divide the bibliography into printed references and online
references. Finally, we provide several type-specific indexes. By covering
Chapters 1 to 9, appendices, glossary and bibliography, these indexes facili-
tate the lookup of acronyms on page 315, figures on page 321, code listings
on page 323, mathematical symbols on page 325, and tables on page 329.
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2Challenges
To enable a systematic investigation and breakdown of the challenges
arising from the problem stated in the Introduction, this chapter begins
with providing fundamental information in Section 2.1. Thinking of a
challenge as a difficult yet stimulating task (Merriam-Webster, 2016b) en-
ables to distinguish two connected elements: a problem and an objective.
While a problem refers to something difficult in the current situation, an
objective refers to a stimulus of achieving the desired state in the future
through addressing the problem. This concept promotes dealing with both
elements individually in two separate yet interdependent sections. Be-
ing a “starting point for the research” and “a unifying thread that runs
throughout all the elements of the research endeavor” (Leedy and Orm-
rod, 2010), Section 2.2 first illustrates the problem by diverse scenarios
and then further details it by classifying related subproblems. As a coun-
terpart to this problem classification, Section 2.3 details the purpose by
classifying necessary objectives. Summarizing the challenges a solution
has to meet, Section 2.4 concludes this chapter.
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Laying the groundwork for a solid discussion and examination of the chal-
lenges, Subsection 2.1.1 describes the research methodology and tools
to approach the problem and 2.1.2 introduces important terms and def-
initions to foster a common understanding.
2.1.1 Research Methodology and Tools
To draw conclusions and answer the research questions presented in Sec-
tion 1.4, we have to provide sufficient evidence (Ellis and Levy, 2009).
Retrieving results as part of a study requires selecting a methodology that is
suited for conducting research in consideration of the problem type (Leedy
and Ormrod, 2010). As we can neither completely oversee nor universally
control nor holistically drive a solution in the problem domain, we regard
the central problem as a complex one, with uncertain future developments
and with diverse stakeholders, who have partially contrary views on the
matter. Responding to this type of problem requires applying a method-
ology that allows for 1) breaking the central problem down into more
manageable subproblems to handle complexity, 2) making use of assump-
tions to deal with uncertainty at least to some degree, and 3) taking the
needs of different stakeholders into account to offer an adequate solution.
Manifested in its direction toward the purpose defined on page 14, the
objective-oriented nature of this work allows for regarding and treating it
as a project. Being a “temporary endeavor undertaken to create a unique
product, service, or result”, we can systematically approach the problem to
achieve the purpose by making use of proven project management method-
ology, i.e., applying knowledge, skills, techniques and tools (PMI, 2009).
While there are diverse approaches for managing projects, like PRINCE2®
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or Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK®) by PMI, we employ
the project cycle management (PCM) in association with the logical frame-
work approach (LFA) as a method for managing the research process. Here,
LFA represents “an analytical tool for objectives-oriented project planning
and management” that assists in facing problems characterized by com-
plexity, uncertainty and conflicting stakeholder interests (NORAD, 1999).
Devised in the 1960’s to support planning, management and evaluation
of projects, LFA has been continuously evolved and is an obligatory part
of EC’s PCM since 1993 (EC, 2004; Miklicˇ, 2008). LFA is predestined for
the domain of this work because it contributes to 1) clarify the purpose,
2) specify key elements, and 3) measure the success of the project (NORAD,
1999). Involving concepts for systematic analysis, sound organization,
weakness identification and informed decision making, LFA defines how
to run projects in a logical way (Miklicˇ, 2008).
LFA, as a research tool, integrates into PCM by supporting four out of five
stages within its cycle of operations, i.e., identification, formulation, imple-
mentation, evaluation and audit (EC, 2004). Even though LFA does not
cover the programming stage in PCM, the elements7 included in this stage
have already been discussed in Chapter 1 through situating this work and
highlighting prevalent shortcomings. In addition to that, they are elabo-
rated further in Chapters 8 and 9 through drawing conclusions from the eval-
uation results that potentially contribute to the subsequent programming
stage. As we consider management and tool support for both the implemen-
tation stage and the audit stage as non-essential for projects at the scale of
this work8, we primarily use LFA for identification, followed by formulation
7The actual strategy development elements are largely shaped by both institutional long-term
visions and scientific standard procedure. They are therefore not fully elaborated in this
dissertation’s scope.
8For example, there is no indispensable need for extensive contracting and progress moni-
toring.
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and, finally, for evaluation. That is, we perform the implementation inde-
pendently yet in the sequence defined by the cycle of operations in PCM.
Employing LFA in three designated stages enables to 1) analyze the existing
situation to recognize potential objectives during identification, 2) plan
the project by setting clear objectives and measurable outcomes during
formulation, and 3) assess the degree of achieving the objectives during
evaluation (EC, 2004). The remainder of this chapter addresses the identi-
fication and formulation, whereas Chapter 8 covers the evaluation stage.
The two main phases of LFA, namely analysis and planning, relate to the
stages of identification and formulation in PCM (EC, 2004). In order to
enable creating a sustainable project design based on the “most direct and
essential causal relationships” identified before, the analysis phase precedes
the planning phase in the cycle of operations as per PCM (NORAD, 1999).
Figure 2.1 depicts the way how we proceed by taking PCM and LFA into
account. We report analysis results obtained by identifying and character-
izing potential major stakeholders and related key problems in Section 2.2,
and discuss derived objectives and an appropriate strategy to achieve them
in Section 2.3. In line with the strategy selection, the latter section also
presents the “documented product of the analytical process”, which we use
as a mean to organize and plan the further course of action (Miklicˇ, 2008).
2.1.2 Terms and Definitions
In order to ensure a proper application of LFA, (EC, 2004) recommends
establishing a common understanding about terminology before proceeding
further. Building on (ITU, 2010; Sakimura, 2013), we therefore define
important terms in the meaning we use them in this work and illustrate
the relations between them in Figure 2.2.
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Figure 2.1: Methodology to Approach the Problem Using PCM and LFA
An entity e ∈ E denotes “something that has separate and distinct exis-
tence” (ITU, 2010), where E is the set of all entities. That is, E includes
different classes of both subjects and objects like persons, devices, accounts,
software applications and services (Barker et al., 2012). It follows from
the foregoing that a user is any entity that makes use of a resource, which
in turn provides something of value (CNSS, 2010). When an entity acts on
another’s behalf, it is referred to as an agent (ITU, 2010). A user agent, like
a web browser, is therefore an entity that acts on behalf of a user for making
use of resources. Particularly with regard to delegation, agents entrusted
with authority, responsibility or a function are known as delegates and en-
trusting entities are called delegators (ITU, 2010). In this sense, trust refers
to the conviction in the “ability and disposition of an entity to act appropri-
ately, within a specified context”, whereas trust can also stand for “reliability
and truth of information” in a more common conception (ITU, 2010).
Although there is no direct way of perceiving an entity (Sakimura, 2013),
attributes A allow for binding information through making statements about
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an entity. With A being the set of all attributes, an attribute a ∈ A can
specify a characteristic of an entity via a type/value statement (ITU, 2010),
e.g., age is 42 or gender is female. An identity i ∈ I represents an entity
within context c ∈ C using a set of context-specific attributes Ac ⊂ A (ITU,
2010), where I is the set of all identities and C is the set of all contexts9.
Determining the variety of attributes assignable to an entity, the context
stands for an “environment with defined boundary conditions” (ITU, 2010).
Identification is about recognizing an entity within context through a set
of attributes, where a particular subset Ai ⊆ Ac is also known as an
identifier (ITU, 2010). Anonymity denotes the state of being unable to
identify a particular entity among other entities (ITU, 2010).
One and the same entity e can have several identities I ⊂ I, e.g., hus-
band, friend or co-worker (Sakimura, 2013). Any such contextual identity
results from a certain self-perception of a (humanoid) entity and is ex-
pressed through a set of attributes (Barker et al., 2012; Sakimura, 2013).
Given that it is virtually impossible to fully represent each entity by one
holistic identity (ITU, 2010), it is also not feasible to completely elimi-
nate issues in recognition. The third-party recognition of an identity may
differ from the self-perception it originated from (Pronin et al., 2004),
e.g., because not all attributes are recognizable, unexpressed attributes
are inferred or the context is regarded diversely.
There are two types of identity assertions: self-asserted identity, which an
entity declares to be its own (ITU, 2010) and third-party asserted identity,
which a trusted authority assigns an entity after successfully confirming all
identity claims made by the entity. For this purpose, there are particular
service providers (SPs) that either manage identities for other entities or
put entities in the position to do so on their own. Such special SPs are
9As a so-called holistic identity, i.e., a complete representation of an entity by all characterizing
attributes, has no basis in practice, we use Ac ⊂ A rather than Ac ⊆ A.
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Figure 2.2: Essential Terms and Relationships
called identity (service) providers (IdPs), whereas a SP is just any entity
that offers a service via web-based means. A relying party (RP) is a SP
that puts confidence in the identity claimed by a requesting entity within
some context (ITU, 2010). Here, identity management (IdM) subsumes
processes and facilities dedicated to identity-related tasks including cre-
ation, assignment, maintenance, termination, verification and assurance
of entity/identity bindings (Dinger and Hartenstein, 2008).
A principal is “an entity whose identity can be authenticated” (ITU, 2010).
Through comparing identity claims with information already verified dur-
ing initial enrollment, the authentication aims at achieving “sufficient
confidence in the binding between the entity and the presented iden-
tity” (ITU, 2010; Sakimura, 2013). Furnishing evidence for a claimed
identity thus allows for successfully authenticating a requesting entity (ITU,
2010). The term credential refers to such evidence. There are three types
of credentials: knowledge-based credentials like passwords, ownership-
based credentials like certificates and inheritance-based ones like finger-
prints (Bertino and Martino, 2007).
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Protection refers to the state of keeping something safe from adverse ef-
fects. With reference to information and information systems, security
or more precisely information security denotes the protection against ad-
verse effects in terms of “unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption,
modification, or destruction in order to provide confidentiality, integrity,
and availability” (CNSS, 2010). The process of granting a principal the
privilege to pass through protective measures taken against entities hav-
ing insufficient permissions is called authorization (Barker et al., 2012).
That is, a privilege is “a right that [. . . ] permits [an] entity to perform
an action” (ITU, 2010). In this regard, access control determines which
principals have what kind of access to which resources based on a set of
rules (Anderson, 2008; ITU, 2010). Distantly related to access control and
put on a more abstract level, privacy is a privilege of individuals to control
what personal data may be accessed by third parties for various purposes
including collection, use and distribution (ITU, 2010).
In specifying the terms privacy and personal data, we fully comply with the
fair information practices OECD established in their privacy framework by
formulating eight basic principles of regulating management of personal
data, including collection and use limitations, data quality and purpose,
security safeguards, openness as well as individual participation and ac-
countability (McCallister et al., 2010; OECD, 2013). As a consequence,
the basic characteristics of the entities described in these guidelines match
those of the stakeholders identified in the remainder of the chapter.
Having defined both the research methodology and the terminology
used in this work, the following section continues with investi-
gating the central problem.
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2.2 Problem Analysis
Identifying causes as well as effects that surround the central problem this
dissertation is dealing with, Subsection 2.2.1 describes today’s handling of
personal data using a set of scenarios, Subsection 2.2.2 characterizes major
stakeholders involved in these scenarios, and, finally, Subsection 2.2.3
extracts and classifies prevalent problems impacting these stakeholders.
2.2.1 Scenarios
By employing following scenarios, we aim for illustrating the man-
agement of personal data that we considered as characteristic in
today’s landscape of web systems and, furthermore, for hinting at
negative aspects, e.g., shortcomings, risks and limitations, which
possibly arise from the situation described.
Scenario 2.1: Online Shopping. As her old camera got irreparably dam-
aged by water during the last vacation, Alice wants to buy a new product
for her upcoming vacation. She therefore invested a significant amount of
time to inform herself and compare suitable products with each other. After
hours of searching, Alice finally found a candidate matching her expecta-
tions. Taking advantage of an online price comparison portal, she hopes
to discover an online shop that offers the desired product for a reasonable
price. Alice actually makes an attractive find, yet it is a recently launched
online shop she never used before. As part of the deal of buying the product,
she has to provide some of her personal data, e.g., phone number, address
and banking account data, to this SP for reasons not completely clear to
her at the moment. Here, Alice can choose between registering by entering
her data manually or relying on one of today’s popular social logon options
offered by a major social platform she signed up some time ago.
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While she knows about the benefits of not having to enter her data over
and over again and just rely on her usual password, she is also aware of
the fact that she often had to complement thus provided data by additional
details about her in order to fully utilize the service. Alice also consid-
ers that such shares of personal data, e.g., her favorite delivery address,
are specific to particular services and cannot be transferred back to the
provider of her preferred social logon option because it only supports a
self-contained set of attributes to describe her identity. Moreover, Alice is
troubled about what she read on tracking, analysis and exploitation of site
visits and interactions among online users by some IdPs. So, she decides
to go without social logon and sign-up manually yet in knowledge of the
likely limited possibilities of exchanging, reusing and managing personal
data she provides the particular service with.
Scenario 2.2: Password Trouble. In addition to completing the form
presented by the SP with her personal data, Alice also needs to create a
password as part of the registration process of the online shop. Here, she
remembers the broad media coverage on security leaks and the large num-
ber of requests she received from diverse SPs in the last couple of months
asking for updating her passwords. Alice recollects the time-consuming,
repetitive effort to change the passwords of user accounts she maintained
at potentially affected SPs. She had to log in with her old password, create
a new one, confirm it by e-mail, and verify that the password change was
successful. In doing so, Alice was confronted with miscellaneous user in-
terfaces for managing certain functions of the underlying access control
facilities. At some point in time, she lost track of whether she has really
updated all passwords or missed some of them. Alice knows that even old
passwords in the wrong hands might do harm because back then she was
too sluggish to create a unique password per SP.
Recalling her last visit in person at the bank to put something in her safety
deposit locker, she noticed the obvious security measures—like cameras,
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guards and the bank vault—taken to protect her financial capital and other
valuable objects. Imagining the hypothetical event of a bank robbery or a
bankrupt, Alice feels confident that she could count on her insurance or
the deposit protection funds established by the government.
Sensing that both attacks and successful breaches on web systems are
increasing in frequency and severity, Alice wonders what measures are
put in place by SPs, like the online shop or the IdPs offering the social
logon option, and by governments in order to protect her personal data.
While she received announcements that some services offer an improved
protection, Alice doubts these promises as she can hardly find evidences,
solid assurances or evaluation results.
Scenario 2.3: Holiday Replacement. For her upcoming vacation Alice
needs to name a holiday replacement at work, which represents her busi-
ness interests in her absence. She authorizes her co-worker Casey to act
on her behalf during the vacation. They agreed on the scope of Casey’s
new function and tasks in an extensive conversation. Being her holiday
replacement, Casey has to access some web applications Alice is regularly
using in her work routine. Even though she does not want Casey to know
the passwords she is using to authenticate herself to those web applications,
Alice does not see another option as she is the only one who can make
certain transactions. The thus acquired access to her user accounts let
Alice feel uncomfortable because they also contain personal data, like her
private phone number, which would be disclosed to Casey. While Alice
could remove or alter such attributes describing her identity and re-entering
them after her vacation, she shies away from this effort. When returning
to work, she will change her passwords and verify that her personal data
was not modified by mistake or on purpose, since she knows Casey as a
guy who occasionally makes some bad jokes at other people’s expense.
From the scenarios, we extract stakeholders in the following subsection.
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2.2.2 Stakeholders
Being the first artifact of the analysis phase in LFA, we summarize be-
low the stakeholder matrix shown in Table A.1 of Appendix A. As stake-
holders are entities that have a stake in the outcome of a project (Miklicˇ,
2008), their analysis is of particular importance for the success of this
work. Independently yet in line with related work10, e.g., (WEF, 2011)
and (Bria, 2012), we identified three groups of stakeholders, namely in-
dividual persons (citizens, people), companies (corporation, firms, pri-
vate sector), and governments (agencies, public sector, regulators). While
the main stakeholder groups have already been broached as part of the
motivation in Section 1.3, this subsection details their characterization,
their concerns in the context of the central problem and their motiva-
tion for improving the current situation.
Individual Persons
Like protagonist Alice, we became acquainted with during above scenar-
ios, individual persons belong to those human entities that employ web
systems for reaching their personal short-term objectives, like assistance
for shopping or work activities. They therefore consume and produce
various types of content in a customized way. A subset of these so-called
web users are users of online social networks, who do not only publish
and manage their user-generated contents with functions provided by
OSN services, but who also want to stay informed by keeping themselves
up-to-date about activities of other users.
Individual persons critically regard the sphere of influence of large web
companies and are concerned about protection of their privacy especially
due to frequent news coverage on data disclosures (WEF, 2011). There are
10Stakeholders mentioned by related work are enclosed in parentheses.
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several issues with regard to personal data management that bother individ-
ual persons. Not only do these issues include the unspecific appropriation,
unclear ownership, and less transparent exploitation of personal data by
third parties (Halpin, 2014; Jahid et al., 2012), but also the constrained
options of choosing personal data operators and the restricted means of ex-
tending, managing and maintaining quality (like validity and consistency)
of personal data beyond application-specific limits (Dinger and Hartenstein,
2008). It is difficult for individual persons to maintain control over access
and use of their personal data, to exchange and migrate data across bound-
aries of SPs, and to estimate risks and aftermaths of data disclosures with
respect to moment, location, type, extent and involved people (EC, 2011;
Müller, 2008). Individual persons are aware that disclosure of personal data
to unwanted parties means that it is possibly disclosed forever without hav-
ing any proper mean of compensation in place. So, they fear that personal
data can fall into wrong hands and is used for purposes they do not agree
to, like impersonating the real identity owners or monetization by criminals
on black markets (Holt and Smirnova, 2014; Horacek, 2013). The very
risks associated to such incidents force individual persons to questionable
actions, yet without exact knowledge about security measures companies
integrated into web systems to keep personal data safe. This results in
syndromes of individual persons such as password fatigue and following fre-
quent calls for global password resets evoked by incident reports (Florêncio
and Herley, 2007; WEF, 2011), which is rather a degeneration into fighting
symptoms than an attempt to systematically address the actual problem.
These issues conflict with the endeavors of individual persons to have
an open, free and customizable user experience when surfing the web,
where they are enabled to maintain ownership and control about use
and safekeeping of their personal data.
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Companies
By providing particular services to individual persons and other organi-
zations through web systems, companies seek for some kind of return on
their investment, e.g., revenues from advertisements (Halpin, 2014). Here,
users take a central role in the business strategy of many companies (cf.
online shopping and holiday replacement scenarios). Aiming for increasing
the return, companies want to maintain the current number of active users
and attract new ones. They therefore invest by continuously adding more
and more functions to web systems. Moreover, some companies also benefit
from acquiring information about certain user characteristics, particular
with regard to personal data, and making thus acquired information accessi-
ble to third-party businesses in return for payment (Bria, 2012; Jahid et al.,
2012). That is, such businesses cooperate with companies, like OSN service
providers, in order to gain access to particular aspects of personal data
which is valuable to them, e.g., for creating appealing context-sensitive
advertisements that are customized to individual persons (Halpin, 2014).
The central problem affects companies in several regards. Firstly, with
web systems getting more and more complex, they become harder to
maintain and evolve for developers. Among other things, this bears the
risk of taking only insufficiently account of security during development
and, thus, introducing security weak spots by mistake, which increases
the vulnerability of web systems for attacks that potentially target the
personal data of their users (cf. password trouble scenario). Secondly,
conducting forensic analysis after security breaches and fixing discovered
security issues in a timely and permanent manner is consequently business
critical for all involved parties, yet the costs incurred put additional weight
upon the balance of affected companies (Gangewere, 2013; Riddell, 2011).
Thirdly, companies are concerned about risks associated to a decline in
the number of users, with effects on core businesses as well as partners,
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which are responsible for further exploitation or for related tasks, like
storage or marketing. They know that today’s users are put in the position
to vociferate their grievances by swiftly and globally spreading news on
incidents, breaches and data disclosures, which are recognizable to them.
Victims do not have to await official statements by involved companies, but
they can utilize social media for word of mouth information exchange. In
this regard companies also fear that offering functions to ease migration
and exchange with competing SPs could result in a drain of users and,
therefore, a reduction of social capital and possible revenues.
These issues conflict with the endeavors of companies to get an advan-
tage over competitors by optimizing diverse parameters such as grow-
ing the number of active users, reducing costs, accelerating the devel-
opment process with respect to maintenance and evolution of web sys-
tems, or obtaining and retaining access to high quality, up-to-date per-
sonal data of users with minimal effort. Lowering the opportunities for
security breaches by design would relieve companies from higher invest-
ments in damage control and enable users to regain trust in the man-
agement of personal data by web systems.
Governments
Democratically elected governments are political organizations which ex-
ercise control and make decisions for those individual persons, called
citizens, who usually occupy and legally belong to specific territories, called
states, state federations, or political unions of states, as in case of the
EU (Merriam-Webster, 2015). Governments are appointed to represent,
protect and fulfill interests of their citizens.
In doing so, governments are concerned about the fact that data disclo-
sures through attacks on web systems increasingly clash with mandated
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responsibilities to protect personal data of citizens (cf. password trouble
scenario) (EC, 2012). While citizens often do not see any alternative
to sharing their personal data with third parties (cf. online shopping sce-
nario) before they are enabled to employ certain services provided by
companies (EC, 2011; Halpin, 2014), governments want to assure civil
rights and make companies accountable for managing personal data of
citizens. Governments are furthermore affected by the central problem
as the prosecution of cybercriminals, which are suspected of attacks on
web systems, is a significant administrative burden as well as an expen-
sive, difficult and time-consuming matter, which is also owing to frag-
mented legal environments with divergent and inconsistent protection
rules across countries (EC, 2012; WEF, 2011).
In line with efforts to make access, transfer and control over personal data
general accepted fundamental citizens’ rights, including the “right to be for-
gotten”, governments attempt to force the principles of “privacy by design”
and “privacy by default”. They hereby intend to urge companies for integrat-
ing mechanisms to safeguard personal data into their products beginning
from the earliest stage of development (EC, 2012). Not only would imple-
menting such initiatives, in the context of the secure by design vision, assist
in ensuring individual persons that web systems, web applications and web
services provided by companies act responsibly towards managing and pro-
tecting personal data, but also contribute to reduce costs and administrative
burden for organizations, including both companies and governments.
After the main stakeholders have been described, the following subsection
continues with discussing prevalent problems that impact them.
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2.2.3 Prevalent Problems Impacting Stakeholders
In line with the logical framework approach, we extracted several negative
aspects from the scenarios and the affected stakeholders. Even though it
does not lay claim for being complete, we consider the selection of negative
aspects characteristic for describing the problem domain. Relating these
problems with each other resulted in a so-called problem tree. It represents
the current negative situation exemplified by Scenarios 2.1 to 2.3 as a set
of cause-effect relationships (EC, 2004). While Figure A.1 in Appendix A
illustrates this second LFA artifact completely, we report on the findings of
the associated analysis individually in the remainder of this subsection.
There are various problem causes that pile up to the central problem,
which we differentiate in first, second etc. level causes. Level one causes
primarily induce the central problem, whereas secondary problem causes
provoke them and so on. Reusing this structure, we continue with listing
the problem effects we identified as negative consequences of the central
problem. In order to provide a bigger picture of the impact of the central
problem, we once again divided the effects into primary, secondary etc.
ones. Each problem cause and each problem effect represents a problem
on its own. Figure 2.3 schematically depicts this structure as an overview,
which we also rely on in the following discussion.
Causes of the Central Problem
To detail causes and root causes of the central problem, we traverse them
beginning at the first level and proceeding in depth-first order:
Problem Cause 1: Security of Web Systems Treated as Afterthought.
From the password trouble scenario, it is apparent that a high number
of incidents entail serious consequences through data disclosures, which
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especially impedes individual persons as stakeholders. This is furthermore
an indication that companies do not treat security of personal data managed
by web systems, including involved web applications and web services, with
the same care as other parts of the business (Horacek, 2013; Symantec,
2014; Verizon, 2014), like acquiring new users through swiftly releasing
new features. Figure 2.4 illustrates this primary problem cause and its
root cause as a part of the problem tree, where other direct causes and the
central problem are included to provide context. Here, the lack of means
for modeling secure web systems induces Problem Cause 1, as described
next.
Problem Cause 1.1: Lack of Means for Modeling Secure Web Systems.
Similar to the incomplete means offered to users for controlling and protect-
ing their personal data (cf. online shopping and password trouble scenarios),
there is also a deficit in proper modeling approaches (Papazoglou et al.,
2007). Without adequate support for modeling security aspects, developers
will continue to pay only minor attention to shield sensible parts of web
systems, e.g., web applications and web services, from criminal activities.
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Such modeling approaches would allow software developers employed by
companies for designing, evolving and maintaining web systems that take
security as a key element into account (Wild and Gaedke, 2014).
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Problem Cause 2: Accumulation of Personal Data by Third Parties.
From the online shopping and password trouble scenarios, it follows that
in addition to an insufficient consideration of security in the design and
during runtime of web systems also the aggregation of personal user data
by third parties is another direct cause of the central problem. This is due
to the fact that such aggregation of personal data creates an unnecessarily
lucrative target for attacks, which promises convincing risk-reward-ratio for
cybercriminals (Horacek, 2013). Figure 2.5 illustrates this primary problem
cause and its root causes as a part of the problem tree, where other direct
causes and the central problem are included as context information. Here,
the customer and data lock-in induces Problem Cause 2, as detailed in the
following.
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Problem Cause 2.1: Customer and Data Lock-in. In order to foster long-
term customer retention, companies make it difficult for individual persons
to switch to web systems of competitors (Halpin, 2014). Companies do this
by refusing to equip products with necessary migration options. Further-
more, companies invisibly increase the barriers for migration by making
users dependent on specific characteristics of provided services (Bria, 2012),
e.g., offering many OSN members to communicate with or expressive user
profiles for self-presentation. Several factors withhold users from migrating
manually on their own, including the potential effort and the loss of entered
data (Yeung et al., 2009). With the thus gained access to an everlasting
source of up-to-date information from and about users, companies aim
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Figure 2.5: Problem Cause 2 and Associated Root Causes
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at exploitation of their users’ social capital for self-serving purposes, like
revenues through advertisements (Bielenberg et al., 2012; Jahid et al.,
2012). The unclear ownership of personal data acquired by third parties
makes this matter even more severe (WEF, 2011), as highlighted in the
online shopping scenario. The restricted scope of identity data, no universal
identification, linkage and discovery of identities, and the lack of reusability,
openness and exchangeability of UGCs furthermore provoke this secondary
problem cause, as outlined next.
Problem Cause 2.1.1: Restricted Scope of Identity Data. Despite the
advantages of today’s heterogeneous landscape of web systems, this variety
also yielded diverse ways of managing user data (Jordan et al., 2003).
Intending to enable user identification and fast data processing by allowing
users for attaching data, e.g., contact details, to their identities, companies
introduced a multitude of separate identity management systems (IdMSs)
over the last decades. Without a wide-ranging, fully satisfying and manda-
tory SSO solution in place, companies designed such systems primarily
to fulfill particular needs of the web applications and web services they
provide. For example, it would be pointless from the perspective of an
online camera shop to allow users for stating which cars they drive as
part of their identity data, when users are solely employing the web ap-
plication for buying camera equipment. While focusing on a certain field
of application is both justified and beneficial from the company’s point
of view, users are left with multiple application-specific identities. Such
application-specific identities are represented by sets of attributes that are
restricted to particular domains. However, this prevents users from em-
ploying identities for web systems different to the originally intended ones
(cf. online shopping scenario) (Bria, 2012). In addition to identities per se,
corresponding management functions are also restricted to domain- and
application-specific limits.
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Problem Cause 2.1.2: No Universal Identification, Linkage and Dis-
covery of Identities. With diverse systems for IdM in use, users have to
rely on several identities for authentication, which narrows identifications,
linkage and discovery to particular application fields (cf. online shopping
scenario) (Halpin, 2014). For example, it is difficult to detect by means
of a known identity whether an individual person, like Alice, is member
of two competing OSNs, which rely on different IdMS. Consequently, also
interlinking identities across fields of application is problematic. This also
interferes with the idea of having a social web with universal identification
and discovery.
Problem Cause 2.1.3: Lack of Reusability, Openness and Exchangeabil-
ity of UGCs. Not only is the customer lock-in issue intensified by identity
usage restrictions but also by missing options for reusing and exchanging
UGC in an open way (Bria, 2012). While web systems, like a video sharing
website, offer facilities for comfortably adding UGCs, like self-made video
clips, they are often sparing with adequate functions for exporting once
provided contents in order to prevent drain of social capital to competing
product offerings. This confinement raises questions and expectations by
users about service reliability and use of personal data not only in the
possible event of a hostile takeover by a competitor.
Problem Cause 3: Incomplete Control and Protection of Personal Data.
From the online shopping and holiday replacement scenarios emerges another
cause of the central problem in terms of the lack of clarity about the
protection of personal data. Accompanied by the non-transparency to
individual persons how their personal data is safeguarded against disclosure,
tampering and unintended use, when managed by third parties (Bria, 2012),
there is also an incomplete set of means in their hands which hinders users
to self-manage access, modification and delegated use of personal data by
other. This is largely due to the fact that today’s companies adopted a silo-
centric approach of managing personal data with characteristics specific to
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particular SPs (Halpin, 2014). Figure 2.6 illustrates this primary problem
cause and its root causes as a part of the problem tree, where Problem
Causes 1 and 2 and the central problem are included to provide context.
Here, the insufficient control of identity based on individual context, the risk
of identity theft and tampering of personal data, and the incomplete range
and granularity of access control induce Problem Cause 3, as explained in
the following.
Problem Cause 3.1: Insufficient Control of Identity Based on Individ-
ual Context. Today’s prevalent application-specific character of identities
restricts a broader use and control by individual persons outside the field
of application specified by SPs (cf. 2.1.1) (Halpin, 2014). While an identity
represents an entity within context, those contexts are usually not defined
by the real identity owners but by service providers. Not only does this pre-
vent identity owners from extensively controlling read/write access to their
identities including associated attributes sets as part of their personal data
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(cf. holiday replacement scenario), but it also impedes further exploitation
in other application fields on the identity owners’ own expectations (Bria,
2012). The inadequate consideration of individual user conditions further-
more provokes this secondary problem cause, as described next.
Problem Cause 3.1.1: Inadequate Consideration of Individual User
Conditions. Individual persons have different expectations towards pri-
vacy and protection of personal data (WEF, 2011), e.g., whether to share
their date of birth, phone number or email address. Nevertheless, they
employ similar web systems for different purposes. They therefore rely on
diverse devices and web browsers, and use them in various environments,
like at work or at home. When issuing, managing and using identities,
such individual conditions and preferences are, however, only insufficiently
considered and, thus, intensify Problem Cause 3.1. Creating multiple iden-
tities allows for partially resolving this issue, yet at the expense of burden
identity owners with having to maintain redundant identity attributes and
associated credentials (WEF, 2011).
Problem Cause 3.1.2: Risk of Improper Use of Identity Data in Delega-
tion Scenarios. In some scenarios, like holiday replacement, it is necessary
that an entity acts on another’s behalf (Wild et al., 2015). To do so, the
so-called delegator provides the delegate with certain privileges. These
might include access to personal data, especially identity data, of the dele-
gator, e.g., allowing the delegate for replying to messages on the delegator’s
behalf while employing her profile-bound business contact list. Although
accessing and utilizing the delegator’s identity data by a delegate might
be less problematic in trustworthy environments and relationships, e.g., a
familiar context, it bears risks towards an exploitation of the delegator’s
personal data beyond the original intention (cf. Problem Cause 3.1). That
is, delegates can misuse the delegator’s identity and data for inappropriate
purposes, e.g., ordering goods in the name of the delegator or impersonat-
ing the delegator in business or private arrangements. The missing control
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of delegation conditions by delegators furthermore induces this tertiary
problem cause, as outlined below.
Problem Cause 3.1.2.1: Missing Control of Delegation Conditions by
Delegators. In contrast to Problem Cause 3.2, which deals with tampering
and identity theft certainly without prior authorization by identity owners,
Problem Cause 3.1.2 is effected by a too informal authorization through
the delegator (cf. holiday replacement scenario). That is, delegators are not
put in the position to clearly specify the scope of a delegation in terms of
limitations, with SPs having to obey these limitations to avoid conflicting
with the delegator’s intention.
Problem Cause 3.2: Risk of Identity Theft and Tampering of Personal
Data. It is apparent that individual persons count on today’s web systems
for properly managing and protecting the different types of personal data
they entrusted them with. Even though users hand over more and more
personal data to third parties, threat reports indicate that companies can-
not keep pace with this development without jeopardizing high quality
standards, particular with regard to security (WEF, 2011). Such transfer of
responsibility and credit of trust by individual persons to companies bear
risks towards management of personal data by web systems different to
what users have expected. Consequences include unwanted data disclo-
sure (cf. Problem Cause 3.3) as well as tampering of personal data and
even identity theft (WEF, 2011). Here, risks are not limited to external
aggressors, but also involve insiders that work for companies. The lack of
means to detect identity theft and manipulation furthermore effects this
secondary problem cause, as explained in the following.
Problem Cause 3.2.1: Lack of Means to Detect Identity Theft and Ma-
nipulation. Aside from missing means to control the conditions of dele-
gations (cf. Problem Cause 3.1.2.1 and the holiday replacement scenario),
there is another shortage of measures affecting the protection of personal
data also in non-delegation scenarios (WEF, 2011). Without extensive
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measures enabling identity owners to protect their data against tampering
and even identity theft, this increases the risk that attacks remain undis-
covered by both identity owners and SPs regardless of whether malicious
actions happened temporarily or permanently. Temporal attacks carry a
special risk as they allow aggressors for tampering identity data, employing
manipulated data for their purposes and disguising the tampering from
later exposure by rolling changes back.
Problem Cause 3.3: Incomplete Range and Granularity of Access Con-
trol. There is a high diversity of access control facilities, which companies
employ in their products. Different web systems provide users with different
measures, which again vary in scope and granularity of controlled access (cf.
password trouble scenario). As a consequence, both the inconsistency and
the incompleteness of access control measures hampers users from properly
protecting their personal data (Bria, 2012). Related to Problem Cause 3.2,
a lack of holistically controlling access to personal data, including PII, on
a fine-grained basis negatively contributes to the incomplete control and
protection of personal data (cf. Problem Cause 3). Moreover, the limitation
of access control facilities to specific SPs induces this secondary problem
cause, as described below.
Problem Cause 3.3.1: Limitation of Access Control Facilities to Specific
SPs. Completing the picture of a deficit of means to fully safeguard the
identity owner’s interests against various attacks (cf. Problem Cause 3.1.2.1
and Problem Cause 3.2.1), the range and granularity of today’s prevailing
access control strongly depends on specific SPs. Such diversity in access
control facilities hampers identity owners in holistically protecting the
variety of their data against acquisition by unwanted third parties (cf.
Problem Cause 3.3). As companies integrate different types of access control
in their web systems, which again offer different levels of granularity in
protection, the restrictions defined by users are consequently only effective
for users employing the particular application the access is controlled for.
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Staff maintaining the applications, like administrators, are usually left out
in this consideration11. Users, who want to migrate their personal data to
another SPs, are further impaired as specified access control settings are
often unavailable for migration (cf. Problem Cause 2.1).
Having classified the causes of the central problem at different levels, we
proceed with its primary and secondary effects.
Effects of the Central Problem
To detail the effects and aftereffects of the central problem, we traverse
them starting with the first level and continuing in depth-first order.
Problem Effect 1: Rise in Successful Attacks on Web Systems. Various
threat reports show that the number of attacks on web systems is increasing
with negative impacts on both companies and individual persons through
breaches and disclosures of personal data (Horacek, 2013; Symantec, 2014;
Verizon, 2014). Figure 2.7 illustrates this direct effect of the central problem
and its aftereffects as a part of the problem tree, where other primary
problem effects and the central problem are included to provide context.
Caused by too weak security for too much personal data entrusted by too
many users to too few SPs, Problem Effect 1 secondarily provokes the risk of
declining reputation, revenues and trust in web systems, the monetization
of personal data by criminals, and the uncertainty about circulation and
exploitation of personal data, as described in the following.
Problem Effect 1.1: Risk of Declining Reputation, Revenues and Trust
in Web Systems. An increase of successful attacks on web systems (cf.
Problem Effect 1) entails serious risks for affected companies. They have to
fear damages in brand reputation, revenues and trust of users in provided
services (Dane, 2012). Companies would have to cope with a fading user
11Unless the identity owner having the only key applies encryption.
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base as well as declining revenues, falling stock prices and lower valua-
tions (Gangewere, 2013). This bears the potential of endangering business
models and, consequently, the very existence of involved companies.
Problem Effect 1.2: Monetization of Personal Data by Criminals. Apart
from negative impacts on companies, individual persons are also hit hard
through attacks on web systems that resulted in data disclosure (Horacek,
2013). Aggressors aim for monetizing stolen personal data of users on spe-
cialized black markets (Halpin, 2014; Holt and Smirnova, 2014). Through
the uncertainty about circulation and exploitation of personal data as an as-
sociated consequence (cf. Problem Effect 1.3), this problem has an adverse
impact on affected individual persons.
Problem Effect 1.3: Uncertainty about Circulation and Exploitation of
Personal Data. Data disclosures through severe attacks on web systems
worry individual persons in terms of the risks resulting from stolen and
resold personal data (Holt and Smirnova, 2014; Jahid et al., 2012). Those
concerns are especially fed by the unpredictability when which parts of
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Figure 2.7: Problem Effect 1 and Associated Aftereffects
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stolen or illicitly retrieved personal data will be circulated and exploited by
whom to what extent and in which context (WEF, 2011). Moreover, the
reluctance of companies to release information on incidents directly to the
public further complicates that matter through missing transparency (Dane,
2012). This problem additionally increases the pressure to reactively update
credentials, as explained next.
Problem Effect 1.3.1: Pressure to Reactively Update Credentials. In
consequence of the uncertainty surrounding use and circulation of per-
sonal data (cf. Problem Effect 1.3), individual persons are asked by SPs for
regularly controlling access and protection of their data, e.g., keep creden-
tials up-to-date (WEF, 2011). While this can be considered as beneficial
for maintaining security, users obey such recommendations without exact
knowledge whether protective measures are really effective against aggres-
sors. Fighting symptoms rather than tackling underlying challenges does
not only shift the problem away from companies towards individual persons,
but also creates problematic side effects, like password-fatigue (Florêncio
and Herley, 2007). The fact that once stolen personal data is potentially
disclosed forever aggravates this situation further.
Problem Effect 2: Incomplete Control of Personal Data Across Web
Systems. As different web systems employ different measures for IdM and
for protection to a varying degree of extent and quality, it is difficult for
users, specifically identity owners, to holistically control their personal data
without gaining profound knowledge in confidently handling such variety
of measures. That is, web systems require that individual persons quickly
familiarize themselves with specific measures in order to enable them to
express what they want in terms of identity attribute editing, access control,
and delegation of usage rights. Missing options to reuse personal data
and associated protection preferences throughout applications represent
an inherent part of this problem effect. As individual persons cannot keep
up with redundantly maintaining their personal data at multiple SPs that
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employ proprietary facilities for IdM and associated separate data silos, it
becomes also difficult for companies to rely on accessing correct, consistent,
coherent, and up-to-date personal data. Figure 2.8 show this problem
effect as a part of the problem tree, where Problem Effect 1 and the central
problem are included as context information. Here, the lack of privacy is
an aftereffect of this problem, as outlined next.
Problem Effect 2.1: Lack of Privacy. Not taking sufficient account of
treating privacy as a significant design principle, of making privacy a default
for managing personal data, and of providing means for controlling access
to personal data throughout web systems causes a lack of privacy with
implications for all involved stakeholders (Bria, 2012).
Problem Effect 3: No Privacy by Default. Despite the presence of diverse
privacy initiatives, like the proposal for reforming the data protection
rules (EC, 2012), there is no all-encompassing default setting currently
implemented by web systems, including involved web applications and
web services, that would comprehensively ensure the privacy of individual
persons. Such idealistic privacy by default setting for disclosing as few
personal data to third parties as possible, however, interferes with the
business models many companies have in use today. As a consequence,
companies are reluctant in offering a default privacy setting to users (Jahid
et al., 2012). Provoked by the central problem, this effect also contributes
to the lack of privacy (cf. Problem Effect 2.1), as shown in Figure 2.8.
Problem Effect 4: No Privacy by Design. With security of web systems
being inadequate for the extent of accumulated personal data (Bria, 2012),
not only the condition of privacy by default is difficult to accomplish, but
also the idealistic privacy by design. The latter is another initiative aiming
for more privacy (EC, 2012). However, unless protective measures are
considered sufficiently, how can privacy be considered by design? That
is, only with adequate protective measures in place, it is manageable to
consider privacy as an integral part of the design of web systems. Being a
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negative impact of the central problem, this issue further adds to the lack
of privacy (cf. Problem Effect 2.1), as depicted in Figure 2.8.
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Figure 2.8: Problem Effects 2 to 4 and Associated Aftereffect
Now that the problems predominant in the context of the central
problem are analyzed, we continue with transforming them into
objectives in the next section.
2.3 Objectives
According to LFA, we transformed the negative statements that describe
the problem domain into a positive reverse image by involving rewording,
revision and consolidation (Miklicˇ, 2008). Converting the problems classi-
fied in the previous subsection into desirable yet realistic and attainable
achievements led up to an objective tree. Contrary to the problem tree, the
objective tree represents the desired future situation as a set of means-ends
relationships, where identified problems have been addressed success-
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fully (EC, 2004). Figure A.2 in Appendix A illustrates this third LFA artifact
completely, whereas Figure A.3 depicts the objective tree, in which certain
closely related objectives have been consolidated for the sake of clarity.
In the consolidated version of this objective tree, we summarize all means
necessary to achieve the purpose in three tangible first level objectives and
five associated second level objectives. While the term results refers to these
first level objectives, the term activities represents the second level objec-
tives. Aiming for reversing effects and aftereffects of the central problem
altogether, we also outline the consolidated overall objective we want to
contribute to, yet in the knowledge that its achievement does not depend
on the success of this project alone. Figure 2.9 shows the transformation
of problems into objectives from a terminological point of view.
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Figure 2.9: Transformation of Problems into Objectives
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The remainder of this section reports on the findings of the objective analysis
in greater detail, starting with results in Subsection 2.3.1, followed by
activities in 2.3.2 and the overall objective in 2.3.3.
2.3.1 Results
To identify the results to be delivered for attaining the purpose, we de-
scribe the objectives we obtained by transforming the primary causes of
the central problem in the following. The description of each result fo-
cuses on what is to be done and deliberately postpones details on the
actual implementation to later chapters.
Result 1: Improved Modeling of Security Aspects for Web Systems. To
address the problem that the security of web systems is treated as an
afterthought (cf. Problem Cause 1), we have to enable companies for taking
greater account of security in the engineering of web systems, including
involved web applications and web services. This necessitates dealing with
the associated secondary problem cause by undertaking following activity:
• Activity 1.1: Extend Means for Modeling Secure Web Systems
Result 2: Reduced Need for Accumulation of Personal Data by Third
Parties. To address the problem of a hardly regulated accumulation of
personal data by third parties (cf. Problem Cause 2), we must reduce the
necessitation for companies to aggregate larger amounts of individual
persons’ data as part of their business model. This requires approaching the
corresponding secondary problem cause by running the following activity:
• Activity 2.1: Offer Alternative to Customer Lock-in
Result 3: Extended Means for Control and Protection of Personal Data.
To address the problem of an incomplete control and protection of personal
data (cf. Problem Cause 3), we need to provide individual persons with
appropriate safeguard measures for increasing control and protection of
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their personal data. This involves addressing all relevant secondary problem
causes by implementing the following activities:
• Activity 3.1: Improve Control of Identity Based on Individual Context
• Activity 3.2: Mitigate Risk of Identity Theft and Tampering of Personal
Data
• Activity 3.3: Increase Range and Granularity of Access Control
Having explained the three results necessary to achieve the pur-
pose, the next subsection proceeds with listing the activities to
be carried out to produce them.
2.3.2 Activities
To tell which activities are needed to deliver the identified results, we
convert the secondary causes of the central problem into the following
five consolidated activities. Similar to the description of the results, we
focus on outlining the content of each objective but leave information on
the actual execution of the activities for later chapters.
Activity 1.1: Extend Means for Modeling Secure Web Systems. To de-
liver Result 1 by removing the lack of means for modeling secure web
systems (cf. Problem Cause 1.1), we have to increase the support for devel-
opers to engineer web systems, including involved web applications and
web services, that take particular account of security-related aspects.
Activity 2.1: Offer Alternative to Customer Lock-in. To create Result 2
by addressing the customer and data lock-in issue (cf. Problem Cause 2.1),
we must provide companies with a suitable alternative to this widely ap-
plied procedure. Such alternative must not interfere with current business
models of fostering customer retention. In doing so, this activity implicitly
enables individual persons to regain ownership of their personal data. Car-
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rying out this activity requires creating a positive reverse image to Figure 2.5
by a) increasing descriptiveness of identity attributes beyond the scope of
individual web systems, b) improving identification, linkage and discovery
of identities so that individual persons can use them across specific applica-
tion fields defined by SPs, and c) enabling individual persons to employ
their user-generated content in other usage scenarios through increasing
the reusability, openness and exchangeability of UGC. Figure 2.10 shows
such positive reverse image as a subtree of Result 2 within the objective
tree, where the proposed measures to tackle Problem Causes 2.1.1 to 2.1.3
are directly subordinated activities of Activity 2.1 and the purpose as well
as Results 1 and 3 are included as context.
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Activity 3.1: Improve Control of Identity Based on Individual Context.
For contributing to produce Result 3 by approaching today’s insufficient
control of identity based on individual context (cf. Problem Cause 3.1),
we are committed to increase the contextual scope of action for individual
persons in terms of their identities. Undertaking this activity necessitates
creating a positive reverse image to the left subtree in Figure 2.6 by a) en-
hancing consideration of individual conditions of users by web applications
and, thus, enable an improved experience that is more custom-tailored
to individual preferences of users, b) alleviating risks of improperly using
personal data, especially with regard to PII, in delegation scenarios, and c)
providing delegators with more control about the conditions of delegations
in order to enable them to clearly specify the scope in which a delegate is
allowed to act on the delegator’s behalf. Figure 2.10 shows such positive
reverse image as the left subtree of Result 3 within the objective tree, where
the proposed measures to tackle Problem Causes 3.1.1, 3.1.2 and 3.1.2.1
are directly subordinated activities of Activity 3.1 and the purpose as well
as Results 1 and 2 are included as context.
Activity 3.2: Mitigate Risk of Identity Theft and Tampering of Personal
Data. For further contributing to deliver Result 3 by mitigating the risk
of identity theft and tampering of personal data (cf. Problem Cause 3.2),
we are obliged to diminish both the chances and the impact of malicious
manipulation of personal data, especially identity data. Executing this ac-
tivity involves creating a positive reverse image to the centrally positioned
subtree in Figure 2.6 by offering protective means to detect identity theft
and tampering of personal data, with special regard to identity data, by
identity owners, by SPs and by entities that request personal data. Fig-
ure 2.11 shows such positive reverse image as the centered subtree of
Result 3 within the objective tree, where the proposed measure to tackle
Problem Cause 3.2.1 is a directly subordinated activity of Activity 3.2.
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Activity 3.3: Increase Range and Granularity of Access Control. For
finally contributing to create Result 3 by approaching today’s incomplete
range and granularity of access control (cf. Problem Cause 3.3), we have to
extend as well as refine the filtering measures applicable to personal data.
Working on this activity requires creating a positive reverse image to the
right subtree in Figure 2.6 by reducing the dependency of individual persons
on the access control mechanisms offered by SPs in order to facilitate
holistically applying protection of personal data by individual persons
throughout different web systems, web applications and web services.
Figure 2.11 shows such positive reverse image as right subtree of Result 3
within the objective tree, where the proposed measure to tackle Problem
Cause 3.3.1 is a directly subordinated activity of Activity 3.3.
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After classifying the activities that represent the means to be provided
for delivering the results and, thus, for achieving the purpose, the next
subsection proceeds with its ends in terms of the overall objective.
2.3.3 Overall Objective
To estimate the positive long-term contributions of attaining the pur-
pose (Miklicˇ, 2008), we transformed all effects of the central problem (cf.
Subsection 2.2.3) into objectives and, then, merged these objectives in one
consolidated overall objective:
To Contribute to Increase the Protection of Privacy and Reduce the
Risk of Personal Data Disclosures. With achieving the purpose, we in-
tend to mitigate the problem effects by contributing to a reduction of attacks
on web systems that would otherwise have entailed breaches and data dis-
closures with negative consequences for both individual persons and com-
panies. Furthermore, we aim for improving the overall protection of privacy
in the context of the web to the advantage of all stakeholders involved. This
would also have a positive bearing on the mentioned problem effects by:
• Improving the overall control of personal data by individual persons
throughout web systems, web applications and web services
• Supporting the accomplishment of the privacy by default initiative
• Helping to realize the privacy by design vision
• Minimizing risks for companies, with regard to losses in reputation,
users and revenues, as well as for individual persons, with regard to
a declining trust in web systems
• Reducing risks associated with monetization of personal data by
aggressors
• Increasing certainty and awareness of individual persons about sev-
eral usage aspects concerning their personal data, e.g., moment,
origin and extent of access
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• Decreasing the necessitation of updating credentials reactively once
breaches affecting security of web systems, web applications or web
services are reported to users
Now, that we have described all objectives that are either means of the
purpose, in the case of results and activities, or ends of the purpose, in
the case of the overall objective, the next subsection continues with ex-
plaining the strategy to achieve them.
2.3.4 Strategy
In this project, we embark on the strategy of processing the objective hier-
archy in a bottom-up way. To achieve the purpose of an enhanced security
in managing personal data by web systems for the benefit of individual
persons, companies and governments, we therefore have to deliver the re-
sults by carrying out all identified activities. Due to the complexity of those
activities, their success does not only depend on systematically approach-
ing them within this work, but also on factors outside our direct control.
Several assumptions have to hold true in order to allow for covering these
factors and, thus, for successfully attaining the objectives with the necessary
condition to verify their completion. That is, we contribute towards achiev-
ing an objective by fulfilling both inferior objectives and their associated
assumptions (EC, 2004). Figure 2.12 schematically depicts this strategy,
which operates on the documented product of the objective analysis, i.e.,
the so-called “Logframe matrix”. While Table A.2 in Appendix A represents
the Logframe matrix completely, we summarize included assumptions,
success indicators and verification sources in the following.
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Assumptions
Clarifying under which circumstances it is possible to achieve each objective,
assumptions take account of external factors that might impact the overall
outcome of the project (NORAD, 1999). That is, assumptions help to deal
with uncertainties of future developments outside the direct control of this
project by determining the conditions which need to be present. In contrast
to hypotheses, such as those outlined in Chapter 1, which are unproven
falsifiable theories to be verified through investigation, assumptions are
statements taken for granted, i.e., they are believed to be true but possibly
cannot be proven (Merriam-Webster, 2016a; Merriam-Webster, 2016c). In
the following, we list identified assumptions in relation to specific objectives
and stakeholders at the level of purpose, results and activities.
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Firstly, we assume that individual persons are willing to:
• apply security enhancements for personal data management (Purpose,
Result 3),
• regain ownership and self-manage their personal data by maintain-
ing a larger set of identity attributes yet with a lower amount of
distributed copies (Activity 2.1),
• support detection and use of individual context and conditions (Ac-
tivity 3.1),
• employ measures for extended access control, integrity protection,
scope definition of delegations to safeguard their personal data (Ac-
tivities 3.1 to 3.3), and
• make additional efforts for protecting their identity data (Activities 3.1
to 3.3).
Furthermore, we assume that companies are willing to:
• employ enhancements towards reducing necessitation of personal
data accumulation, protecting personal data, and taking greater
account of security aspects during design and runtime of web systems
(Purpose, Results 2 and 3),
• use extended means for modeling web systems with special focus on
security-related aspects (Result 1 and Activity 1.1),
• open up for universal identification, extended identity attributes,
linkage and discovery across web systems, web applications and web
services (Activity 2.1),
• settle with just obtaining access to user-generated contents rather
than demanding storage within own premises and, hence, also giving
up own application-specific facilities for controlling access to personal
user data (Activities 2.1 and 3.3), and
• integrate means into their web systems for integrity protection and
delegated access whilst obeying the scope defined by delegators
(Activities 3.1 and 3.2).
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Finally, we assume that governments are willing to:
• keep up with their support towards enabling more self-determined
control about personal data for individual persons (Purpose, Activ-
ity 2.1).
It is evident that a large proportion of the assumptions are directed towards
companies. Especially producing Result 2 requires a broad adoption and a
rethinking of companies in terms of their business model, which is expected
to be a long-term endeavor. While this result is essential for achieving the
purpose of this work, it is not independently manageable as part of this
dissertation. Yet, we intend to present an alternative to the current business
model employed by companies, which would allow individual persons for
controlling the conditions at which companies can access personal data.
In addition to knowing what needs to happen for achieving specific objec-
tives, we must have some indicators that show when certain objectives are
met based on what sources. This information is provided in the following.
Success Indicators and Verification Sources
Not only do success indicators and verification sources increase “clarity and
specificity of objectives”, but they also assist in providing a “monitoring
and evaluation framework” (EC, 2004). Indicators should therefore be
specific, measurable, available, relevant and time-bound. For collecting
necessary information to assess success, the project management team is
eligible to perform acceptance tests, implement proof of concepts and make
observations. Determining whether, when and to what extent we achieved
objectives (NORAD, 1999), objectively verifiable indicators are installed at
different levels in the objective hierarchy. They enable verifying that 1) all
activities necessary for delivering results have been carried out, that 2) all
outputs required for attaining the purpose are present through producing
64 Chapter 2 Challenges
the results, and that 3) the outcome of achieving the purpose contributes to
the overall objective, which in turn creates certain impacts on stakeholders.
To assess the impact of contributing to the overall objective, we consider
user studies as well as reports on analyzed risks and threats, like (Ho-
racek, 2013), as appropriate verification sources. Although these sources
would allow attesting both an increase in privacy protection and a re-
duction of breaches and data disclosures through successful attacks on
web systems, the achievement of the overall objective is a joint long-run
effort outside the direct control of this project and, therefore, not pro-
foundly verifiable as part of this dissertation.
To assess the outcome of achieving the purpose, we think that integration
and operational acceptance tests are suitable sources to verify not only the
availability of all required results, but their prototypical integration into
a demonstrator that proves the feasibility of the underlying concepts and
illustrates the benefits of an enhanced security in managing personal data.
To assess the output of producing the results, we see proof of concepts
as well as unit and operational acceptance tests as proper sources for
verifying the successful implementation of all necessary activities in terms
of extended protective means to safeguard personal data, modeling support
with strong focus on security-related aspects, and an approach for accessing
personal data that enables more control for individual persons by taking
account of their preferences towards protection.
After discussing how to approach identified objectives, deal with factors out-
side our direct control, and verify progress as well as successful achievement
of objectives, the following section proceeds with concluding this chapter.
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2.4 Summary
Based on the foundations established by selecting PCM/LFA as an appropri-
ate research methodology and by clarifying frequently occurring terms and
definitions, we started investigating the central problem. From three scenar-
ios illustrating the problem context, we extracted three relevant stakeholder
groups and detailed how they are affected through the central problem. In
order to describe the challenges we need to tackle, we further divided the
central problem into first, second etc. level problem causes as well as pri-
mary, secondary etc. problem effects. Using this problem classification, we
transformed all causes and effects into a consolidated means-ends hierarchy
represented by several objectives. This hierarchy consists of five activities to
be carried out to produce three results necessary for achieving the purpose,
which in turn contributes to the overall objective. Having formulated a
suitable bottom-up strategy to systematically meet the challenges, the next
chapter examines to which extent already existing technologies bear the po-
tential to facilitate achieving the objectives and fulfilling the assumptions.
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3State of the Art
To analyze state-of-the-art technologies with regard to their suitability of
contributing to meet the challenges, this chapter first introduces a cat-
egorization of technologies that appertain to the scope of this work in
Section 3.1. Based on the objectives obtained through investigating the
research problem in the previous chapter, Section 3.2 specifies the analysis
criteria by setting significance indicators, deriving requirements and spec-
ifying a rating system. Section 3.3 then discusses the analysis results to
show the degree to which the requirements have been fulfilled by prior art.
For creating an overview of existing technologies upon which we can build
our research, as suggested in (Creswell, 2012), we employed systematic
literature review and field testing of technologies. Finally, Section 3.4 sum-
marizes the outcome of the state of the art analysis and the thus established
basis for constituting our research contributions.
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3.1 Categorization
The analysis of the problem in Section 2.2 showed that the reasons for
today’s insufficient consideration of security during development, runtime
and evolution of web systems are manifold. However, Problem Cause 1 on
“security of web systems treated as afterthought” and its secondary problem
cause also pointed out that these reasons are at least partially attributed to
an incomplete support of web engineers through appropriate development
methods, models and tools. Leaving aside the variety of individual, pure
implementation-driven approaches for manually developing web applica-
tions and web services, we aim at the engineering of web systems through-
out their entire life cycle in an organized way. Here, web engineering is an
eligible branch of software engineering that takes account of the particular
conditions and needs of development efforts in the context of the web.
Web engineering is about the “application of systematic and quantifiable
approaches (concepts, methods, techniques, tools) to cost-effective require-
ment analysis, design, implementation, testing, operation, and maintenance
of high-quality web applications” (Kappel et al., 2006). That is, web engi-
neering approaches (WEAs) intend to offer high adaptability and reusability,
while reducing costs potentially caused through new developments and
maintenance work (Gaedke, 2000; Koch, Meliá-Beigbeder, et al., 2008).
By providing abstraction, formalization, separation of concerns and under-
standing through models, model-driven development (MDD) applied to the
web serves this discipline of systematically building web systems (Saleem et
al., 2014). Web engineering in conjunction with MDD furthermore enables
to postpone the technical implementation on the basis of semi-automated
model transformations until later engineering stages.
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The discussion of analysis results on existing approaches for web engineer-
ing starts in Subsection 3.3.1, where we specially regard security aspects
and use of models during the engineering process. Another important factor
to be considered are users that employ web systems for their daily business.
That is, users rely on web systems to properly take care of personal data
entrusted to them. With web applications, web services and (web) users
being essential entities as per definition on page 26, we continue the dis-
cussion in Subsection 3.3.2 with means for identifying and distinguishing
those entities through appropriate web-based digital identities.
For further organizing this discussion, we extend the classification of IdMSs
proposed in (Jøsang et al., 2007). Not only do we examine digital identities
per se, but also other aspects of IdM including storage, integration and
processes (Dinger and Hartenstein, 2008). While not necessarily predefined,
many systems for IdM come along with a preferred form of authentication
and a default set of attributes for describing entities, with implications as
highlighted by Problem Cause 2 on “accumulation of personal data by third
parties” and its subordinated problem causes. To cover identity creation
and identification for both human and non-human entities, the options
available for describing characteristics of such entities need to be sufficiently
expressive and support various contexts. Subsection 3.3.3 investigates this
matter by analyzing identity description languages (IdDLs).
In addition to modeling web systems as well as identifying and describing
entities present therein, protection with focus on security in managing per-
sonal data takes an essential role. Applying protective measures, however,
largely depends on the forgoing findings. By outsourcing the analysis of
measures for protection and control to the related work sections of the solu-
tion components in Chapters 5 to 7, we enable detailed, self-contained and
domain-specific reviews. Directing these technology reviews on either one
of the areas of context-aware control, protection against tampering, and
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access control assists in area-wise dealing with the root causes of Problem
Cause 3 on “incomplete control and protection of personal data”.
Having outlined the categorization in web engineering approaches, identity
management systems and identity description languages, the next section
details criteria for examining the representatives of these categories.
3.2 Criteria
To set the criteria for analyzing the state of the art, Subsection 3.2.1 defines
intrinsic significance indicators to weight specific aspects of a requirement,
Subsection 3.2.2 then describes the requirements each technology category
must satisfy, and, finally, Subsection 3.2.3 outlines the rating system to
quantify the degree of fulfilling requirements.
3.2.1 Significance Indicators
For consistently determining the significance of diverse aspects of a
requirement, we rely on both the request for comments (RFC) 2119
and the so-called MoSCoW analysis (Bradner, 1997; IIBA, 2009). As
different characteristics of requirements have different implications
on the success of this project, we interrelate each aspect with one
out of the three levels listed below:
Must Fulfilling a certain aspect of a requirement is mandatory.
Should Fulfilling a certain aspect of a requirement is recommended.
Could Fulfilling a certain aspect of a requirement is optional.
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Now that we have defined the significance indicators, we use them
as keywords to weight each aspect of the requirements described
in the following subsection.
3.2.2 Requirements
Software quality determines how well products fulfill certain requirements
under particular conditions (ISO/IEC, 2011), yet it focuses on processing
by the software and not on produced data. Software products, however,
are often chained with each other in practice, i.e., the output data of
one product is the input data of another. A prime example are mashup
applications, which use, connect and combine data produced by other
web applications and web services to create an improved experience tai-
lored to certain scenarios (Chudnovskyy, Nestler, et al., 2012). Data
quality therefore strongly determines how well software products can
deal with inputs to generate outputs. Consequently, it is more difficult
to generate high quality data from low quality inputs, e.g., incorrect, in-
complete, inconsistent or incoherent data.
Based on the problem and objective descriptions, we derive several
requirements per identified category in consideration of established
standards, particularly the specifications of the software quality model
9126-1:2001 as well as its successor 25010:2011, and the data quality
model 25012:2008 by the International Organization for Standardization
(ISO)/International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) (ISO/IEC, 2001;
ISO/IEC, 2008; ISO/IEC, 2011). Even though the ISO/IEC quality models
taken by themselves would enable an extensive and differentiated analysis
based on the numerous requirements they specify, we intentionally restrict
this large set to five requirements per category for ensuring brevity, clarity
and understandability. For selecting the requirements, we particularly
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pay attention to aspects concerning the management of personal data,
e.g., access, creation, extension, modification, ownership, and last but
not least protection. These collective requirements consolidate many
requirements according to ISO/IEC using five generic concepts. Such
consolidation of requirements is not an unusual approach to adjust the
focus, e.g., (Rafique et al., 2012) proposed a similar combination.
Requirements on Web Engineering Approaches
To improve the consideration of security aspects for web systems (cf. Result 1
and associated Activity 1.1), we make use of interoperability, processability,
scope, security and serviceability as collective requirements on web engi-
neering approaches including related processes, tools and models. Each
requirement is elaborated on in the following:
Interoperability A WEA must produce artifacts, particularly web system
models, that are usable independently from specific SPs (WEF, 2011). To
prevent data and customer lock-in, a web engineering approach must foster
interoperability for models, metamodels, transformations and tools (Koch,
Meliá-Beigbeder, et al., 2008). The exchange between different modeling
approaches should be supported through relying on open standards, which
would also contribute to increase compatibility and reusability of modeled
artifacts (WEF, 2011).
Processability A WEA must enable machine-independent accessibility, un-
derstandability and modifiability for produced models (ISO/IEC, 2011).
That is, these models should be obtainable, interpretable and processable
by human and non-human entities on both syntactic and semantic level,
which includes that reliable language processors are available for enabling
efficient operation and supporting human entities in their endeavors (WEF,
2011; Wild and Gaedke, 2014).
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Scope A WEA must be sufficiently accurate, expressive and flexible to
cover diverse scenarios and stages of development. Promptly responding to
changing conditions requires adaptability and extensibility of existing soft-
ware (Wild and Gaedke, 2014), which also contributes to ensure scalability,
evolvability and maintainability of web systems (Koch, Meliá-Beigbeder,
et al., 2008).
Security A WEA must support modeling security aspects at different ab-
straction levels by taking account of web systems as a whole and their
individual components like web services (Wild and Gaedke, 2014). This re-
quires facilities to 1) identify involved entities, 2) describe the thus obtained
identities by appropriate attributes, e.g., interface definitions, and 3) specify
the means for their protection, e.g., through access control (OECD, 2013).
The necessity of identifying web systems and components throughout dif-
ferent development stages enables clarifying responsibilities and paves the
way for authentication and accountability in later stages (ISO/IEC, 2011;
OECD, 2013).
Serviceability A WEA and related tools must be available, reliable and
technically accessible to support entities in modeling web systems (ISO/IEC,
2011; Wild and Gaedke, 2014), which includes options for efficient cre-
ation and adaption. Contributing to understandability and usability of
architecture models by human entities asks for simple yet powerful graphi-
cal representation and editing capabilities (Koch, Meliá-Beigbeder, et al.,
2008).
Requirements on Identity Management Systems
To reduce the need for accumulation of personal data by third parties on the
one hand and to extend the means for control and protection of personal
data on the other hand (cf. Results 2 and 3 and associated Activities 2.1
to 3.3), we employ adequacy, control, openness, protection and transfer-
3.2 Criteria 73
ability as five collective requirements on identity management systems,
with each requirement being detailed below:
Adequacy An IdMS must not only be technically accessible, but it should
also be supportive, self-explanatory and easy to operate for the entities
that employ it (ISO/IEC, 2011; Papazoglou et al., 2007; The White House,
2011). Along with supplying facilities for IdM, this includes allowing
efficient processing of identity-related activities with special regard to
authentication and access to identity data, and using human-memorable
identifiers (El Maliki and Seigneur, 2007; Halpin, 2014). In addition to
serviceability for users, an IdMS should be maintainable by developers and
administrators to ensure its reliability and availability (ISO/IEC, 2011; The
White House, 2011).
Control An IdMS must enable appropriate user control, imperative user
consent and minimal disclosure of personal data, especially identity data,
only to justifiable parties for a constraint use (cf. laws of identity) (Cameron,
2005; OECD, 2013). It must allow for claiming and maintaining ownership
of personal data by actual data owners to prevent unauthorized accumula-
tion and unwanted lock-in by third-parties, but without strongly interfering
with companies’ current models of fostering customer retention (OECD,
2013). Together with identity creation, SSO, attribute retrieval, and iden-
tity selection, an IdMS should also support single logout and federation
establishment (Barisch, 2012). To properly take account of privacy needs,
an IdMS must facilitate anonymity and unmappability12, and support mul-
tiple identities per entity. Each identity should be made available either
as self-asserted identity or as third-party asserted identity, e.g., issued by
companies or government agencies (Cameron, 2005; Halpin, 2014; The
White House, 2011). Supported by high descriptiveness of identities, an
IdMS must handle different application areas to facilitate a consistent expe-
12The capability to conceal an entity’s connections from discovery (Halpin, 2014).
74 Chapter 3 State of the Art
rience across contexts (Barisch, 2012; Cameron, 2005), like in delegation
scenarios (cf. Activity 3.1).
Openness An IdMS must offer global identification of entities in order to
enable linkage and discovery unbound of specific IdPs (OECD, 2013; Papa-
zoglou et al., 2007). This avoids data and customer lock-in, and facilitates
connectivity to other entities. Moreover, an IdMS must be interoperable
to ease cooperation with other IdMSs and to enable compatibility and
reusability of personal data, especially identity descriptions (Barisch, 2012;
ISO/IEC, 2011; The White House, 2011).
Protection An IdMS must provide confidentiality, integrity and privacy to
allow for protecting against unauthorized read/write access to personal
data (OECD, 2013; The White House, 2011). Furthermore, it should fa-
cilitate non-repudiation and accountability for clarifying responsibility of
activities carried out by entities (ISO/IEC, 2011; OECD, 2013). Finally, an
IdMS must enable authenticating human and non-human entities (ISO/IEC,
2011), which makes support of ownership-based authentication neces-
sary13.
Transferability An IdMS must be portable to different environments to
allow for broad adoption by users. Employing open standards on the
protocol, interface and data type level facilitates transferability through
compatibility and interoperability (Bria, 2012; ISO/IEC, 2011; WEF, 2011).
High modularity of IdMSs conduce to their installability and adaptability.
13Unlike human, machines cannot keep secrets in mind, like passwords. Authentication of
non-human entities by biometrics, i.e., by intrinsic characteristics such as temperature,
utilization or fan rotation, is still an insufficiently explored field of research and, thus,
immature for productive use. Consequently, non-human entities have to rely on some kind
of persistent data, like a key or an access token.
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Requirements on Identity Description Languages
To further contribute to reduce the need for accumulation of per-
sonal data by third parties (cf. Result 2 and associated Activity 2.1),
we present accuracy, appropriateness, assurance, interpretability and
portability as five collective requirements on identity description
languages, which are described in the following:
Accuracy An IdDL must allow for representing entities according to their
preferred level of detail in certain contexts in a consistent, precise and
up-to-date way by relying on appropriate vocabularies (ISO/IEC, 2008;
OECD, 2013; Rafique et al., 2012). Here, consistency should cover both
the syntactic and the semantic level.
Appropriateness An IdDL must offer a rich set of expressive language con-
structs to appropriately represent entities according to their specification in
certain contexts in a fairly complete manner (ISO/IEC, 2008; OECD, 2013).
This requires that descriptions are extensible, which involves capabilities
for expanding, linking and merging data sets (Halpin, 2014).
Assurance An IdDL should facilitate providing assurances in terms of avail-
ability, confidentiality, credibility, recoverability and traceability (ISO/IEC,
2008). It should not restrict distribution of parts of identity descriptions
(e.g., as distinct web resources for enabling access control, availability or
recoverability) and metadata attachment (e.g., signatures for fostering
confidentiality, traceability or credibility).
Interpretability An IdDL must yield identity descriptions that are obtain-
able and processable by human and non-human entities, i.e., the resulting
identity descriptions have to allow for machine-independent accessibility,
understandability, and modifiability (ISO/IEC, 2008; Rafique et al., 2012).
This necessitates the availability of language processors to enable efficient
operation and support human entities in their endeavors.
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Portability An IdDL must allow for migration, exchange and reusability
of identity descriptions beyond the scope of specific IdPs in order to foster
openness and, thus, reduce barriers for entering and exiting IdPs, and
prevent discrimination caused by customer and data lock-in (Bria, 2012).
Therefore, identity descriptions should be portable by relying on open,
widely accepted standards (ISO/IEC, 2008).
After outlining the requirements, we continue with describing how
to assess their fulfillment.
3.2.3 Rating System
Applying a point-based rating system for specifying the degree of fulfill-
ment by a technology (group) in terms of a requirement allows for precise
valuation, yet such absolute assessment is difficult to accomplish in prac-
tice (Hubbard, 2009). It involves taking the complete spectrum of tech-
nologies in a certain field into account in order to determine the minimum
and maximum valuations per requirement a priori to the actual assess-
ment. Furthermore, such absolute rating system would suggest doubtful
precision also for subjective criteria assessments (Röder et al., 2009), like
usability (Speicher, 2015), and, thus, falsely encourage comparability of
technologies by characteristics via point and point differences. This, in
turn, bears the risk of erroneous conclusions, e.g., a criterion assessed
with value 14 is twice as good as one with value 7.
For these reasons, we rely on a relative rating system for determining the
degree technologies fulfill the requirements given above. This relative
rating system relies on a simplified cost-utility analysis and does not imply
any exact conversion factor among certain degrees of fulfillment, but its
ordinal scale provides a coherent four-step differentiation as described next.
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Completely fulfilled Technology does completely fulfill requirement.
Largely fulfilled Technology does largely yet not completely fulfill re-
quirement.
Partially fulfilled Technology does fulfill requirement to some extent
yet not largely.
Insufficiently fulfilled Technology does not or not sufficiently fulfill
requirement.
Now that we derived requirements and provided a rating system appli-
cable to all technology assessments in this work, the next section con-
tinues with presenting the findings.
3.3 Analysis Results
Employing the criteria defined in the previous section, we discuss the results
obtained by analyzing web engineering approaches in Subsection 3.3.1,
identity management systems in Subsection 3.3.2, and identity descrip-
tion languages in Subsection 3.3.3. A summary containing a technology
recommendation concludes each subsection.
3.3.1 Web Engineering Approaches
By assisting engineers in the systematic design, development and evolution
of web systems, web engineering approaches intend to reduce error-prone
and time-consuming activities associated with the manual construction and
maintenance of web applications and web services (Koch, Meliá-Beigbeder,
et al., 2008). WEAs aim at facilitating the engineering of web systems
through models, processes and tools. In order to pursue this purpose,
WEAs provide features like abstraction from implementation details, sepa-
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ration of concerns, fostering flexibility and reusability, cost reduction, and
automation the code generation. Here, models and components allow
for such abstraction but with varying objectives, directness and affinity
towards the technical implementation.
While models represent certain attributes of entities at different levels of
details, components encapsulate technical or functional related parts in
self-contained units and make functionality accessible through well-defined
interfaces. Furthermore, models can act as blueprints for components.
Both types of abstraction enable composition, with the option that models
integrate other models and components consist of subcomponents.
Through adapting principles of conventional component-based software
engineering to the characteristics of the web, engineers can interlink func-
tional building blocks according to an underlying composition approach in
order to establish component-based architectures such as today’s prevalent
service-oriented architectures (SOAs) (Gaedke and Rehse, 2000). In a
SOA, web applications and web services represent components that provide
web-accessible interfaces and might involve public or private subsidiary
components. Not only do many WEAs enable engineers to model application
aspects such as navigation and presentation, but also offer model-to-model
and model-to-code transformations to automatically build web systems
through appropriate tools (Koch, Meliá-Beigbeder, et al., 2008).
In order to discuss the analysis results of WEAs, we rely on the classification
established in (Kappel et al., 2006) and updated in numerous publications
including (Meinecke, 2008) and (A. Heil, 2012). This classification distin-
guishes between four primary orientations of web engineering approaches:
data, hypertext, object and software (Kappel et al., 2006). While data-
oriented approaches offer advantages when modeling data-intensive web
systems due to their heritage from database systems, hypertext-oriented ap-
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proaches focus on navigational aspects of web systems (Kappel et al., 2006;
Meinecke, 2008). Object-oriented approaches make use of congeneric
modeling languages, whereas software-oriented ones adapt many princi-
ples of conventional software engineering (A. Heil, 2012). In addition to
these four groups, we also elaborate on the more implementation-directed
group of component-based web engineering approaches.
Sorting analyzed approaches according to their focus into five groups
allows for conducting the assessment on a more general level and for
classifying new approaches without undermining conclusions drawn for
those groups. With modeling of security aspects taking an important role,
the discussion of analysis results starts with the group of data-oriented
web engineering approaches, proceeds with hypertext-, object- and
software-oriented ones, and ends with component-based WEAs. For
each group, we provide a characterization, an assessment using the
requirements (cf. Subsection 3.2.2) and examples.
Data-Oriented Approaches
Not just since the era of big data, data-intensive software systems make
up a large share of all web-based solutions (Meinecke, 2008). This group
of web systems focuses on presentation and modification of data and,
therefore, heavily relies on one or more central data repositories (A. Heil,
2012). Here, users gain access to specific parts of the underlying data sets
through appropriate interfaces. Data-oriented WEAs assist in the systematic
development of web systems, with the set of applications spanning data-
driven domains like e-commerce and social networking. In line with their
orientation, approaches of this group primarily involve data-centric models
such as the entity-relationship (ER) model (A. Heil, 2012).
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Prime examples of data-oriented WEAs include the Web Modeling Language
(WebML) (Ceri et al., 2000) and Hera (Houben et al., 2003). Beyond its
original intention as a conceptual language for designing data-intensive
web systems, several extensions increased the capabilities of WebML to
cover modeling service, workflow, semantic and context-awareness as-
pects (Brambilla and Fraternali, 2014; Ceri et al., 2000). Based on the
spiral model, WebML also proposes a design-centric, non-incremental pro-
cess model for engineering web systems that consists of seven stages (A.
Heil, 2012). WebML enables to specify structure, composition, naviga-
tion and presentation of web systems. Furthermore, its process model
supports these specifications through three dedicated design stages that
take account of data, hypertext and architecture. Specialized tools like
WebRatio support the engineering process through features such as model-
to-code transformations (Brambilla and Fraternali, 2014). As noted in
(Meinecke, 2008), WebML can consider IdM aspects during modeling as
a foundation for personalization and access control.
Similar to other data-oriented WEAs, WebML forces a strong binding be-
tween application and data model, which also includes security models like
the identity model. This results in creating data models that are compatible
to ER and Unified Modeling Language (UML) diagrams on the one hand,
yet these models are specific to certain applications or domains on the other
hand. By fostering SP-centric models to IdM, this entails deficits towards us-
ing, extending and managing data, with particular regard to personal data,
across application domains (cf. remote silo model in Subsection 3.3.2). As
an effort to resolve such limitation, Hera supports integrating diverse data
repositories through relying on transformations based on semantic mod-
els (Vdovjak et al., 2003). However, the definition of integration engines
increases complexity and represents a compromise towards the greatest
possible intersection between data models (Meinecke, 2008).
3.3 Analysis Results 81
Although data-oriented WEAs provide advantages for engineering data-
centric web systems, they show deficits in creating and using models for
heterogeneous domains, which limits the scope. Models and tools of this
group are appropriate and lead to a reasonable level of serviceability, with
benefits introduced by them being primarily evident during the stages of
design and code generation, but lag behind during runtime. The defini-
tion and management of security-related aspects is specific to particular
domains (or SPs respectively) and, thus, restricts universal processability
and interoperability. Table 3.1 summarizes the results for data-oriented
WEAs and corresponding tools using the symbols defined on page 77.
Table 3.1: Analysis Results of Data-Oriented Web Engineering Approaches
Interoperability Processability Scope Security Serviceability
Hypertext-Oriented Approaches
Focusing on navigational aspects, hypertext-oriented WEAs specially sup-
port modeling structural characteristics of web systems on the conceptual
foundation established through hypertext (Nelson, 1994). Based on content
models, engineers can describe available nodes and edges using special-
ized notations, where nodes represent certain information fragments and
edges link interrelated nodes together according to underlying require-
ments (Kappel et al., 2006). This allows for creating different perspectives
on the information space for different viewers.
Prime examples of hypertext-oriented approaches are the Hypertext-
Design Model (HDM) (Garzotto et al., 1993) and the Web-Site Design
Method (WSDM) (Troyer and Casteleyn, 2003). By providing a
platform-independent hypertext model, HDM supports the design phase
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of engineering hypermedia web systems. HDM divides the design in
navigation structure and documents, and enables to specify diverse types
of references including structure, perspective and application (Gaedke
and Gräf, 2000). Similar to HDM, WSDM is primarily intended for
engineering web systems that allow users to consume and navigate
through the information space. WSDM implements a user-centric
modeling approach that assists engineers in conceptual design and
physical design (Troyer and Casteleyn, 2003).
Partially attributed to an incomplete support by models, tools and guide-
lines throughout the web engineering process, both examples do, however,
show deficits in developing complex web systems or web systems that
do not represent information systems (Gaedke and Gräf, 2000). Here,
HDM does not define an own process model, yet it is combinable with
conventional software engineering approaches (Garzotto et al., 1993).
Not relying on systematic and comprehensive process models, HDM and
WSDM neglect reusability and, thus, reduce their applicability with impli-
cations on interoperability, processability, scope and serviceability. These
issues led to further developments, like Object-Oriented Hypermedia De-
sign Method (OOHDM), which involve dedicated process models with
increased coverage of other engineering stages.
Hypertext-oriented WEAs offer only insufficient means to develop web sys-
tems with focus on security. By primarily addressing navigational character-
istics in engineering non-complex web systems, they fall short in other engi-
neering stages. In consequence, hypertext-oriented approaches became ob-
solete and were superseded by other WEA groups, which incorporated con-
cepts of hypertext-orientation. Through employing specialized proprietary
models, domain-specific languages (DSLs) and tools for describing struc-
tural aspects of web systems, hypertext-oriented approaches furthermore
lack in largely fulfilling other collective requirements, like interoperability
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and processability. As summarized in Table 3.2, this group of web engineer-
ing approaches has little to offer for achieving the purpose of this work.
Table 3.2: Analysis Results of Hypertext-Oriented Web Engineering Approaches
Interoperability Processability Scope Security Serviceability
Object-Oriented Approaches
In order to provide a holistic approach to engineer web systems, object-
oriented WEAs rely on the conceptual foundation of objects that comprise
structure as well as behavior (Kappel et al., 2006). By enabling to model
both structural and behavioral aspects of web systems at the levels of
content, hypertext and presentation through appropriate diagrams, UML
acts as a general-purpose language (GPL) many modeling methods are
based on (A. Heil, 2012; Kappel et al., 2006). Furthermore, UML facilitates
creating human-interpretable design artifacts, which can serve as generally
accepted specification and documentation of the engineering process.
OOHDM (Rossi and Schwabe, 2008) and UML-based Web Engineering
(UWE) (Koch, Knapp, et al., 2008) represent prime examples of object-
oriented approaches. Based on UML, UWE describes guidelines for using
general modeling constructs and maps them to the particular require-
ments of engineering web systems (Meinecke, 2008). Employing special
profiles, it covers aspects like navigation and presentation at a highly ab-
stract level, and supports modeling content objects through UML class
diagrams. Like UWE, OOHDM includes a dedicated process model, which
consists of conceptual, navigation and interface design as well as imple-
mentation (Rossi and Schwabe, 2008). In addition to utilizing UML for
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design matters, OOHDM enables to semantically specify conceptual models
of web systems (Rossi and Schwabe, 2008).
However, UWE and OOHDM lack support for integrating content objects
from third-party sources like web services. For controlling access to specific
nodes of the navigation model, UWE allows for specifying digital identities
and setting authorization preferences within the model. Despite this advan-
tage in modeling security aspects, UWE and OOHDM do neither detail the
implementation of such aspects nor foster the application-independent use
of identities and access control preferences (Meinecke, 2008). Both prime
examples focus on non-implementation characteristics of web systems.
Object orientation in the analyzed approaches of this group applies pri-
marily to models and only secondarily to actual implementations, whereby
code generation supports creating object-oriented implementation arti-
facts. All evolutionary steps, e.g., evoked by changing requirements, entail
possibly complex adjustments to the models before code modifications
can happen, which limits the scope. Moreover, a large set of complex
models as necessary requirement complicates interpretability and process-
ability by human entities and makes security matters difficult to incorporate
properly. With object orientation being a common paradigm in software
engineering, there is a solid level of standardization and broad support
by tools, e.g., for modeling. This results in largely fulfilling the collective
requirements regarding processability and serviceability, where the latter
is, however, impaired by insufficient assistance during implementation.
Table 3.3 shows these findings as an overview.
Table 3.3: Analysis Results of Object-Oriented Web Engineering Approaches
Interoperability Processability Scope Security Serviceability
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Software-Oriented Approaches
On the methodological basis of conventional software engineering, recent
software-oriented WEAs pursue creating model-driven architectures
(MDAs) by involving multiple models at different abstraction layer (Meliá
and Gómez, 2005). Approaches of this group are therefore especially
suited for implementing projects with clear functional requirements,
so that benefits from structured models, separation of concerns and
standard platforms have a clear effect (Koch, Meliá-Beigbeder, et al.,
2008). When approached systematically, a MDA allows for addressing
interoperability, model evolution and adaption, and for bridging the
gap between high level design by computational independent models
(CIMs) and platform independent models (PIMs) described using DSLs
and low level implementation by platform specific models (PSMs) and
source code (Koch, Meliá-Beigbeder, et al., 2008).
The Web Software Architecture (WebSA) (Meliá and Gómez, 2005) is a
prime example of a software-oriented approach. Unlike other approaches,
WebSA does not introduce own DSLs and modeling methods for describing
aspects such as navigation, presentation and content, but it reuses existing
approaches like UWE. To develop web systems on the MDA foundation,
WebSA utilizes UML for describing PIMs as well as transformation engines
for converting these models to PSMs and source code (Kappel et al., 2006).
WebSA offers an architectural perspective in engineering web systems,
which distinguishes between coarse-grained subsystem models and fine-
grained configuration models (Meliá and Gómez, 2005).
Similar to component-based approaches, which are discussed next, WebSA
can represent building blocks of a web system as components (Meliá and
Gómez, 2005). However, it does not elaborate on how models and compo-
nents reflect changes made through maintenance and further development.
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Although a so-called integration model enables to join various model types,
they have to be from known sources, i.e., there is a lack in support of exter-
nal web services (Meinecke, 2008). WebSA does not inherently cover IdM.
By combining advantages of models and components, software-oriented
web engineering approaches that follow the MDA concept strive for pro-
viding a passable compromise between abstraction and implementation
focus. With security treated as an afterthought during engineering, scope
impaired through missing capabilities for driving evolution and change
management appropriately, and processability as well as serviceability re-
duced by external dependencies, only interoperability can score owing to
the (non-semantic) model basis, as outlined in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4: Analysis Results of Software-Oriented Web Engineering Approaches
Interoperability Processability Scope Security Serviceability
Component-Based Approaches
In contrast to the methodologies presented so far, component-based web
engineering (CBWE) approaches assist in rapid development of web sys-
tems by focusing on implementation through software building blocks that
are ready to use with none or only a few adjustments. The four other
WEA groups involve thoroughly analyzing the problem domain before cre-
ating domain-specific models based on analysis results, whereas CBWE
does not require such exhaustive investigation of the problem domain
and subsequent complex designs. Components offer a lower level of ab-
straction compared to models, but they facilitate adaptability, reusabil-
ity and composition, especially when a large set of building blocks is
available. Component-based approaches enable composing web systems
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by orchestrating reusable, existing components, like web services, to-
wards a more complex service offering (Schill and Springer, 2012). How-
ever, models and components are not mutually exclusive, as the group
of software-oriented approaches has shown.
Prime examples of component-based approaches include WebComposition
(Gellersen and Gaedke, 1999), the portlet-centric web development ap-
proach (Díaz et al., 2008) and the Open Mashup Enterprise service platform
for LinkEd data in the Telco domain (OMELETTE) approach (Chudnovskyy,
Nestler, et al., 2012). WebComposition describes an incremental, iterative
development process adopted from the spiral model that takes account
of changing requirements of web systems (Gaedke, 2000). This so-called
WebComposition Process Model (WCPM) involves analysis, design, imple-
mentation and evolution (Gaedke and Gräf, 2001). Being both a reusability-
and a life-cycle-centric approach, WebComposition defines a repository of
design artifacts and organizes the evolution into three cyclic stages, which
cover analysis, design and implementation (Gaedke, 2000). In (Trujillo
et al., 2007), the authors propose a MDD process to create web applications,
named portals, by making use of portlets as building blocks. While portlets
offer dedicated services like components do, they additionally “encapsulate
the presentation layer and all navigation that goes with it” and, thus, are
primarily suited for building user-facing applications (Díaz et al., 2008).
OMELETTE describes an open reference architecture, where engineers can
build web-based solutions upon, and assists them by integrating component
repositories and by providing tools like the automatic composition engine
to accelerate the engineering process (Chudnovskyy, Nestler, et al., 2012).
Employing specific models and languages, WebComposition supports
1) formalizing web-specific characteristics based on object-oriented
and technology-independent component-based modeling with the
WebComposition Component Model (WCCM), 2) describing components in
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a non-semantic manner with the eXtensible Markup Language (XML)-based
WebComposition Markup Language (WCML), and 3) modeling intercon-
nected building blocks of web systems in consideration of federation aspects
with the WebComposition Architecture Model (WAM) (A. Heil, 2012;
Meinecke and Gaedke, 2005). Using a UML-like notation, WAM allows for
characterizing essential entities and their associations within architectures
of web systems (Meinecke and Gaedke, 2005). An architecture model
described by WAM can represent different connection types, “organiza-
tional zones of control over networks, hardware and software system”
called security realms, and entities classes including web applications and
web services, in both disassociated and federated contexts. Enabling to
swiftly incorporate changes, WAM is a proven yet proprietary formalism for
modeling distributed solutions in consideration of trust and security aspects
on a technology-independent, service composition level (Meinecke and
Gaedke, 2005; Meinecke et al., 2007). As part of the reference architecture,
OMELETTE defines a dedicated IdP that can integrate identities of externals
domains in addition to performing common IdM activities.
Components are a generic, uniform concept for defining artifacts of web
systems. Unlike the models used in other web engineering approaches,
components are stronger bound to specific platforms and, thus, restrict
interoperability and require further means for description, interpretability
and processability. Facilitating the composition of web systems, CBWE
approaches provide sufficient yet limited scope and serviceability, while
taking aspects of security into account. Nevertheless, questions in terms of
identification, discovery, linking, access and protection of modeled com-
ponents remain not completely answered. Table 3.5 presents a summary
of the analysis results for CBWE approaches.
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Table 3.5: Analysis Results of Component-Based Web Engineering Approaches
Interoperability Processability Scope Security Serviceability
Summary of Web Engineering Approaches
Approaches that rely on models for driving the engineering of web sys-
tems intend to provide adaptability and reusability through abstraction
in the design phase, yet they yield solutions that are tailored to particu-
lar scenarios or use cases, and remain below their potential during run-
time. Even though such tailoring offers advantages, like an increase in effi-
ciency, for domain-specific engineering efforts, data-, hypertext, object- and
software-oriented WEAs bear deficits in interoperability through customiz-
ing models, including security models, to the requirements of particular
domains. Web engineering models can describe web systems independently
of platform and implementation language, yet these PIMs do not have this
level of abstraction in common in order to represent CIMs (Koch, Meliá-
Beigbeder, et al., 2008). WEAs permit building similar types of models,
but employ different graphical notations for them. The variety of exist-
ing domain-specific and often proprietary model description languages,
e.g., UML with additional notations, makes interoperability difficult, as
stated in (Koch, Meliá-Beigbeder, et al., 2008).
Limiting domain-independent use of models entails negative consequences
for processability, scope, security and serviceability, which becomes espe-
cially evident during runtime. Interoperability issues of models and asso-
ciated tools implicitly impair serviceability particularly for human actors
because they need to adjust to varying conditions, capabilities and features,
which requires additional training efforts. The web engineering community
just started addressing the topic of security in the last couple of years and
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has not yet provided an integral and widely adopted solution. By rejecting
a security approach covering multiple domains, IdM is bound to individual
applications by design, which in turn affects various runtime aspects like the
expressiveness of identities through limited attribute sets, restricted access
control settings or non-uniform management interfaces. This does not only
promote lock-in of users and their personal data, increase redundancy and
weaken (re-)usability, but it also interferes with Results 2 and 3. Data-,
hypertext, object- and software-oriented WEAs impede rapid prototyping
and agile development through necessitating a complex foundation of mod-
els before code generators can create implementation fragments. That
is, engineers that manually make adjustments or add extensions directly
to the source code have to properly reflect these changes within models
in order to avoid their automatic removal during future code generation
based on outdated models (Saleem et al., 2014). Unlike methodologies
that focus on obtaining customer feedback as early as possible through
running software, the plurality of web engineering approaches postpone
the technical implementation to a late stage in engineering.
Endeavors such as (Rivero et al., 2012) try to combine advantages of
different engineering methodologies; others like (Wimmer et al., 2007)
aim at increasing interoperability by establishing migration paths among
different WEAs (Vallecillo et al., 2007), yet they introduce model trans-
formations rather than aligning the underlying engineering process (A.
Heil, 2012). In (Koch, Meliá-Beigbeder, et al., 2008), the authors recom-
mend introducing a common metamodel to 1) partially meet the challenges
with respect to increasing universality and processability, and to 2) bear
positive effects on various engineering aspects like having holistic descrip-
tions and simplifying identification of arbitrary entities. Notwithstand-
ing these efforts, today’s data-, hypertext, object- and software-oriented
WEAs only represent a compromise, which does neither fully serve engi-
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neering universally applicable nor completely custom-tailored web sys-
tems that sufficiently focus on security.
Component-based web engineering approaches like WebComposition go
without a large set of detailed models in order to facilitate development,
maintenance and evolution of web systems and, thus, be in line with agile
software development methodology. While component-based methodology
shows advantages in scope, security and serviceability, they lack in pro-
foundly addressing interoperability and processability through a holistic
approach of describing and identifying building blocks of web systems at
the individual and composite level. Enriching CBWE by a light-weight
yet sound foundation of models bears the potential for not only improv-
ing diverse characteristics such as specification, search and selection of
suitable components, but also for providing an integral perspective on
security for both human and non-human entities.
Before the next subsection continues with discussing the outcome of the
IdMS analysis, Table 3.6 summarizes the results for web engineering ap-
proaches and associated tools using the criteria specified in Section 3.2.
Table 3.6: Analysis Results of Web Engineering Approaches and Corresponding
Tools in Terms of Collective Requirements
WEA Collective Requirements
Orientation Interoperability Processability Scope Security Srv.-ability
Data
Hypertext
Object
Software
Component
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3.3.2 Identity Management Systems
For analyzing IdMSs, we adapted and extended the classification proposed
in (Jøsang et al., 2015; Jøsang et al., 2007), with the result of distinguishing
overall eight models to IdM, where five models are primarily SP-centric and
three models are primarily user-centric. SP-centric models are designed to
fulfill the needs of service providers in the first place and, thus, SPs are in
charge of storing and controlling personal data of users. In contrast, user-
centric models empower individual entities to self-manage their personal
data by enabling them to exercise control about storage and access.
The discussion of analysis results starts with SP-centric models and
proceeds with user-centric models. For each model, we provide a
characterization, an assessment with regard to the requirements
stated in Subsection 3.2.2 and examples.
Remote Silo Model
By enabling SPs to authenticate users without requiring external IdPs,
the remote silo model is a SP-centric model, where each SP also acts as
IdP (Jøsang et al., 2007). In addition to their actual service offering, SPs
therefore provide custom-tailored facilities for IdM, e.g., handling of au-
thentication tokens and identity data of users. For historic reasons, it is a
widely adopted model. Based on (Jøsang et al., 2007), Figure 3.1 illustrates
this the remote silo model using the WAM notation, as discussed in Sub-
section 3.3.1 and described in (A. Heil, 2012). Here, an entity e requires
separate credentials for each individual identity managed at different SPs
(SP1, . . . , SP j , . . . , SPn). Each of those SPs acts in its own domain or, to be
more precise, security realm (SR) (SR1, . . . , SR j , . . . , SRn) with an inherent
IdP (IdP1, . . . , IdP j , . . . , IdPn) and a silo (Silo1, . . . , Silo j , . . . , Silon) storing
personal data associated with an identity (i1, . . . , i j , . . . , in) of entity e.
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Figure 3.1: Remote Silo Model (adapted from (Jøsang et al., 2007))
Prime examples include e-commerce applications and online banking appli-
cations. The remote silo model is simple in deployment, but it is designed
for the individual conditions of specific SPs, e.g., an OSN would have dif-
ferent needs to IdM in comparison to an online book store application. Its
use is adequate within so-called “walled gardens” and it allows for sharing
personal data only with SPs intended by a user (Yeung et al., 2009).
On the downside, it bears problems in handling many identifiers and as-
sociated credentials which users can only employ for individual SPs with
their particular namespaces (Jøsang et al., 2007). This can entail so-called
“password fatigue”, which has implications on control and protection (Sun
et al., 2010). While password fatigue is evident for all SP-centric models
to IdM, especially the remote silo model promotes this negative effect due
to a vast number of passwords users need to remember. This in turn can
provoke poor password quality and high password redundancy (Florêncio
and Herley, 2007). Users need to get along with a variety of individual
IdM facilities, which most likely differ between SPs. Having to deal with
different interfaces that offer different options for IdM decreases adequacy
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in terms of serviceability, particularly for users that rely on many SPs.
Moreover, the silo character of this model largely impairs openness and
transferability, e.g., by limiting identity linkage and discovery only to a
specific IdP (or SP) and fostering proprietary IdM solutions, which in turn
are hardly portable. Table 3.7 summarizes the results for the remote silo
model to IdM using the symbols introduced in Subsection 3.2.3.
Table 3.7: Analysis Results of Remote Silo Model
Adequacy Control Openness Protection Transferability
Common Domain Model
In contrast to the remote silo model, SPs and IdPs are separate entities
in the common domain model. Here, an IdP acts as central authority
and, thus, is responsible for several SPs sharing a namespace. That is, a
central authority carries out the IdM for a common domain. This simplifies
management of authentication tokens as well as enables to unify or reduce
identifiers and corresponding credentials, yet authentication per se is done
by SPs individually (Jøsang et al., 2007). Figure 3.2 depicts the common
domain model. It is obvious that entity e has to employ only one credential
for identity ih to authenticate to several SPs in a common domain SRh
with a shared IdPh and SP-specific data silos.
Prime examples include public key infrastructures (PKIs). When based
on certificate authorities (CAs) as central authorities, a PKI represents
a centralized trust model that uses hierarchically organized authority
chains (Caronni, 2000). It is a “set of hardware, software, people, poli-
cies, and procedures needed to create, manage, store, distribute, and
revoke digital certificates” (Stallings, 2010), which defines CAs for issu-
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Figure 3.2: Common Domain Model (adapted from (Jøsang et al., 2007))
ing digital certificates, establishing trustworthy certification chains, and
providing the infrastructure to verify the integrity of signed certificates.
That is, a PKI associates digital certificates with physical entities after
passing a strong review process. Here, an entity does only obtain a third-
party asserted identity, supported by a CA-signed certificate, after it has
intensely proven the claims made.
A PKI, however, bears several risks as discussed in (C. Ellison and Schneier,
2000), e.g., the centralization of authority, security and trust. If used in
the wrong hands, this can facilitate discrimination and espionage. These
risks do not solely apply to PKI, but to the common domain model. On a
global scale, this SP-centric model shares drawbacks in terms of control,
openness, protection and transferability with the remote silo model, albeit
in a somewhat weaker form. Such mitigation results from the consolidation
of IdPs, with the corresponding domains creating wider yet still walled
gardens (Yeung et al., 2009). The common domain model is inappropriate
when it comes to identity-related interactions across domains, such as reuse
of identifiers and identity data. Table 3.8 outlines these analysis results.
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Table 3.8: Analysis Results of Common Domain Model
Adequacy Control Openness Protection Transferability
Centralized SSO Model
Similar to the common domain model, a central authority represented
by an IdP serves multiple SPs per domain sharing the same namespace
in the centralized SSO model. However, authentication is not individu-
ally done by SPs, but happens in a centralized manner through an IdP
per domain (Jøsang et al., 2007). IdPs consequently have to send secu-
rity assertions, i.e., assertions to be checked in a security architecture,
to SPs either directly or indirectly via user agents. While this requires a
mutually agreed upon policy on IdM within a domain, it allows for SSO
and, thus, slightly contributes to adequacy and protection. That is, the
model is suited for more complex yet clearly defined environments with
multiple SPs, like in large organizations of the public or private sector.
Figure 3.3 illustrates the centralized SSO model for a single domain SRh,
with entity e authenticating either explicitly (as depicted) or implicitly to
a domain-wide IdPh using an appropriate credential for identity ih. After
successful authentication, entity e can access SPs in that specific domain
by means of security assertions obtained by IdPh.
Kerberos is a prime example of an implementation of this SP-centric
model (Jøsang et al., 2007). As summarized in Table 3.9, the centralized
SSO model shares many risks in open environments with the common
domain model, which is again due to the fact that many SPs would
have to trust few authorities represented by IdPs.
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Table 3.9: Analysis Results of Centralized-SSO Model
Adequacy Control Openness Protection Transferability
Multi-Domain SSO Model
Complementing the centralized SSO model, the multi-domain SSO model
involves support for multiple IdPs, where each is responsible for a particular
domain. The SP-centric model disallows direct interactions between IdPs
and SPs, i.e., all communication is redirected through user agents. As the
model is similar to the centralized SSO model for the most part, the already
introduced Figure 3.3 sufficiently illustrates the multi-domain SSO model
with the addition that entity e needs to employ separate credentials for
separate identities maintained at diverse domains.
A prime example of this model is InfoCard (Jones and McIntosh, 2008).
The ownership-based InfoCard approach tries to consistently represent
digital identities by so-called information cards, which are “analogous to
Credential 
for identity ih
SRh
SPnSPjSP1
IdPhSiloh
Entity e
Invocation including 
security assertion
Figure 3.3: Centralized SSO Model (adapted from (Jøsang et al., 2007))
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[. . .] physical identity and membership cards” (Hackett and Hawkey, 2012;
Maler and Reed, 2008). Such information cards either self-contain a set
of identity attributes or link to them, when stored on IdPs (Jøsang et al.,
2007). Although Microsoft decided to stop development for its InfoCard
implementation (Windows CardSpace) in 2011, the InfoCard approach
remains a valuable IdMS contribution (Barisch, 2012), which open-source
projects like Higgins (Trevithick, 2016) and Open InfoCard (Openinfocard,
2016) adopted and evolved further. InfoCards can represent both self-
asserted identities and third-party asserted identities (Maler and Reed,
2008). For selecting an InfoCard-based identity, users need a special
client tool (Dhamija and Dusseault, 2008).
Although these specialized agents contribute to improve control for users
with regard to identity selection, confirmation and redirection of identity
data or tokens that reference IdPs storing relevant personal data, they
also add dependencies that limit the applicability of the multi-domain
SSO model in different environments. To implement this model, operat-
ing system or browser vendors would have to integrate appropriate sup-
port (Jøsang et al., 2007). This in turn impedes transferability and openness,
where the latter is further weakened—in case of InfoCard—through relying
on non-web-compliant, binary identifiers that restrict universal linkage and
discovery (Jones and McIntosh, 2008). In (Barisch, 2012), the authors out-
line deficits in adequacy that are caused by “complex software development
[of InfoCard] for IdPs and [RPs]”. Like in the centralized SSO model, users
need to entrust personal data to third-party IdPs, where in case of InfoCard
such data consists of a neither extensible nor machine-readable attribute
set (Jøsang et al., 2007; Maler and Reed, 2008). Table 3.10 presents an
overview of the analysis results for the multi-domain SSO model.
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Table 3.10: Analysis Results of Multi-Domain SSO Model
Adequacy Control Openness Protection Transferability
Federated SSO Model
In addition to independently authenticating users for purposes that relate
to an individual SP, the federated SSO model enables SPs to recognize
identities through accepting security assertions on pre-authenticated users
from trusted SPs/IdPs (Cantor et al., 2005b; Jøsang et al., 2007). As of this
writing, the federated SSO model is a widely applied SP-centric model that
allows for mapping domain-specific identifiers upon each other and, thus,
form a federated domain, where each SP remains responsible for its own
namespace. This assists in referring to the same entity, even though different
identifiers are present. As a consequence, the model is compatible to the
remote silo model and also facilitates SSO in virtually open environments,
i.e., within federations of arbitrary size. Figure 3.4 depicts the model, where
SPs mutually trust each other; however, this is not stringently required.
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Credential
for identity in
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Figure 3.4: Federated SSO Model (adapted from (Jøsang et al., 2007))
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OpenID (Fitzpatrick et al., 2007) and Shibboleth (Cantor et al., 2005a) are
prime examples that actualize the federated SSO model. Other efforts for
assembling federated web applications include the yet abandoned Liberty
federation and the identity federation system (IdFS). In order to enable SSO
in accordance with the WS-Federation specification, IdFS provides an infras-
tructure consisting of IdPs, security token services and modules for linking
web applications and web services (Meinecke and Gaedke, 2005). Moreover,
social login providers such as Google adapted OAuth 2.0 (Hardt, 2012),
which is an authorization protocol in the first place, for authentication
and especially for SSO purposes (Hühnlein, Wich, et al., 2014). Here, RPs
have to trust these social login offering IdPs (Jøsang et al., 2015). As with
OpenID Connect (Sakimura et al., 2014) OAuth and OpenID are merged,
OAuth is not separately taken account of in the analysis of this model.
Both OpenID and Shibboleth cover similar use cases, but differ in their
individual implementation in various aspects, e.g., valid initiators of an
authentication, support for bindings and for single sign-out. Shibboleth
is based on the Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML), which is
the “most prominent standard for identity federation” (Jøsang, 2014) that
consists of a “set of specifications describing security assertions that are
encoded in XML, profiles for attaching the assertions to various protocols
and frameworks [. . .]” (Hodges et al., 2005). On the other hand, OpenID
represents a “lightweight alternative to SAML-based systems” (Barisch,
2012), which focuses on decentralization, easy setup and reduction of
the complexity of SAML. For instance, OpenID tolerates only a subset of
identifiers allowed in SAML, yet it provides Uniform Resource Identifier
(URI)-based identification of primarily human entities (Cantor et al., 2005b;
El Maliki and Seigneur, 2007). Although the OpenID specification does
not detail protection and trust matters on purpose, it is typically deployed
using passwords as proof of a user’s identity for the sake of applicability
and compatibility (Barisch, 2012; Maler and Reed, 2008). Unlike Shibbo-
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leth, OpenID does neither require an already established trust relationship
between IdP and RP nor it involves central authorities to approve new
RPs (Fitzpatrick et al., 2007; Hackett and Hawkey, 2012). With large
IT companies offering IdPs and enabling skilled users to do so on their
own, the adoption of OpenID swiftly increased, so that it is considered as
well-adopted by users today (Hackett and Hawkey, 2012). For many SAML-
based implementations (Mayer, 2013), like Shibboleth, the same holds true
in more constrained environments, e.g., organizations of the public sector.
For effective operation, the federated SSO model is designed to map iden-
tifiers among SPs. This, however, bears risks towards correlation of user
information within a federation (Jøsang et al., 2015). Moreover, such
mapping of identifiers is only insufficiently supported in practice in case
of OpenID, with the result that some RPs confuse users by offering nu-
merous choices for IdP-specific authentication, which is also known as
the NASCAR problem (Messina, 2009). That is, users have to trust SPs
and IdPs of a federation for properly handling and protecting their per-
sonal data. This is contradicted by the limited inherent capabilities OpenID
and Shibboleth provides to protect personal data against unauthorized
access (like integrity protection) and to assign, process and exchange self-
explanatory attributes. Even though extensions aim at resolving the latter
issue for OpenID 2.0 (Hardt et al., 2007), the direct application of these
IdMSs remains restricted to certain environments. Notwithstanding that
Shibboleth only permits strict XML-based attributes and OpenID Connect,
as successor of OpenID, relies on lightweight JavaScript Object Notation
(JSON), they both require clearly defined attribute sets (Hughes et al.,
2005; Sakimura et al., 2014). Without pre-negotiating vocabularies or
introducing mediators, this lack of control and openness in terms of flexi-
bility and extensibility makes these representatives of the federated SSO
model inappropriate for attaching further descriptive data to identifiable
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human and non-human entities in a holistic fashion. The analysis results
for the federated SSO model are condensed in Table 3.11.
Table 3.11: Analysis Results of Federated SSO Model
Adequacy Control Openness Protection Transferability
Omitted Silo Model
In order to elevate user control, the omitted silo model provides authenti-
cation that involves exchange of only a minimal attribute set characterizing
an identity. For the sake of minimal disclosure of personal data, the model
does neither consider advanced attribute handling nor storage of identity
data within silos. Figure 3.5 illustrates the omitted silo model with en-
tity e authenticating to a trusted security token provider (in this case a
certificate provider) that involves IdP∗. Having obtained a security asser-
tion after verifying the credential for identity i, entity e can access diverse
model-compliant SPs as an authenticated user.
SR*
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Cert.
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Invocation including security 
assertion through certificate
Credential
for identity i
SR1
Silo1
SP1
SRn
Silon
SPn
Figure 3.5: Omitted Silo Model
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BrowserID (Mozilla, 2013) is a prime example of this user-centric model.
It represents a hybrid knowledge/ownership-oriented IdMS that relies
on email addresses as identifiers and internally hands out certificates to
authenticated users (Akhawe et al., 2013; Bai et al., 2013). To prove
ownership of an email address, a BrowserID-based IdP issues a certificate to
a user after successful password-based authentication. Within a default time
frame of 24 hours, users can employ such certificates without requiring any
further IdP interaction (Bamberg et al., 2013). This contributes to control
and protection through making user tracking by IdPs difficult (Dietz and
Wallach, 2014). While (existing) email providers are primarily intended
as certificate issuers, Mozilla acts as a fallback. BrowserID is designed
for performing cryptographic operations on the client side, which makes
support for JavaScript obligatory (Hackett and Hawkey, 2012). Before
each authentication attempt, BrowserID asks for explicit user consent,
which allows for anonymity, but it also intentionally prevents automatic
SSO (Hackett and Hawkey, 2012). Characteristic for the omitted silo model,
attribute handling and exchange is of little relevance in BrowserID.
Although the omitted silo model per se enables comprehensive control
and protection, the abandonment of an inherent attribute management
bears negative consequences for openness and adequacy with regard to
serviceability. As a result of these missing capabilities, the model com-
pels users to store attributes individually per SP, i.e., which is similar to
the remote silo model with regard to attribute handling. Through rely-
ing on JavaScript, BrowserID shows additional deficits in protection and
transferability, e.g., it appears vulnerable to phishing attacks due to lo-
gin web page manipulation (Hackett and Hawkey, 2012). Furthermore,
the precondition of an all-encompassing support for efficient, client-side
JavaScript execution is not fully satisfied, especially when taking account
of aspects such as older devices, different web browsers or opposing user
preferences. Table 3.12 summarizes these results.
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Table 3.12: Analysis Results of Omitted Silo Model
Adequacy Control Openness Protection Transferability
Local Silo Model
Providing extensive control for users similar to the omitted silo model, the
local silo model involves an external, isolated and trusted device to verify
identity claims and (optional) store personal data (Jøsang et al., 2015).
Such personal authentication device (PAD) allows for authenticating a
user locally at first and then performing the login to a RP on behalf of the
pre-authenticated user either automatically or with explicit user consent.
A PAD can therefore be seen as some sort of personal IdP, which enables a
universal SSO solution (Jøsang et al., 2007). Figure 3.6 shows the local silo
model, where entity e authenticates towards the PAD once. A SR represents
the PAD in this figure. It also includes an IdM application, a data silo storing
personal data as well as credentials for the SPs used by entity e, and an
authentication service acting in concert with an IdP. After authenticating to
the PAD, entity e can invoke diverse SPs of multiple domains, with having
access conditions negotiated automatically between PAD and each SP.
OffPAD is a prime example of this user-centric model (Jøsang et al., 2015).
Other examples include FutureID (Hühnlein, Schmölz, et al., 2014) or
SkIdentity (Hühnlein, Hornung, et al., 2014), which also involve smart
cards, but additionally make use of mediators for bridging among diverse
IdM concepts (Hühnlein, Wich, et al., 2014). For the sake of focus on the
local silo model, these examples are neglected in the analysis. Undertaking
the management of identities and credentials decoupled from the environ-
ment usually employed for accessing web contents, OffPAD strengthens
security and improves usability (Jøsang et al., 2015). OffPAD supports user
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Figure 3.6: Local Silo Model (adapted from (Jøsang et al., 2007))
authentication through extending the HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP)
challenge-response framework, so that security-relevant operations are out-
sourced to the PAD (Jøsang et al., 2015). To improve privacy, OffPAD only
permits access to attributes for the time defined by the device. Furthermore,
OffPAD offers a common user interface to IdM independently from SPs.
Notwithstanding the advantages in control and protection, the local silo
model shows deficits in terms of openness, transferability and also adequacy
particularly in scenarios that deal with heterogeneous environments. For
authentication, a user needs to carry an additional device in form of a
PAD, where existing mobile and desktop platforms, operating systems or
web browsers have to be capable interacting with it in a trustworthy and
transparent manner. This bears the risk of introducing potential weak points
due to having to support various systems. What is a blessing for privacy
introduced by the PAD can be a curse for RPs with regard to accessibility
to identity attributes when the user in question is unavailable or offline.
Moreover, it is questionable how non-human entities can employ the local
silo model. Finally, the model does not specify what attributes can be stored
in which way on the device or smart card and how they can be exchanged
106 Chapter 3 State of the Art
with RPs, e.g., the so-called “eID” feature of the new german identification
card only allows for exchanging a couple of attributes (Gutwirth, 2015).
This might entail that SPs keep maintaining individual data silos. Table 3.13
outlines the findings for the local silo model.
Table 3.13: Analysis Results of Local Silo Model
Adequacy Control Openness Protection Transferability
Open Silo Model
Like the local silo model also the open silo model involves a mean un-
der exclusive user control that allows for storing personal data. Rather
than being dependent on 1) availability, on 2) online state and on 3) a
device users need to carry along, the open silo model focuses on enabling
universal access to personal data independently from a user’s individual
conditions and approvals, yet in line with pre-defined needs towards pri-
vacy. Therefore, the open silo model necessitates that identity owners store
their personal data at public domains they either (preferably) own or at
least trust. Characteristic for all user-centric models, also the open silo
model fosters distribution of personal data per user or per (relatively small)
group of users with the consequence of reducing the impact of successful
attacks. Although such impact reduction does not help affected individuals,
it relieves the vast number of users which would be affected through data
disclosure when relying on a SP-centric model instead.
Figure 3.7 illustrates this user-centric model, where entity e can store per-
sonal data in a dedicated silo within a trusted or owned domain represented
by SR∗. There, IdP∗ enables creating new identities and managing existing
ones. When accessing a SP, entity e decides on employing one of those
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Figure 3.7: Open Silo Model
identities, e.g., identity i. While a web service associated with IdP∗ allows
third parties for retrieving data related to identity i in a controlled way,
a web application assists entity e in managing personal data.
WebID (Sambra et al., 2014) is a prime example of the open silo model de-
vised by the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C). Representing a distributed
IdM approach, WebID enables users to globally authenticate themselves,
connect to each other and manage their identity data at self-defined places.
Therefore, it uses three interrelated artifacts: URIs to identify arbitrary
entities, profiles to semantically store personal data of identity owners, and
certificates to enable ownership-based authentication. Here, WebID URIs
also link to WebID profiles, which are resources that store personal data in
a flexible, extensible and machine-readable way using Resource Description
Framework (RDF)-based vocabularies like Friend of a Friend (FOAF) (Brick-
ley and Miller, 2014; Sambra et al., 2014). It is a crucial design aspect that
such personal data silos are owned by individual identity owners or entities
they trust. Instead of authorities, WebID empowers identity owners to main-
tain control of their data. Forming relationships between WebID profiles
through WebID URIs facilitates establishing the basis for creating distributed
OSNs, similar to alternatives like Diaspora (Bielenberg et al., 2012; Jahid
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et al., 2012; Tramp, Frischmuth, et al., 2012). Furthermore, WebID certifi-
cates are X.509v3-compliant, have no static expiration time as in BrowserID
and contain WebID URIs referring to WebID profiles that also store public
keys with the corresponding private keys being verified during the Transport
Layer Security (TLS) handshake (Cooper et al., 2008; Dierks and Rescorla,
2008; Inkster et al., 2014). By signing certificates appropriately, WebID
enables both self-asserted identities and third-party asserted identities.
Even though it would not be an implementation effort to enable SSO by
automatically selecting a favorite identity in form of a client certificate,
WebID does not offer SSO by default and, thus, it allows for anonymity if de-
sired (Hackett and Hawkey, 2012). That is, it requires explicit user consent
before each authentication attempt, which is similar to BrowserID (Hackett
and Hawkey, 2012). Unlike PKIs as an example of the common domain
model, WebID allows for implementing the web of trust (WoT) concept,
which represents a flat hierarchy only relying on individuals (Caronni,
2000). The open silo model strengthens responsibility of users for their
personal data. With personal data being available as Linked Data, i.e.,
accessible via URI and retrievable using established standards like SPARQL
Protocol and RDF Query Language (SPARQL) (Harris and Seaborne, 2013),
a controlled exploitation of profile data remains possible for SPs, e.g.,
to improve customer services or user experiences through customization
specific to authenticated users (Wild, Chudnovskyy, et al., 2013a). More-
over, WebID does not burden users with creating and remembering strong
passwords, but it necessitates that web browsers support X.509v3 client
certificates. By reusing the certificate selection dialog of web browsers,
WebID does not need a separate client for identity selection, as in case
of CardSpace (Dhamija and Dusseault, 2008).
Notwithstanding that the open silo model sufficiently fulfills all collective
requirements, as summarized in Table 3.14, it bears risks originating from
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the individual yet consolidated storage of personal data. For instance,
outages or successful attacks, e.g., tampering of personal data, would impair
IdM at once for all RPs an identity owner is associated with. Therefore,
the model requires that users either have enough expertise to protect the
systems used for storing their personal data or are supported by appropriate
tools respectively. With regard to applying fined-grained access control
and detecting misuse or tampering of profile data, WebID shares similar
deficits with other IdMSs like OpenID or BrowserID (Hackett and Hawkey,
2012). However, the open silo model and, consequently, WebID facilitates
flexibly extending profile data, e.g., add cryptographic signatures. Such
extension is not applicable to many other IdMSs due to their centralized,
closed, remote or restricted handling of personal data.
Table 3.14: Analysis Results of Open Silo Model
Adequacy Control Openness Protection Transferability
Summary of Identity Management Systems
The analysis of IdMSs shows that user-centric models are superior to SP-
centric models especially with regard to control, openness and protection.
This is partly due to the fact that users explicitly have to show more respon-
sibility for their personal data. While SP-centric models score in adequacy,
both groups of IdMSs are coequal in terms of transferability. The federated
SSO model sufficiently fulfills the collective requirements and ranks on
top of the group of SP-centric models, whereas the open silo model is the
user-centric model with the overall best results. None of the analyzed
models fulfills all requirements completely, yet the open silo model, with
WebID as a prime example, bears the greatest potential for enhancing con-
trol and protection by appropriate extensions made possible through its
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open approach. Before proceeding with investigating IdDLs in the next
subsection, Table 3.15 provides an overview of the analysis results.
Table 3.15: Analysis Results of Identity Management Systems in Terms of
Collective Requirements
IdMS Collective Requirements
Model Adequacy Ctrl Openness Protection Transfer.
Remote Silo
Common Dom.
Centralized SSO
Multi-Dom. SSO
Federated SSO
Omitted Silo
Local Silo
Open Silo
3.3.3 Identity Description Languages
To discuss the suitability of IdDLs, we employ a four-element grouping
consisting of proprietary, data interchange, markup and seman-
tic languages. Relying on criteria defined in Subsection 3.2.2, we
characterize, assess and illustrate each language type by examples
starting with proprietary languages.
Proprietary Languages
While not limited, diverse proprietary languages for describing identities
are prevalent in connection with the remote silo model and the common
domain model (cf. Subsection 3.3.2). This is especially due to the fact
that systems implemented on the basis of these models were developed
in-house and evolved independently from each other, i.e., without hav-
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ing a mutually agreed language specification for identity data in place.
Since SPs treated IdM as an afterthought yet as a necessary mean for the
actual service offering (cf. Section 1.2), e.g., order processing in online
shopping applications like Amazon, it is not unusual that languages and
functions related to IdM were designed for individual SP-centric use cases.
In consequence of SPs employing own DSLs, accuracy, appropriateness
and assurance capabilities of associated identity data fit only their specific
needs instead of the needs of the users. Together with storing identity
descriptions in internal databases rather than making them universally
accessible through web-based application programming interfaces (APIs),
this impairs portability of personal data to third parties.
Although there are efforts for making structured data on identities accessible
or exportable, like in case of (Facebook, 2015) accomplishing a federated
SSO model with Facebook Login (cf. Subsection 3.3.2), they lack thorough
implementation. It is obvious that the absence of semantics and schema
specifications for languages used to describe identities affects interpretabil-
ity, particularity for non-human entities. In contradiction to the sophisti-
cated data storage and processing technologies utilized by SPs internally,
they provide users with simplified identity descriptions, e.g., plain Hyper-
Text Markup Language (HTML) contents in case of Facebook exports (Berjon
et al., 2014). Here, these contents are designed for human entities, which
is furthermore affirmed by the fact that only identity owners can manually
trigger most export features. Despite such ambitions, proprietary languages
do only insufficiently meet the collective requirements. Table 3.16 summa-
rizes the results for proprietary identity description languages using the
symbols of the rating system established at the beginning of this chapter.
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Table 3.16: Analysis Results of Proprietary Languages
Accuracy Appropriateness Assurance Interpretability Portability
Data Interchange Languages
To tackle the problems of proprietary languages especially with respect
to their restricted appropriateness, interpretability and portability, data
interchange languages offer both domain-specific and general-purpose
alternatives in form of DSLs and GPLs. Although both types differ in the
scope of covered use cases, they aim at fostering exchange of data among
various providers. By relying on common languages for describing data,
including personal data on identities, SPs can benefit from standardized
tool sets made available with such languages for data structuring and
processing, e.g., through schema support or query processors.
Prime examples of data interchange languages include vCard (Perreault,
2011a) and JSON (Bray, 2014). While vCard represents a DSL for describ-
ing personal data of individuals, JSON is a GPL capable of expressing mis-
cellaneous data structures like arrays and dictionaries. The two languages
are widely supported standards and have their own Multipurpose Internet
Mail Extensions (MIME) types. Like all GPLs, also the common applicability
of JSON comes at the cost of a slightly increased overhead in expression and
processing in relation to a DSL, when only taking separate domains into ac-
count. However, the overhead of JSON is smaller compared to markup lan-
guages, e.g., by shorter delimiters (Bray, 2014). Additionally, JSON is exten-
sible, simple to process by human and non-human entities, and compatible
to JavaScript with only a few exceptions (Holm, 2015). There are also ef-
forts for standardizing schema definitions through JSON Schema (Galiegue
et al., 2013) and query languages, e.g., JSONPath (Goessner, 2007).
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On the downside, semantics and extent of DSLs like vCard are pre-defined
by a domain, whereas GPLs like plain JSON are applicable to multiple
domains with extensible attribute sets, but the latter lacks—in case of
JSON—inherent semantics and capabilities for intrinsic and extrinsic ob-
ject references14. Here, the meaning of structural elements results from
their relative position in the data set rather than from an explicit labeling.
Finally, data interchange languages allow for specifying assurances, yet
their interpretation highly depends on external knowledge and specialized
processors. Table 3.17 outlines these analysis results.
Table 3.17: Analysis Results of Data Interchange Languages
Accuracy Appropriateness Assurance Interpretability Portability
Markup Languages
Extending plain data interchange languages by annotations, markup lan-
guages indicate structural elements in data sets using explicit labels. So
they do not only enable to distinguish structure from text, but also permit
human entities for extracting hints on the meaning of thus annotated data.
A prime example of a markup language is XML (Bray et al., 2008), which
relies on a hierarchical model for organizing data. Being a human- and
machine-readable GPL, XML focuses on support for various applications,
easy creation and usability over the Internet (Bray et al., 2008). As XML,
however, permits representing the same information in different ways,
there is a strong need for schemas that specify the recommended struc-
ture. XML schema definition (XSD) (Fallside and Walmsley, 2014) complies
14Even though URIs within JSON data can link to external resources, a default language
processor is incapable of handling them without further instructions, e.g., whether to
merge or add data.
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with this need, whereas query support is available through technologies
such as XQuery (Boag et al., 2010) and XPath (Clark and DeRose, 1999).
Furthermore, there are XML representations for describing identities that
denote human entities, like xCard for vCard (Perreault, 2011b). On the
other hand, XML derivatives like the Web Application Description Lan-
guage (WADL) (Hadley, 2009) or the Web Service Description Language
(WSDL) (Chinnici et al., 2007) facilitate describing identities of non-human
entities in case of web applications and web services.
Compared to general-purpose data interchange languages like JSON, XML
is not that concise and reasonably clear as it is intended to be (Bray, 2014;
Bray et al., 2008). Moreover, (Tauberer, 2014) notes that XML is “not partic-
ularly suited for distributed, extensible information unless that XML looks a
lot like RDF”. Although markup languages enable human entities for obtain-
ing semantics from labels, this is not the case for non-human entities. Simi-
lar to data interchange languages, this has negative implications on accuracy,
appropriateness, assurance and portability, as summarized by Table 3.18.
Table 3.18: Analysis Results of Markup Languages
Accuracy Appropriateness Assurance Interpretability Portability
Semantic Languages
As an effort to improve interpretation of descriptions by non-human en-
tities without relying on extensive prior knowledge, semantic languages
aim for associating data with further information and, thus, enable to de-
termine underlying concepts and infer meaning. By enriching, detailing
and relating data to other data, it is possible to largely increase accuracy,
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appropriateness and portability of descriptions, yet this also depends on
availability and quality of associated data.
Prime examples for semantic languages include vocabularies created upon
RDF (Schreiber and Raimond, 2014). While originally intended for specify-
ing metadata in the context of markup languages like XML, RDF-based vo-
cabularies can also be employed independently as decentralized databases.
RDF enables to make statements about data using triple-logic involving
subject, predicate and object, where subjects can refer to multiple objects
through predicates and objects can also act as valid subjects. That is, RDF
implements a flexible, extensible and distributable data model through
a graph, which uses URIs as identifiers and as links to related concepts.
Schema definition languages such as RDF schema (RDFS) (Brickley et al.,
2014) and Web Ontology Language (OWL) (Bechhofer et al., 2004) fa-
cilitate specifying RDF-based vocabularies, whereas query operations are
supported through languages such as SPARQL (Harris and Seaborne, 2013).
In addition to serialize RDF-based statements completely as markup or
data interchange languages, like JSON for Linked Data (JSON-LD) (Sporny
et al., 2014), other approaches allow for embedding RDF triples within
these languages. These approaches include RDF in attributes (RDFa) to
“[. . .] augment the visual information on the Web with machine-readable
hints” (Herman et al., 2015), HTML Microdata (Hickson, 2013) and domain-
specific, vocabulary-providing microformats like hCard (Çelik and Suda,
2013). Here, hCard fully represents vCard (Perreault, 2011a) in HTML
with semantic annotations. To close the circle, technologies like Glean-
ing Resource Descriptions from Dialects of Languages (GRDDL) (Connolly,
2007) enable to recreate purified RDF graphs by extracting (relevant) RDF
triples from documents they were embedded in.
For describing different types of entities, there are various domain-specific
yet frequently interlinked semantic vocabularies available, which contribute
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to increase the “collection of interrelated datasets on the Web”, known as
Linked Data (W3C, 2015a). The Dublin Core (DC) (DCMI, 2012) ontol-
ogy, the FOAF vocabulary (Brickley and Miller, 2014), the contact ontol-
ogy (Berners-Lee, 2001) or the vCard ontology (Iannella and McKinney,
2014) are examples that enable to describe aspects of people and organiza-
tions in an open, standardized and machine-readable notation. Semantic vo-
cabularies for web applications and web services, however, usually focus on
one particular type of service aspect. While OWL-S, SAWSDL or WSMO are
designed for describing web services that involve the Simple Object Access
Protocol (SOAP), SA-REST and ROSM are tailored for services that imple-
ment the REpresentational State Transfer (REST) architectural style (Field-
ing, 2000; Lee and Kim, 2010). Although their service aspect specifications
vary in precision and scope, they share a unified type of description and
universal identification and, hence, provide advantages originating from
their RDF heritage including flexibility and ease of interpretation (Wild and
Gaedke, 2014). Supporting the specification of both RESTful and SOAP-
based web services in terms of message types, interfaces, bindings and end
points, the WSDL 2.0 RDF mapping is an example of a semantic description
language offering sufficient precision and scope (Kopecký, 2007).
To sum it up, semantic languages do almost completely fulfill the collective
requirements, as shown in Table 3.19. Assurances are supported by RDF-
based vocabularies through permitting variable extension and distribution
of related data via linking, which is an intrinsic part of the framework. Nev-
ertheless, assurances have to be made and processed individually because
of the domain-specific focus of RDF vocabularies.
Table 3.19: Analysis Results of Semantic Languages
Accuracy Appropriateness Assurance Interpretability Portability
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Summary of Identity Description Languages
When exchanging and processing identity descriptions among diverse
providers is a matter of concern, proprietary languages are not preferable.
Data interchange and markup languages partially address shortcomings of
proprietary languages through offering improved portability, interpretabil-
ity and appropriateness, but they lack in terms of linking and interpreting
data without having prior knowledge or pre-defined routines available.
Semantic languages cover these aspects well. Moreover, the analysis re-
sults for semantic languages indicate that they are not only well-suited for
describing people and machines, but also have the potential to address
the interoperability issues detected in web engineering models (cf. 3.3.1).
Before concluding the chapter in the next section, Table 3.20 summarizes
the analysis results using the criteria specified in Section 3.2.
Table 3.20: Analysis Results of Identity Description Languages in Terms of
Collective Requirements
IdDL Collective Requirements
Type Accuracy Appropriate. Assurance Interpret. Port.
Proprietary
Data Interch.
Markup
Semantic
3.4 Summary
By investigating approaches for web engineering, systems for IdM and
languages for describing identities, we retrieved an overview of tech-
nologies related not only to management of personal data, but also to
control and protection of such data.
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Focusing on reusability of building blocks, CBWE approaches offer strong
support for evolving web systems in relation to approaches orientating on
other aspects. Here, especially WebComposition in association with WAM
satisfies the collective requirements by considering the life cycle of web
systems and by providing conciseness, review and simplicity when designing
and making architectural changes to web systems. WAM enables to describe
composition of federated web systems and involved components as well as
their relations at a high level of abstraction. It is easy to apply during design
using a graphical notation and allows for automatic model verification
during system evolution (A. Heil, 2012). However, it lacks capabilities for
consistently describing and detailing semantics of involved entities, which
would assist in modeling web systems at different granularity levels and
improve interoperability and utilization of models through machines.
With regard to IdM, the open silo model is superior to alternative models
through fostering control, ownership, responsibility and self-determination
while ensuring accessibility to personal data. WebID is a promising repre-
sentative of a decentralized IdMS implementing this model. It 1) empowers
individual entities rather than authorities, 2) supports domain-independent
authentication involving certificates that offer high cryptographic strength,
3) utilizes flexible, extensible and machine-interpretable identity descrip-
tions, and 4) provides application-independent identification and linkability
of identities. Here, identities are not restricted to represent characteristics
of human entities only. Moreover, WebID facilitates consolidating personal
data and, thus, eases controlling access and privacy with the option of both
local and global revocation of identities or identity proofs respectively.
Easing interpretation and inference by machines, semantic languages
are well-suited for conceptual modeling and domain-specific de-
scriptions of identities in an accurate, expressive and portable way.
RDF-based vocabularies are application-neutral, standard-based and
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web-compliant. They enable to create adaptable, distributed, extensible,
interlinked and reusable descriptions of heterogeneous facts, which
human and non-human entities can then integrate, process or utilize
in a dynamic, scalable and seamless manner.
Now that technologies suitable for meeting the challenges outlined in
Chapter 2 have been detected, the next chapter proceeds with describing
how we make use of them as part of the proposed solution.
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4Enhanced Security
in Managing
Personal Data
To holistically address the challenges outlined in Chapter 2 with respect to
the suitability of technologies analyzed in Chapter 3, this chapter describes
an approach to enhance security in managing personal data by web systems.
Section 4.1 outlines the design of the proposed solution. Using the design,
Section 4.2 then specifies the solution architecture and process to enable
reusability and show possible integration points. Section 4.3 introduces
three key components that extend the fundamental solution architecture
in order to meet the remaining challenges. Not only to manifest the pro-
posed solution architecture and process, but also to establish a basis for
integrating the key components, Section 4.4 describes the proof-of-concept
platform. Summarizing our proposal for solving the central problem stated
in Section 1.2, Section 4.5 concludes this chapter.
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4.1 Design
For designing the solution, we involve three reusable artifacts that are
building upon each other. Each artifact represents a certain state of the
design through a particular model, i.e., conceptual model, logical model,
and physical model. Taking into account the principles of web engineer-
ing and WebComposition in particular (cf. Subsection 3.3.1), we facilitate
both adaptability and reusability through postponing the technical imple-
mentation until a sound security foundation has been established. As a
starting point, Subsection 4.1.1 describes the conceptual model. To ac-
complish a common understanding of the matter, this model only denotes
significant entities as well as the relationships between them, and creates
a generalized formal structure. Subsection 4.1.2 then outlines the logi-
cal model, which details the conceptual model by putting the concepts
into context, yet without considering the physical representation. Finally,
Subsection 4.1.3 specifies the physical model, which defines the basis for
the technical implementation of the logical model.
4.1.1 Conceptual Model
In order to model the concepts relevant for enhancing security in managing
personal data by web systems, we have to properly take account of all enti-
ties involved, i.e., particularly persons, web applications and web services.
For consistently defining these entities, we make use of semantic vocabu-
laries as they enable to apply the same metamodel by RDF and, thus, offer
advantages with regard to universal linkage, discovery, accessibility and
arbitrary detailing data (cf. Subsection 3.3.3). Therefore, we distinguish
between entity classes, entities and identities. While entity classes define
the general concepts of entities, identities characterize specific aspects of
entities within defined contexts (cf. Subsection 2.1.2 on “Terms and Def-
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initions”). For instance, Alice is an entity of entity class person and has
a co-worker identity representing her in a business context.
As an effort of making architectural descriptions of web systems machine-
readable and linkable, we use the WAM ontology proposed and extended
in (A. Heil, 2012; Wild and Gaedke, 2014). Modeled using OWL, the WAM
ontology does not only define the classes of web entities, legacy entities,
and security realms, but also their associations. To reflect the organizational
boundaries of control, both web and legacy entities can be contained within
security realms. The subclasses identity (service) provider, application, and
service are inherited from the web entity class. They might invoke other web
entities and maintain relationships to legacy entities, which are responsible
for tasks like storage or processing. Figure 4.1 illustrates the WAM ontology.
SubClassOf
SubClassOf
Data Unit
Legacy Entity
Process Unit
Security 
Realm Contains
TrustsContains
WebID URI
Web
Entity
Contains
Application
Service
Identity 
Provider
SubClassOf
SubClassOf
SubClassOf WebID URI
Invokes
Invokes
Legacy Relationship
Figure 4.1: WAM Ontology
Having extended WAM (Meinecke and Gaedke, 2005) towards a semanti-
cally enriched architecture model for web systems, we also have to consider
typical SOA implementations with SOAP and RESTful services. Similar to
above model definition, we detail the concepts present in such architectures
using domain-specific semantic vocabularies. A descriptive approach using
Linked Data facilitates systematic use by authorized services in later phases
and also assists in controlling the evolution of web systems as proposed
in (Wild and Gaedke, 2009). In addition to describing web applications
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and web services, this allows denoting the people involved as suggested
in (Maamar et al., 2011). For modeling identities that denote entities
of the class of web services, we rely on the vocabulary introduced with
WSDL 2.0 RDF mapping (Kopecký, 2007). Furthermore, we make use of
existing vocabularies such as FOAF or the contact ontology to character-
ize identities that refer to entities of the class of persons. Although other
ontologies enable to model the identities of the remaining entity classes
referenced in the WAM ontology, these classes are of less relevance for
this dissertation and, therefore, left out of consideration.
To clearly identify relevant representations of entities in an architecture
description of a web system, we need to detail essential concepts of identity
management first. For IdM we rely on WebID (Sambra et al., 2014). Not
only does WebID allow for identifying entities, but it also enables authentica-
tion and facilitates the creation of precise, extensible, interpretable, linkable
and portable descriptions (cf. Subsection 3.3.2). WebID is a distributed iden-
tification approach that involves three underlying artifacts for various pur-
poses, including recognition, characterization and legitimization. These ar-
tifacts are the WebID URI, the WebID profile and the WebID certificate. The
following formalism of WebID extends the definitions of Subsection 2.1.2.
A WebID URI refers to an identity i that represents entity e. Like a user-
name in other IdMS, a WebID URI w ∈ W ⊂ U is a URI denoting an
identity i, where W is the set of all WebID URIs and U is the set of all
URIs. Dereferencing a WebID URI w returns a set of RDF triples T ⊂ T
that describes personal attributes of identity i using Linked Data. While
T is the set of all RDF triples, each triple t ∈ T consists of subject t1,
predicate t2, and object t3. Equation (4.1) formalizes the dereferencing
through function α(u), which yields T for URI u being a valid WebID URI.
W = {u|α(u) = T}, u ∈ U (4.1)
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A WebID profile is a URI addressable resource. It is available at WebID
URI w and contains a set of RDF triples T describing identity i. As RDF is
used for specifying all personal data, an identity’s attributes are expressive,
extensible and machine-readable (Schreiber and Raimond, 2014). This
is a major advantages to other IdMSs, which are restricted in assigning
and exchanging user attributes. Such semantic descriptions facilitate con-
trolled large scale exploitation of profile data to optimize customer services
and improve the user experience (Wild, Chudnovskyy, et al., 2013a). As
RDF triples T span graph G = (V , L), G ∈ G, where G is the set of all
graphs, and graph G refers to a set of triples describing identity i, we
formalize this equivalence in Equation (4.2).
T ∼ G⇔∀t = (t1, t2, t3) ∈ T :
t1, t2, t3 ∈ V ∧ (t1 t2) ∈ L ∧ (t2, t3) ∈ L
(4.2)
In addition to being a semantic repository for personal data of an identity i, a
WebID profile also contains a set of public keys described by triples T K ⊂ T .
Each single public key k′ ∈ K is described by triples T k′ ⊆ T K , where
K ⊂ K is the set of asymmetric keys owned by identity i and K the
set of all asymmetric keys. T k′ specifies diverse attributes of a public
key k′, including type, modulus and exponent. A k′-corresponding private
key k′−1 ∈ K allows for proving that an identity i actually owns public
key k′. Equation (4.3) defines the relation between k′ and k′−1 by means
of function β(k, m), which maps messages M and the set of keys K on the
set of messages, where key k ∈ K and message m ∈ M .
β : K×M → M β(k′,β(k′−1, m)) = m ∀m ∈ M (4.3)
A WebID certificate X k′ ∈ X ⊂ X contains WebID URI w and public key k′
of an identity i, where X is the set of WebID certificates associated with
an identity i and X is the set of all WebID certificates. This is formalized
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by Equation (4.4). WebID certificate X k′ is signed with the corresponding
private key k′−1 or the private key of a trusted party.
X k′ = (w, k
′) (4.4)
An identity i = (w, T) is described by WebID URI w and personal data T
contained in the associated WebID profile. Unlike knowledge-based authen-
tication approaches using username/password pairs as proof of identity,
WebID is an ownership-based authentication approach. For authentication,
it relies on public key data available in both WebID profile and certifi-
cate. An identity i is authenticatable when i has a WebID certificate X k′
containing a public key k′ for which i owns the corresponding private
key k′−1, as defined in Equation (4.5).
i = (w, T ) is authenticatable⇔∃k′ : T k′ ⊂ T ,∃X k′ ,∃k′−1 (4.5)
The above stage of authentication is performed after the ownership of the
private key k′−1 is proven during the TLS handshake (Dierks and Rescorla,
2008). Building on the conceptual model, the next subsection continues
with discussing the authentication flow as part of the logical design.
4.1.2 Logical Model
Relating the concepts of the prior model, the logical model puts them into
context by outlining valid sequences of their usage. The logical model
also details the conceptual model, so that we can apply now established
capabilities for identification not only to the entity class of person, but
also to web and legacy entity classes defined by the WAM ontology. This
enables to employ WebID URIs for identification (cf. Figure 4.1) and for
referencing open silos of personal data that specify identity attributes. By
laying the foundation for entities of arbitrary class to refer to each other
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and access associated data, it becomes possible that persons can reference
and retrieve data of machines and vice versa. Having set the identification,
authentication follows as the next logical step.
In accordance with the WebID-TLS specification (Inkster et al., 2014),
Figure 4.2 illustrates the logical authentication flow as a UML sequence
diagram. Here, entity e intends to access a resource made available by
a web entity. For the sake of simplicity and understandability, let e be
a person called Alice that employs a user agent, like a web browser, to
perform the request on her behalf. Let furthermore the resource-providing
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7
Figure 4.2: Default WebID Authentication Sequence
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web entity be a storage server. Acting as a SP, the storage server allows
for authenticating users via WebID. To request a particular resource stored
on the server, Alice has to initiate a secure connection via her user agent.
Having established a TLS-secured connection in 1©, a guard shielding the
storage server directly intercepts Alice’s actual request sent in 2©. The
guard parses the request to match the detected target and existing access
control settings in 3©. If the requested resource is access controlled, the
guard asks Alice for authenticating herself by providing a credential in form
of a WebID certificate in 4©. Given that principal Alice selected an identity i
through WebID certificate X k′ for which she owns the corresponding private
key k′−1, the public key k′ of the certificate is compared to a valid one
found in Alice’s WebID profile (cf. Equation (4.5)). That is, this valid
public key described by T k′ has to be out of T , which in turn represents
all personal data stored in the profile associated with her identity i. The
WebID verifier, being responsible for this check, therefore automatically
retrieves Alice’s WebID profile. This is done by dereferencing WebID URI w
stored in WebID certificate X k′ , which Alice has been provided. Here, not
the SP, but another server hosts Alice’s WebID profile. It is important to
note that Alice either owns or sufficiently trusts this profile-hosting server
in its role as IdP. Assuming that both public keys are identified as equal
in 5©, Alice is potentially granted permission to the requested resource
in 6©, which she eventually accesses in 7©.
On closer examination of above default authentication flow, we can make
a number of observations relevant for the further course. While a person
represents the requesting entity in this case, e could also have been a non-
human entity, like another web service, without changing anything on
the sequence shown in Figure 4.2. With an IdP offering a WebID profile
that includes both personal data and essential means for a successful au-
thentication, it is necessary that SPs not only can access the WebID profile
on such system, but also trust data described therein. On the side of the
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requesting entity, a user agent has to assists in selecting a WebID certifi-
cate. During authentication, the principal does not have an opportunity to
review and approve that statements inside the WebID profile are correct
and as indented by the identity owner. Individual circumstances of the SP,
the IdP and most importantly the requesting entity are not taken account
of. Moreover, any SP retrieving the WebID profile obtains the identical
view on personal data independently from its own identity. Even though
identity owners could adjust access to personal data by creating multiple
identities with varying data sets stored inside the corresponding WebID pro-
files, keeping personal data among different WebID profiles in sync would
be an additional maintenance effort. By extending the IdP by means for
authentication similar to those of the SP, it would be possible to distinguish
between different sources that attempt to retrieve profiles.
Now that we have explained the logical modeling of the underly-
ing concepts, the following subsection adds further details in order
to create the physical model.
4.1.3 Physical Model
With the concepts and logic defined in the previous subsections,
the physical model builds on them to facilitate the technical im-
plementation as a subsequent step.
Figure 4.3 shows the physical model of the WebID artifacts. Here, WebID cer-
tificate X k′ is a common X.509 client certificate as per (Cooper et al., 2008).
It contains only non-essential personal data like the subject statement, which
however can assist human entities in locating the right certificate. More
importantly, X k′ stores WebID URI w in its Subject Alternative Name (SAN)
property in (cf. A© in Fig. 4.3) as well as public key k′ by specifying algo-
rithm, modulus and exponent (cf. B©). Dereferencing w returns a specific
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…Issuer: O=FOAF+SSL, OU=The Community of Self
Signers, CN=Alice Anderson
···
Subject: O=FOAF+SSL, OU=The Community Of Self
Signers, CN=Alice Anderson
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
Public-Key: (2048 bit)
Modulus: 00:cb:25:…
Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
X509v3 Extensions:
X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
URI: https://example.org/alice#aa
···
WebID Certificate
@prefix xsd: <http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#>.
@prefix rdfs: <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#>.
@prefix foaf: <http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/>.
@prefix cert: <http://www.w3.org/ns/auth/cert#>.
@prefix profile: <https://example.org/alice#>.
profile:aa a foaf:Person;
foaf:name “Alice Anderson”;
foaf:knows <https://example.com/bob#me>;
cert:key [ 
a cert:RSAPublicKey;
rdfs:label “Made Monday, May 8, 2013 3:16”;
cert:modulus “00cb25...”^^xsd:hexBinary;
cert:exponent 65537;
].
WebID Profile
available at WebID URI https://example.org/alice#aa
B
A
D
C
Figure 4.3: Artifacts in WebID: Certificate, URI and Profile
representation of a WebID profile made available at that location (cf. C©).
Valid representations include JSON-LD, Notation3 (N3) (Berners-Lee and
Connolly, 2011), RDF/XML (Gandon and Schreiber, 2014) or Turtle (Beck-
ett et al., 2014), where compliant accessors must stringently support the
latter. RDF triples T stored in the WebID profile are depicted in Turtle syntax.
In addition to applying common semantic vocabularies or adequate exten-
sions like RDF, RDFS and XSD, RDF triples T k′ specify a k
′-corresponding
public key (cf. D©) using the cert ontology (Story, 2008). While RDF
enables employing various ontologies, it is apparent that T describes per-
sonal data associated with an identity of a human entity via appropriate
attributes using the FOAF vocabulary (Brickley and Miller, 2014).
In addition to identity descriptions of human entities (cf. Figure 4.3), WebID
profiles allow for describing identities of arbitrary entities without alter-
ing process and technologies involved for identification, authentication,
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attribute access or retrieval. As an example, Listing 4.1 shows the WebID
profile associated with a WAM-compliant web entity.
The listing describes an accounting web service by semantically specify-
ing diverse characteristics including the public key k′ used for authen-
Listing 4.1: WebID Profile of a Web Service (non-essential RDF triples are skipped)
1 @prefix wsdl: <http ://www.w3.org/ns/wsdl -rdf#> .
2 @prefix foaf: <http :// xmlns.com/foaf /0.1/ > .
3 @prefix cert: <http ://www.w3.org/ns/auth/cert#> .
4 @prefix owl: <http ://www.w3.org /2002/07/ owl#> .
5 @prefix aSrv: <https :// example.org/AccountingService #>.
6
7 aSrv:me a foaf:Agent;
8 foaf:name "Accounting Service ";
9 foaf:maker <https :// example.org/BobBuilder#me >;
10 owl:sameAs aSrv:wsdl .
11 cert:key [ a cert:RSAPublicKey;
12 cert:modulus "a45d1e ..."; cert:exponent 65537; ];
13 foaf:knows <https :// example.org/DatabaseService#me ;
14 foaf:knows <https :// example.org/ReportingService#me >;
15
16 aSrv:wsdl a wsdl:Description;
17 wsdl:interface aSrv:interface;
18 wsdl:binding aSrv:bindingHTTP , aSrv:bindingSOAP;
19 wsdl:service aSrv:service .
20
21 [...]
22
23 aSrv:service a wsdl:Service;
24 wsdl:endpoint aSrv:endpointHTTP , aSrv:endpointSOAP;
25 wsdl:implements aSrv:interface; [...] .
26
27 aSrv:endpointHTTP a wsdl:Endpoint;
28 wsdl:address <https :// accounting.ex.org/rest/>;
29 wsdl:usesBinding aSrv:bindingHTTP; [...] .
30
31 aSrv:endpointSOAP a wsdl:Endpoint;
32 wsdl:address <https :// accounting.ex.org/soap/>;
33 wsdl:usesBinding aSrv:bindingSOAP; [...] .
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tication (cf. lines 11 and 12), associated services identified via WebID
URIs (cf. lines 13 and 14), and endpoints to access resources provided
by the web service (cf. lines 23 to 33).
With defining artifacts at this level of detail, we can determine the use of
Turtle for representing semantic descriptions of personal data, SPARQL for
queries and OWL for schema definitions. That is, to transform the physical
model into executable source code, these technologies need to be supported
by suitable programming languages and libraries. After completing the
physical state, the next section reports on the integration of the design
artifacts into the solution architecture and the associated process.
4.2 Architecture and Process
For assembling the design artifacts described in the previous section, we fac-
tor in the various objectives different stakeholders have in terms of a satisfy-
ing solution. The findings retrieved by investigating the challenges in Chap-
ter 2 suggest that an enhanced security in managing personal data necessi-
tates to take account of relevant entities present in web-based architectures.
Relevant entities include both the components, like web applications or
web services, and the users that interact with these entities, i.e., persons or
other components, through certain interfaces either explicitly or implicitly.
By making use of light-weight models, we intend to deliver Result 1: “Im-
proved Modeling of Security Aspects for Web Systems” by enabling an inte-
gral perspective on security for both human and non-human entities and im-
prove diverse attributes at design time and runtime. Our proposition builds
upon WebComposition as a CBWE approach and WAM as an architectural
modeling method that puts importance on security. To assist in modeling
web systems at different granularity levels, improve interoperability and in-
132 Chapter 4 Enhanced Security in Managing Personal Data
crease the utilization of models through machines, we implement a holistic
approach to consistently identify and semantically describe relevant entities.
In line with the vision of utilizing semantics in a broader and integrative
context (Papazoglou et al., 2007), the proposed solution involves iden-
tification and semantic description for persons, individual components
and compositions resulting from CBWE efforts. Through providing also
non-human entities with identities, we facilitate the application of eligi-
ble building blocks when engineering web systems. Here, WAM helps
engineers to model architectures of web systems with respect to security
matters, where the proposed solution allows for universally identifying
and semantically describing included components, like web services, in
an expressive manner (Wild and Gaedke, 2014). In addition to describe
components, it also enables to specify their relationships through trust
bonds and invocations as well as their affiliations through security realms
within the architecture (cf. Activity 1.1: “Extend Means for Modeling Secure
Web Systems”). To this end, we provide appropriate support by tools, as
described in the remainder of this chapter. Resulting architecture models of
web systems are made retrievable via URI-accessible, semantic descriptions
as per WAM ontology (cf. Figure 4.1) through relying on RDF.
Rather than realizing a push model, where users entrust SPs with manage-
ment and storage of their data, we propose an architecture that forces a pull
model, where interested parties can actively obtain personal data from the
users’ individual repositories according to their conditions. In concert with
delivering Result 2: “Reduced Need for Accumulation of Personal Data by
Third Parties”, we nurture a controlled user-centric integration of personal
data by implementing the open silo model (cf. Subsection 3.3.2), where
identity management and storage are decoupled from usage of identities
and associated data. Our proposition hereby regards the objectives of in-
dividual persons, companies and governments. It also considers essential
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elements of identity management, i.e., digital identities, storage and inte-
gration of personal data and related processes (Dinger and Hartenstein,
2008). Relying on the basis established through WebID, we enable arbitrary
entities to holistically manage personal data associated to their identities at
self-defined web-accessible locations, which are either under their exclusive
control or in control of entities they sufficiently trust. Yet, this also implies
that identity owners have to take over responsibility through governing
access, quality and protection of (their) personal data.
The proposed architecture involves four inherent elements: an IdP, a per-
sonal data repository, a protection service and tool support for identity
management. Regardless of whether a system implementing this archi-
tecture serves one or many entities, all four architectural elements have
to be present in order to allow a self-deterministic identity management
with focus on security of personal data. While we refer to these elements
individually, they are combinable with each other in order to create con-
solidated service offerings. Figure 4.4 exemplarily illustrates the proposed
architecture using WAM. Here, an IdP (cf. A©) allows for creating an iden-
tity representing an entity in a certain context. Furthermore, a central
repository (cf. B©) semantically stores all data associated with this iden-
tity. Along with assisting in accomplishing diverse IdM-related tasks, an
identity management application (cf. C©) enables an entity to express the
conditions to which third parties can access personal data owned by this
particular entity. A service protecting personal data stored in the repository
(cf. D©) enforces the conditions defined by the entity owning the data.
Depending on the trust relationships15 between an entity making personal
data available and potential requesting entities (cf. E©, F© and G©) as well
as the legitimization provided by them, the protection service permits or
15For the sake of simplicity in illustrating the trust relationships in Figure 4.4, we assume
that only one identity is employed per security realm.
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Figure 4.4: Architecture for Self-Deterministic Identity Management
denies access to certain personal data sets. Moreover, the protection service
safeguards personal data from several threats, as outlined in Section 4.3.
For fostering self-deterministic IdM on the basis of the open silo model
and means for an enhanced security, the proposed solution defines a five-
stage life cycle valid for identities of both human and non-human entities.
Figure 4.5 schematically illustrates this IdM life cycle, where identity man-
agement begins with the stage of initiation followed by provision, moves
on with the potentially recurring stage of operation, and ends up with the
stage of deprovision before final termination. While combining initiation
with provision and deprovision with termination are valid options, treat-
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Figure 4.5: IdM Life Cycle as per Proposal
ing these stages separately allows for more flexibility in IdM, as further
explained when characterizing each stage in the following:
Initiation Employing an own or a sufficiently trusted IdP, an entity triggers
the creation of an identity, which consists of at least a universally unique
identifier. The identity owner either manually specifies or automatically
generates such identifier.
Provision According to the entity class an identity has been created for,
an IdP declares a default set of vocabularies and optionally assigns com-
mon attributes to the identity, which have been provided by the initiating
entity. That is, an identity of a human entity involves vocabularies and
attributes different to those of identities of non-human entities, e.g., a
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composition or a web service. Furthermore, an entity can decide upon
applying precautions for tampering protection of data associated with an
identity (cf. Section 4.3). In line with individual preferences and privacy
needs, an entity can optionally determine the parameters of the credential
to be issued by an IdP16 for a created identity, such as the type of signature,
cryptographic strength and validity (cf. Section 4.3). Depending on the
selected parameters, the proposed solution enables creating self- as well as
third-party asserted identities. Finally, the IdP preconfigures the privileges
for managing the identity by setting appropriate access control rules.
Operation Contrary to other stages in the IdM life cycle, the stage of
operation particularly contains ongoing and recurring activities that nec-
essarily imply provisioned identities. Representing a practicable choice
for both human and non-human entities, the proposed solution specifies
ownership-based authentication of users. When authenticating to an IdP
with an appropriate credential, an identity owner can control various as-
pects concerning the identity in question. Among other things, these aspects
include characterizing an identity semantically using an extensible set of
class-related attributes, establishing links to other human or machine iden-
tities, and maintaining credentials. To execute operations on behalf of
identity owners, IdPs need access to personal data. By setting permissions
to personal data in a homogeneous way, identity owners are elevated in
the position to control access for requesting entities of arbitrary class. For
further enhancing the security in self-deterministic IdM, the proposed solu-
tion supports and protects identity owners through context-aware control,
tamper-evidentness, fine-grained filtering of personal data, which represent
integral yet discrete operations provided by individual components (cf.
Section 4.3).
16The IdP used for initiation may be distinct from the IdP issuing the credential, yet not
without causing some disadvantages in user experience and automatic data integration.
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Deprovision On behalf of the identity owner, the IdP releases the depro-
visioning by disabling the attributes associated with the identity and by
revoking access through putting corresponding privileges on hold. Dis-
abling the attributes prevents the identity owner from authentication and,
thus, authorization on a global scale, i.e., independent of specific SPs.
Termination With finishing the stage of deprovision, the IdP finally re-
moves the identity and associated attributes so that the identifier is not
longer valid. Moreover, the IdP deletes all privileges on hold. In contrast to
other IdMS, it is the entity’s responsibility to erase the credential associated
with the identity, i.e., the digital certificate.
The IdM life cycle applies to relevant entities present in web-based ar-
chitectures. In comparison to persons and components, however, com-
positions take a special role. With reference to Figure 4.6, which illus-
trates the IdM life cycle for compositions by making use of the Business
Process Model and Notation (BPMN), we detail this process for compo-
sitions in the next two paragraphs.
Even though the stages of initiation and provision for identities of composi-
tions (cf. 1© in Fig. 4.6) are quite similar to other classes of entities, the
stage of operation involves two tiers of identity management: one for the
composition and another one for involved components. When describing
the architecture of a web systems using WAM in 2©, engineers can not
only denote components according to the WAM ontology, but also their
connections and associations to security realms (cf. Activity 1.1). After
modeling the web system at the composite level, web engineers can discover
and integrate eligible components in 3©. In case no suitable component is
available, an identity specifying the missing component has to be created
prior to the actual implementation in 4©. Web engineers must therefore
initiate the IdM life cycle for each non-existing component (cf. 5© and
8©). Once an identity representing a component is created, engineers can
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Figure 4.6: IdM Life Cycle for Compositions
describe specifics of the new identity in 6© by employing known semantic
vocabularies such as the WSDL 2.0 RDF mapping, in case the component is
a web service. The proposed solution also enables web engineers to refer
to already existing components by their identifiers in order to acquire data
associated with their identities, e.g., interface definitions or statistical data
(cf. 7©). It is worth noting that components represented through identities
are not bound to particular compositions by design, but can be employed
in multiple compositions in accordance with prevailing policies. That is,
components, which were used in a composition that became outdated or un-
necessary for some reason, might still be applicable in other compositions.
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Beyond the stage of initially modeling web systems, web engineers also
benefit from the proposed solution after a composition has been deployed.
During runtime of a web system, service providers can reflect changes to
components, like new endpoints extending an existing interface, in updating
associated identity data. By monitoring, discovering and obtaining updated
identity data via WebID URIs ( 9© in Fig. 4.6), web engineers and also
capable components can learn from propagated changes and potentially
adapt to them in a semi-automatic fashion through interpreting semantic
component descriptions (Wild and Gaedke, 2014). If adjustments to a
web system are feasible, web engineers can reenter the inner process loop
with modifying the underlying model (cf. 2©).
Moreover, the proposed solution allows entities for authenticating them-
selves and retrieving—if authorized—runtime parameters of other entities,
like the current utilization of a web service or the number of issues emerged
within a specific period (Wild and Gaedke, 2009). For authentication ac-
cording to WebID, entities like web services can employ evidence for a
claimed identity through an ownership-based credential issued during pro-
vision, i.e., a WebID certificate as explained in Subsection 4.1.1. Holistically
enabling semantic description, universal identification and access control
for compositions and components, the proposed solution supports web en-
gineers in maintaining and evolving web systems using light-weight models
(cf. Result 1: “Improved Modeling of Security Aspects for Web Systems”
and Activity 1.1: “Extend Means for Modeling Secure Web Systems”). For
example, engineers can detect a busy web service within a composition by
means of propagated runtime parameters and find eligible alternatives that
feature compatible interfaces while being more responsive. Providing an
up-to-date big picture of the architecture, the proposed solution facilitates
a systematic, well-directed and controlled maintenance and evolution of
web systems (Wild and Gaedke, 2009; Wild and Gaedke, 2014).
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While the IdM life cycle mostly relates to functions of IdPs, service providers
have to be considered as well during the stage of operation, albeit less
comprehensively. An IdP acts as a particular SP that is specialized in iden-
tity management. Similar to other IdMSs, SPs must integrate appropriate
software modules to support authentication as per WebID. The proposed
solution does explicitly not involve that SPs maintain own repositories for
storing personal data, but they still can access data associated with an iden-
tity, like personal data, under the terms of the corresponding identity owner.
During operation, both IdPs and SPs must therefore ensure that se-
curity measures taken by identity owners are in force and obeyed.
In order to so by delivering Result 3: “Extended Means for Control
and Protection of Personal Data”, the following section introduces
three key components for enhancing security.
4.3 Key Components for Enhanced
Security
To enhance security in managing personal data by web systems, it is not
sufficient to only secure web applications and web services that exploit
data associated with identities. The systems that offer data have to be
protected as well. It is evident from the IdM life cycle (cf. Figure 4.5) and
the architecture (cf. Figure 4.4) that we have to particularly protect identity
(service) providers, as they make personal data on identities available.
The fact that our proposal towards self-deterministic identity management
involves centralized data repository in control of identity owners further-
more underlines the absolute necessity to specially focus on protecting IdPs.
Nevertheless, the cooperation by SPs is mandatory for implementing a holis-
tic and comprehensive approach towards protection. When identities are
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about to be employed by entities, SPs have to confirm that protective mea-
sures are in place and taken into account during authentication attempts.
In line with delivering Result 3, we consequently dedicate key components
to safeguard personal data managed by identity (service) providers from
three main types of threats, i.e., improper use, tampering and identity theft,
and unwanted retrieval (cf. Activities 3.1 to 3.3 on page 58). As the use
of the components is part of the IdM life cycle as per our proposal, we
symbolically illustrate the intrinsic processes related to them at the top of
Figure 4.5, with detailed explanations to follow in Chapters 5 to 7.
For taking advantage of these key components, we integrate them into
the WebID authentication sequence and, thus, extend the original process
shown in Figure 4.2. There, entity e, exemplarily named Alice, wanted to
retrieve an access-controlled resource and had to authenticate with her
WebID certificate before. The extension to this process by our solution
is labeled “Security enhancement by proposal” and highlighted bold in
Figures 4.7 and 4.8. Here, 1© to 5© are analogous to Figure 4.2. Our
proposal adds 6© and 7©, as shown in Figure 4.7. These two extra steps are
responsible for coping with Problem Cause 3.2: “Risk of Identity Theft and
Tampering of Personal Data” and Problem Cause 3.1: “Insufficient Control
of Identity Based on Individual Context” (cf. pages 45 and 47) through
verifying both the integrity of personal data and the delegation rights stored
within an identity owner’s WebID profile. Both allow detecting tampering
and improper use of personal data corresponding to WebID identity owners.
As an example, this assists in discovering malicious requests originating by
profile data compromised by aggressors or subjects seemingly acting on
the identity owner’s behalf yet not within mutually agreed upon scopes.
On the side of the IdP hosting Alice’s WebID profile, our proposal adds a
mechanism to address Problem Cause 3.3: “Incomplete Range and Granu-
larity of Access Control” (cf. page 48) through creating customized views
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Figure 4.7: Security-Enhanced WebID Authentication Sequence for SPs
that are specific to requesting entities and, thus, avoid unwanted disclosure
of Alice’s personal data, as depicted in Figure 4.8.
All three key components are complementary, rely on pre-existing security
artifacts and help to increase the protection of personal data (Wild et al.,
2015). They are intended to seamlessly fit into the RDF-based semantic
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landscape and contribute assuring quality and maintainability by reduc-
ing adjustments and extensions to the necessary minimum. Unlike both
verification mechanisms that are integrated on the service provider’s side,
protection against unwanted disclosure is only available on a system host-
ing an identity owner’s WebID profile, i.e., an IdP. Since an IdP hosting
a WebID profile serves incoming profile requests as well, the verification
mechanisms could be also integrated there in order to check requests
initiated by subjects authenticated via WebID.
The next three subsections briefly describe the key components enriching
our proposal by measures for increased protection and control. While
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Subsection 4.3.1 outlines a way for avoiding improper use of personal data
by subjects acting outside their scope yet on behalf of identity owners (cf.
7© in Figure 4.7), Subsection 4.3.2 explains how WebID profiles can be
secured from malicious manipulation by offering an integrity protection and
detection mechanism (cf. 6© in Figure 4.7). Subsection 4.3.3 presents the
third key component. There, we show our contribution against unwanted
retrieval attempts using fine-grained filters.
4.3.1 Context-Aware Control
In order to resolve Problem Cause 3.1: “Insufficient Control of Identity Based
on Individual Context”, 3.1.1: “Inadequate Consideration of Individual User
Conditions”, 3.1.2: “Risk of Improper Use of Identity Data in Delegation
Scenarios” and 3.1.2.1: “Missing Control of Delegation Conditions by Dele-
gators” by carrying out Activity 3.1: “Improve Control of Identity Based on
Individual Context”, the component for context-aware control complements
the proposed solution by measures for an improved consideration of individ-
ual conditions, stated preferences and current contexts of users by web sys-
tems, including web applications and web services (Wild, Ast, et al., 2013;
Wild and Gaedke, 2014). Here, we focus on the provision in the IdM life
cycle because decisions made by identity owners at this stage fundamentally
affect the security in managing personal data also during future operations.
When recalling the bank analogy we first employed when describing the
problem in Section 1.2, it is obvious that customers choose banks that fit
their preferences and security needs by offering appropriate assurances, like
a solid legitimization process. That is, customers can control the terms their
monetary capital is managed and protected. Similar to limited authorities
of bank accounts, which bank customers can issue to other entities to access
certain information or perform particular functions (like transfer money,
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but not delete the account), we enable web users to both define and control
the scope of actions of the entities authority has been issued to.
As a consequence, the component furthermore allows for mitigating
risks of improperly employing authority as well as personal data in
delegation scenarios (Wild et al., 2015). By enabling delegators to
clearly specify the scope in which a delegate is allowed to operate on
the delegator’s behalf, we provide more control about the conditions
of delegations (Scholtz et al., 2015a).
Chapter 5 details this synopsis of the component for context-aware control
through providing insights on analysis, development and evaluation.
4.3.2 Tamper-Evidentness
In order to resolve Problem Cause 3.2: “Risk of Identity Theft and Tam-
pering of Personal Data” and 3.2.1: “Lack of Means to Detect Identity
Theft and Manipulation” by carrying out Activity 3.2: “Mitigate Risk of
Identity Theft and Tampering of Personal Data”, the component for tamper-
evidentness complements the proposed solution by protective means to
detect identity theft and malicious manipulation of personal data. With
this component, we particularly aim for reducing the risk originating from
potentially compromised IdPs, regardless whether aggressors are operating
outside or within the premises of IdPs (Wild et al., 2015).
Coming back to the analogy, imagine all employees of a bank—from the
director over management to regular staff members—would have the keys
to the safety deposit lockers containing their customers’ monetary capital.
With the keys, they could open the safety deposit lockers, take a look inside
as well as add, modify or remove content. If such behavior would be
obvious to potential bank customers, they would probably not trust the
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bank any longer. Applied to the web-based management of personal data,
malicious IdP operators or aggressors might have or already have acquired
such extended read/write access to sensitive data, which bears the danger
of data tampering happens without the data owner’s knowledge.
Encrypting personal data is not a practicable choice, as it would largely
complicate matters through issues like affirming public accessibility or
distributing and updating cryptographic means. Although there is no sat-
isfying solution available to prevent personal data from various kinds of
manipulation (like replacement, altering, removal, addition), this compo-
nent enables sound proof of the identity owner’s intent by verifying the
integrity of personal data stored in WebID profiles and detecting possible
anomalies (Wild et al., 2014). That is, identity owners are put in the posi-
tion to assure SPs and other requesting entities that the personal data they
obtained is as intended by these identity owners. Through ensuring that
especially identity data was not altered by unauthorized entities, we in-
crease the authenticity of personal data and, thus, the credibility of identity
owners during diverse operations, like authentication.
Chapter 6 details this synopsis of the component for tamper-evidentness
through providing insights on analysis, development and evaluation.
4.3.3 Fine-Grained Filtering
In order to resolve Problem Cause 3.3: “Incomplete Range and Granularity
of Access Control” and 3.3.1: “Limitation of Access Control Facilities to
Specific SPs” by carrying out Activity 3.3: “Increase Range and Granularity
of Access Control”, the component for fine-grained filtering (FGF) comple-
ments the proposed solution by measures for controlling access to sensitive
data at the attribute level. By shifting the default location of typically
storing personal data from various SPs to individual IdPs, the proposed
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solution for self-deterministic IdM already facilitates implementing holistic
access control by identity owners. Unlike other systems that involve pro-
tection of data only at the resource level, we increase the granularity on
the one hand and, on the other hand, reduce the efforts identity owners
would have when dividing and distributing their personal data manually
among web-accessible resources (Wild et al., 2015).
Relying on the bank analogy once again, it is evident that employees do
not share the same view on account data of customers. On the contrary,
the privilege to access certain information is specific to particular persons,
depending on their trust level and position in the company. Transferring
these characteristics concerning the management of monetary capital to
social capital would result in establishing requester-specific customized
views on personal data. For protecting data stored within resources, i.e.,
in particular WebID profiles containing personal data, this component
applies a facade design pattern to create customized views on data (Wild,
Chudnovskyy, et al., 2013a). Depending on the identity of the requesting
entity, we filter semantic data within URI-addressable RDF resources in
a fine-grained manner (Wild, Chudnovskyy, et al., 2013b).
Chapter 7 details this synopsis of the component for FGF through providing
insights on analysis, development and evaluation.
Following the introduction of the key components that extend the pro-
posed solution architecture in diverse security respects on IdP and SP
side, the next section proceeds with explaining how to substantiate and
verify the underlying concepts in practice.
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4.4 Proof-of-Concept Platform
As an effort to manifest the proposed solution including the key compo-
nents, we created Sociddea in the context of the EC Seventh Framework
Programme for Research and Technological Development (FP7) project
OMELETTE (Chowdhury et al., 2013; Tschudnowsky et al., 2013). Estab-
lished on the IdMS foundation of WebID, Sociddea is an open, extensible
and component-based identity (service) provider and management plat-
form developed using ASP.NET MVC4. It puts the constituents of our
proposal into effect, including the IdM life cycle. Entities can deploy and
maintain their own instance of the Sociddea platform or rely on an al-
ready existing one administrated by a third party they sufficiently trust.
Employing Sociddea, users can automatically create a new WebID identity
incl. a WebID URI, an underlying WebID profile and an associated WebID
certificate. Although Sociddea allows users for hosting their WebID profiles
in the ecosystem provided by this platform, there is no constraint to do
this. That is, users are also empowered to create new WebID certificates for
profiles hosted somewhere else. To improve user experience and adoption,
Sociddea is capable of bridging between WebID and other identity concepts
such as OpenID (cf. Subsection 3.3.2) (Rienäcker et al., 2014).
According to the entity class employing the platform, Sociddea provides
several customized user interfaces. For supporting the composition of
web systems using WAM, it offers a web-based diagram editor (Scholtz
et al., 2015b), as illustrated in Figure 4.9. Furthermore, Sociddea
implements online forms human entities can employ to edit personal
data associated with their identities. Sociddea also assists web engi-
neers in describing identities of SOAP-based and RESTful web services
via appropriate input masks (Braune et al., 2014). In addition to
these graphical interfaces, Sociddea features a RESTful interface for
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Figure 4.9: Tool Support for WAM-based Architecture Modeling
machines. Depending on the content type requesting entities declare
when accessing WebID profiles managed using Sociddea, like HTML,
JSON-LD or RDF/XML, they receive a representation compliant with
their preferences, as exemplarily shown in Figure 4.10.
After presenting the proposal-compliant Sociddea platform that assists
arbitrary entities in self-deterministic IdM, we conclude this chapter by
summarizing our contributions in the next section.
4.5 Summary
In the conceptual, logical and physical designs, we formalized WebID as an
approach we employ for IdM, specified the WAM ontology for describing
architectures of web systems, and agreed upon several vocabularies. Based
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 Figure 4.10: Representations of a WebID Profile Managed Using Sociddea (Wild,
Chudnovskyy, et al., 2013b)
on these designs, we proposed a solution that intends to meet two major
challenges by delivering Result 1: “Improved Modeling of Security Aspects
for Web Systems” and 2: “Reduced Need for Accumulation of Personal Data
by Third Parties”. The proposal involves representing relevant classes of
entities, i.e., persons, compositions and components, by identities and,
thus, benefiting from universal identification, semantic description and
authentication. For systematically managing such identities, we defined
an IdM life cycle applicable to persons, compositions and components.
As an effort to deliver Result 3: “Extended Means for Control and Protec-
tion of Personal Data”, we created three key components that enrich the
solution architecture by complementary protective means with regard to
context-aware control, tamper-evidentness and fine-grained filtering. To
manifest the proposed solution, we built Sociddea as a proof-of-concept
and integration platform, which we also utilize for similar purposes in the
chapters to come. The platform provides basic tool support for specifying
identities, including a web-accessible WAM diagramming editor to compose
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web systems. Now that our proposal for enhanced security in managing
personal data has been described, the following chapter proceeds with
addressing the first key component in depth.
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5Context-Aware
Control
To particularly address Problem Cause 3.1: “Insufficient Control of Identity
Based on Individual Context”, this chapter starts with analyzing require-
ments and related work specific to the problem domain in Section 5.1. With
the obtained analysis results, Section 5.2 describes the development of the
context-aware control (CAC) component to completely meet the domain-
specific requirements. Employing the success indicators and verification
sources described as part of the strategy on page 61, Section 5.3 evaluates
our approach to context-aware control to verify the compliance with the
requirements. Finally, Section 5.4 concludes this chapter by summarizing
the outcome of our contribution for context-aware control.
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5.1 Analysis
With reference to Activity 3.1: “Improve Control of Identity Based on Indi-
vidual Context”, Subsection 5.1.1 describes several scenarios to highlight
the necessity for context-aware control as a recommended security enhance-
ment of the proposed solution. Using these scenarios, Subsection 5.1.2
then derives a set of requirements that we employ to analyze related work,
with results discussed in Subsection 5.1.3.
5.1.1 Scenarios
In addition to inherent features of the proposed solution, the capabili-
ties of context-aware control play a decisive role in enhancing security,
as shown in the next three scenarios:
Scenario 5.1: Task Delegation. From Scenario 2.3: “Holiday Replace-
ment” we know that Alice needs to delegate tasks to others to act on her
behalf. These persons should have access to certain yet not all personal
data sets stored in her WebID profile in order to accomplish a task. She
knows that her authorization would not be misused for other purposes,
when she is delegating a task to a person she fully trusts. While this is the
case with close friends, Alice is not sure about her new co-worker Casey in
his role as delegate. When Casey uses Alice’s authorization intentionally, he
usually acts on her behalf within her specified scope, but sometimes he also
does other things in her name. This is an improper use of her authorization.
Alice therefore wants to control the activities Casey does on her behalf.
Scenario 5.2: Scope of Delegation. Building upon Scenario 5.1, Alice
does not want Casey to work on a particular task on her behalf beyond
a fixed deadline or use other unspecified services in her name. She tries
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to prevent Casey from misusing her authorization outside the scope they
mutually agreed upon.
Scenario 5.3: Credential Generation. When Alice intends to create an
identity as per WebID, she also has to generate a credential for this identity
during provision in order to enable operations like authentication. Contrary
to knowledge-based authentication systems, where she can control only
a few parameters concerning a credential (like length and complexity
of passwords), Alice has to take account of diverse factors that have a
bearing on the WebID certificate generation. Being a not that technically
experienced user, Alice does not want to employ command line tools, like
OpenSSL (OpenSSL Software Foundation, 2016) or keytool (Oracle, 2016)
but specialized web applications that promise an accelerated creation of
her WebID certificate. However, variations in cryptographic capabilities,
performance and supported devices, operating systems and web browsers
complicate that matter for Alice. Depending on her individual conditions
and trust needs, Alice has to carefully consider diverse factors on her own
in order to find the most appropriate way for generating a WebID certificate.
This involves the risk that inexperienced users, like Alice, make either no or
wrong assessments, which may result in suboptimal choices that potentially
impair their security and privacy.
The next subsection outlines the requirements inferred from the scenarios.
5.1.2 Requirements
By examining Scenarios 5.1 to 5.3, we derived compatibility, context-
awareness, controllability, scope-compliance and secrecy as five
essential requirements on approaches towards context-aware control,
which are detailed in the following.
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Compatibility In order to avoid degrading key features offered by the
proposed solution involving WebID, like universal identification and au-
thentication, we must rely only on already existing, standard-compliant
WebID artifacts for accomplishing delegations (cf. Scenarios 5.1 and 5.2).
As this involves either reusing existing or creating new WebID identities,
we have to ensure the latter by a way for generating WebID certificates
which is compatible with most users (cf. Scenario 5.3).
Context-Awareness As a user’s individual conditions have significant im-
pact on the process of finding a suitable way for generating a WebID cer-
tificate, we must provide means to acquire individual conditions of users
before taking them into consideration (cf. Scenario 5.3). In delegation
scenarios, it is essential to clearly identify delegator and delegate in order
to prevent delegates from actions unwanted by the delegator, like imper-
sonation or data disclosure (cf. Scenario 5.1). Therefore, we must make
a distinction between delegators, delegates and entities that intentionally
operate outside delegation contexts by employing their common identities.
Controllability While context-awareness facilitates taking account of in-
dividual conditions, users must retain control over the generation of their
WebID certificates (cf. Scenario 5.3). That is, users must be enabled to
express their preferences with regard to security, protection and trust,
even though they might conflict with acquired conditions at an acceptable
level. For example, users with strict requirements regarding privacy and
secrecy of personal data might want to avoid creating WebID certificates –
completely or in parts – by a third party they do not control (cf. secrecy).
This also means that users have to be in control of the process how WebID
certificates are created and made available to them. With reference to
delegation, entities must be enabled to control at any time whether they
act as delegator or as delegate (cf. Scenario 5.1).
Scope-Compliance Delegators must have the option to clearly specify the
scope in which delegates are allowed to operate on the delegator’s behalf.
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To set the scope of a delegation, we must provide delegators with means to
define constraints including service restrictions and validity of a delegation
(cf. Scenario 5.2). Service providers must verify that delegates operate
within the scopes that delegators have optionally defined. A mechanism
to generate WebID certificates should ensure scope compliance by taking
account of scope-related preferences like validity or certification by a third
party (cf. Scenario 5.3).
Secrecy WebID is based on the premise that nobody except for the ac-
tual identity owner can modify the WebID profile owned by this entity.
Otherwise, there is a severe risk of tampering and identity theft. Identity
owners should therefore maintain their WebID profiles only on servers they
either own or trust, and protect stored personal data against unauthorized
read/write access (cf. Chapters 6 and 7). That is, delegates must not or
only under certain circumstances defined by the delegator be enabled to
make modifications on a delegator’s WebID profile. Furthermore, the dele-
gator must be in the position to ensure secrecy by only allowing particular
requesting entities, including delegates, to retrieve specific personal data
sets contained inside the delegator’s profile (Scenarios 2.3 and 5.1). In line
with ensuring secrecy of WebID profile data, we must prevent unwanted
access from the very beginning by avoiding disclosure of private keys during
WebID certificate creation (cf. Scenario 5.3). This is because an aggressor
could use a disclosed private key together with the easily retrievable public
key to construct an own WebID certificate, which then would permit access
to personal data in a way indistinguishable from the actual data owner.
As the term private in private key already implies, this type of key should
never be accessible to an untrusted party.
Having specified the requirements, we discuss related work next.
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5.1.3 Related Work
With WebID certificates being an essential artifact of the IdMS un-
derlying the solution proposed in the previous chapter, we start
the discussion of related work with their generation and, then,
proceed with approaches to delegation.
Web applications are typically divided into two sides, i.e., server and
client. This separation enables executing functionality on server side,
on client side or partially on both sides (Ast et al., 2013). The same
division applies when it comes to web-based generation of WebID cer-
tificates initiated from within web browsers.
In the traditional client-server model, tasks and workloads have been
partitioned to utilize servers and relieve clients because servers typically
offer more powerful computing capabilities and higher reliability. In the
mode corresponding to this model, only the server side is involved in
creating a WebID certificate and underlying asymmetric key pair, whereas
the client side has just to provide the server side with a WebID URI. Almost
all user agents are compatible with the server side generation mode in
the sense that they allow submitting a request to the server for further
processing. Moreover, an extensive support of programming languages,
libraries and tools eases constructing WebID certificates on the server side.
The server side generation mode allows creating both CA-signed and self-
signed WebID certificates and, thus, third-party asserted identities as well as
self-asserted identities. Generating a self-signed WebID certificate requires
the private key of the entity this certificate is to be issued to, whereas a
CA-signed certificate only claims that the entity is owning the private key. In
any case, the server side signs the certificate with the corresponding private
key from the key pair or a private key of a trusted party and, then, sends
the WebID certificate back to the client side. Users need to add the WebID
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certificate manually to their certificate/key store. Despite advantages in
signing and compatibility, generating a WebID certificate completely on
the server side requires creating or accessing an asymmetric key pair there,
which implies disclosure of private key data to a third party.
In the past, the client side of a web application was solely responsible for
providing a graphical user interface (GUI). Advances in JavaScript and
related technologies, like Asynchronous JavaScript and XML (AJAX), en-
able to execute client-side code more dynamically and efficiently nowadays.
Specialized frameworks enable to outsource more and more complex func-
tional parts of a web application from server side to client side (Ast et al.,
2014). Today’s modern web browsers, like Mozilla Firefox, Google Chrome
or Microsoft Internet Explorer, are optimized for executing JavaScript code.
In line with these developments, also cryptographic routines have been
adapted to run decoupled from the server side using JavaScript only, like
Forge (Longley et al., 2014). That is, solely the client side is involved in gen-
erating a WebID certificate and asymmetric key pair. As a consequence, the
client side generation mode allows for creating WebID certificates offline,
yet users need to add produced certificates manually to their certificate/key
store. While primarily designed for constructing self-signed certificates,
the client side generation mode is also capable of generating a certificate
signing request (Turner, 2010) and, thus, create a CA-signed certificate.
Rather than strictly separating server and client side, there is a so-called
hybrid mode that divides the WebID certificate generation into two steps.
In the first step, the client side creates an asymmetric key pair by making
use of a particular mechanism, like the HTML5 keygen element (Berjon
et al., 2014). The resulting private key is directly transferred to the local
key store and, thus, never has to leave the client side. In the second step,
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the client side submits the WebID URI, the public key and a challenge17 to
the server side. When using the HTML5 keygen element, this submission
is triggered via the HTML5 form element. On the server side, both the
public key and the WebID URI are included during the construction of
the WebID certificate. Since the private key is already available in the
local key store, the WebID certificate is automatically associated to it when
received by the client side. The hybrid generation mode only enables
to create CA-signed certificates because the private key usually remains
on a system different to the certificate-issuing one. However, the hybrid
generation mode shows larger incompatibilities caused by missing native
support through web browsers (SurveyMonkey Inc., 2015).
Above explanation revealed that WebID certificate generation modes not
only vary in their characteristics but also depend on more dynamic factors
including the user’s individual conditions and trust needs. This matter
has been further investigated in (Wild, Ast, et al., 2013). For example,
the server-side generation mode might be unqualified due to private key
disclosure, the client-side generation mode might be unqualified due to
lower performance regarding key creation, and the hybrid generation mode
might be unqualified due to incompatibility or missing self-signing support.
Therefore, users have to be assisted in choosing an appropriate WebID
certificate generation mode by taking account of their preferences, by
clearly communicating potential risks associated with certain modes, and
by indicating fallback measures. Having outlined the need for mechanisms
that are aware of an entity’s context already during credential creation, we
expand the discussion to delegation approaches in the following.
SAML allows for detailed specification of authorization and delegation
aspects (cf. Subsection 3.3.2), whereas eXtensible Access Control
17A challenge proves that a user possesses the private key matching to the submitted public
key.
160 Chapter 5 Context-Aware Control
Markup Language (XACML) (Rissanen, 2013) enables describing and
implementing policy-based authorization (Busch et al., 2012). Further-
more, XACML differentiates between access and delegation rights, and
fosters a decentralized management of access policies. The syntax of
XACML, however, complicates the task of specifying policies (Busch
et al., 2012). As both languages are based on plain XML, they lack
semantic features, including high expressiveness, self-descriptiveness and
simplified machine interpretability, which makes them hardly compatible
with WebID and, thus, with the proposed solution.
OAuth is a widely adopted open standard to authorization (Hardt, 2012).
It has been designed to allow users to grant third parties access to their
personal resources without disclosing their private credentials. The protocol
flow in brief: An entity requests access to a protected resource. From the
resource owner, the entity retrieves an authorization grant and presents
it to the authorization server for validation. Once the entity received an
access token, it can request the protected resource from the resource server.
Evidently, this is a delegation of access rights from the resource owner to
the entity. While OAuth facilitates restricting the entity’s scope of action
through setting constraints, it does not directly integrate with WebID.
An extension of WebID towards access delegation is discussed in (Tramp,
Story, et al., 2012). The approach distinguishes involved entities by their
roles as principal (delegator) and secretary (delegate). A WebID URI
stored in the principal’s WebID profile denotes the secretary. To act on
the principal’s behalf, the secretary has to add an X-On-Behalf-Of header
to each HTTP request she issues. This HTTP header field contains the
principal’s WebID URI. When a capable service receives such request, it
pre-authenticates the secretary using the default WebID authentication
sequence (cf. Figure 4.2). To check the claimed on-behalf-of relationship
to the principal, as specified in the HTTP header, the service then derefer-
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ences the principal’s WebID profile. If it contains an appropriate statement
confirming the claim, the secretary is authorized to access the requested
resource with the same access rights as the principal. Although this ap-
proach provides an almost practicable solution that enables compatibility
by reusing existing WebID artifacts, it also depends on a header exten-
sion of each HTTP request. Not only does this increase complexity, but
it also decreases controllability, interoperability and applicability due to
relying on adequate support by user agents.
As related work does not sufficiently fulfill the requirements, the
following section continues with presenting a distinct approach
to context-aware control.
5.2 Development
For developing a component encapsulating our approach to context-aware
control (CAC)18 on the basis of (Ast et al., 2013; Ast et al., 2014; Scholtz
et al., 2015a; Wild, Ast, et al., 2013; Wild et al., 2015), we adopt the design
procedure that has been applied to model the artifacts of the solution in
Section 4.1. That is, we involve three models, each representing a different
state of the design. Using the conceptual model formalized in Subsec-
tion 5.2.1, we specify the logical model in Subsection 5.2.2. By deriving the
physical model from the logical model in Subsection 5.2.3, we establish the
technical foundation for the implementation described in Subsection 5.2.4.
18For the sake of brevity, we refer to this “component encapsulating our approach to context-
aware control” simply as CAC.
162 Chapter 5 Context-Aware Control
5.2.1 Conceptual Model
In order to assist users in generating WebID certificates in line with their
individual conditions and preferences, as indicated in Section 5.1, CAC com-
prises hiding the complexity of choices by associating several interdepen-
dent concepts affecting compatibility, context-awareness, controllability and
secrecy with each other under the umbrella of a so-called need for privacy.
These interdependent concepts include generation mode, signing type, key
strength and validity of a WebID certificate. As WebID certificates also have
a central role in CAC with regard to scope-compliant delegations, we first in-
troduce this contribution and postpone relating the concepts that affect the
creation of WebID certificates to the logical design in the next subsection.
In a delegation according to CAC, a delegate acts on behalf of a delegator
(cf. Subsection 2.1.2), where identity i1 denotes the delegator, and identity
i2 denotes the delegate. This is formalized in Equation (5.1), where w1 is
the delegator’s WebID URI, T 1 represents the delegator’s WebID profile, w2
is the delegate’s WebID URI, and T 2 represents the delegate’s profile.
i1 = (w1, T 1) i2 = (w2, T 2) i1, i2 ∈ I; w1, w2 ∈ W ; T 1, T 2 ∈ T (5.1)
While a delegator’s WebID certificate is according to Equation (4.4), a
delegate’s WebID certificate X 2,k′2 ∈ X 2 is as formalized in Equation (5.2),
where X 2 ⊂ X is the set of WebID certificates owned by delegate’s iden-
tity i2. Not only does the delegate’s WebID certificate contain the dele-
gate’s WebID URI w2 and a public key k
′
2 ∈ K2 owned by the delegate,
but also the WebID URI w1 denoting the delegator’s identity i1. Here,
K2 ∈ K describes the subset of asymmetric keys owned by delegate i2.
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As usual, WebID certificate X 2,k′2 is signed with the corresponding private
key k′2
−1 ∈ K2 or the private key of a trusted party.
X 2,k′2 = (w2, k
′
2, w1) (5.2)
When the delegate authenticates to another entity, like an application
or service, with such certificate X 2,k′2 , this entity can use the delegator’s
WebID URI w1 stored within the certificate to dereference the delegator’s
WebID profile represented by T 1. This profile contains a set of delegations
D1 ⊂ D specified by delegator’s identity i1, where D is the set of all
delegations. While D1 is described by triples T 1,D1 ⊂ T 1, each delegation
d ∈ D1 is described by triples T 1,d ⊆ T 1,D1 . Equation (5.3) defines
delegation d that involves task b ∈ B to be done by delegate i2 taking a
set of constraints Q into account. Here, WebID URI w2 refers to delegate
i2 and B is the set of all delegatable tasks.
d = (b, w2,Q) (5.3)
With delegation d specified in delegator’s i1 WebID profile through T 1,d
and the delegation-enabled WebID certificate X 2,k′2 issued to delegate i2, this
particular delegate referred to by WebID URI w2 is enabled to act on behalf
of the delegator referred to by WebID URI w1 (cf. Equation (5.4)).
i2 can act on behalf of i1⇔∃w1, w2 : ∃T 1,d ∈ T 1,∃X 2,k′2 (5.4)
Building on this conceptual model for CAC, the next subsection
proceeds with specifying the logical flow.
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5.2.2 Logical Model
To associate the concepts affecting the WebID certificate generation, CAC
establishes a case differentiation that depends on the preferences stated by
a user as well as obtained conditions. It allows for generating certificates
on client side, on server side and in hybrid mode, yet in conformity with
the analysis results outlined before and detailed in (Wild, Ast, et al., 2013).
As a consequence, it utilizes server-side generation if and only if a user has
declared that secrecy is not an issue. When making this choice, CAC enables
constructing self-signed and CA-signed certificates, which can optionally
involve a short key length and a long validity. Furthermore, it involves
hybrid generation for creating CA-signed certificates if and only if a user has
not a high need for privacy. In contrast, CAC employs client-side generation
for severing all other preferences, but only if signing by CAs is not required.
The client-side generation of WebID certificates is the only option provided
to users that have a high need for privacy. Figure 5.1 depicts the described
case differentiation, starting from the user input on the left side and summa-
rizing the consequences on the right side. In line with detected conditions,
like support of hybrid generation mode, CAC may block some cases, which
then reduces the overall number of possible choices user can make.
Having described a way to generate the artifacts that are central to CAC
with regard to delegation, we continue with specifying the corresponding
process based on the conceptual model. The delegation process involves ini-
tializing a delegation, notifying potential delegates, accepting a delegation,
performing the task by a delegate on behalf of the delegator, monitoring a
delegation, and, finally, terminating a delegation. While Figure 5.2 illus-
trates the delegation process using BPMN, we describe it in the following.
Initializing a Delegation. The process of delegation is driven by a dele-
gator represented by identity i1. This has various advantages regarding
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Figure 5.1: Case Differentiation for Certificate Generation According to
Preferences
the purposefulness of the process and the protection of the delegator’s
personal data represented by T 1. The delegator has to formalize the in-
tention that another entity should act as delegate in order to perform a
certain task on the delegator’s behalf. Therefore, the delegator describes
the delegation parameters d and optionally sets constraints Q, like service
restrictions or validity (cf. 1© in Fig. 5.2).
Notifying the Potential Delegate. After parameters d specifying a delega-
tion are added to the delegator’s WebID profile (cf. 2©), the delegator can
inform the potential delegate. Using the delegate’s WebID URI w2 from del-
egation parameters d, the delegator can obtain further information about
the delegate on the basis of the thus referenced WebID profile, represented
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Figure 5.2: Delegation Process Model
by T 2. That is, the delegator can inform the delegate about the delega-
tion request by employing one of the delegate’s preferred communication
methods that are outlined in the corresponding WebID profile.
Accepting a Delegation. When the delegate retrieves the delegator’s
WebID profile, delegation parameters d are visible to him (cf. 3©). Given
that the delegate received the delegator’s notification, the delegate can
read the description of task b and, consequently, either accept or reject
the request the delegator intends to entrust him with. If the delegate
decides to work on this task on behalf of the delegator, CAC enables
to create a delegation-enabled WebID certificate X 2,k′2 (cf. 4©), as de-
scribed above and in the conceptual model. Such WebID certificates con-
tains two WebID URIs that denote the delegator’s identity i1 and the
delegate’s identity i2, i.e., w1 and w2.
Executing a Delegation. Having received a delegation-enabled WebID cer-
tificate, the delegate can authenticate to a SP that supports WebID authenti-
cation and integrates CAC, which is represented by a dedicated component.
To allow for a closer look, Figure 5.3 details CAC within the authentication
sequence as per proposed solution, denoted by 7© in Figure 4.7. For rea-
sons of clarity, the UML sequence diagram just depicts the WebID verifier,
5.2 Development 167
the security enhancements by CAC and the WebID profiles of delegator’s
identity i1 and delegate’s identity i2, which are stored on different servers.
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Figure 5.3: Sequence of Verification for Scope-Compliant Delegation
When authenticating to a system implementing the proposed component,
the WebID verifier passes the delegate’s valid delegation-enabled WebID
certificate to the component (cf. 1© in Fig. 5.3). It then parses the delegate’s
WebID certificate and extracts both WebID URIs w1 and w2 contained therein
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(cf. Equation (5.2)). Afterwards, the component employs w2 to request the
delegate’s WebID profile in 2© and receives it in 3©. Similar to the delegate,
the component then employs w1 to request the delegator’s profile in 4© and
receives it in 5©. Both WebID profiles are passed back to the WebID verifier.
The delegation parameters d are analyzed in 6© using the delegator’s
profile, which has been retrieved before. They must contain the delegate’s
WebID URI. Otherwise, the verification of the delegation rights fails, i.e.,
either the entire authentication fails or the delegate is allowed to use the SP
on his own but not on the delegator’s behalf. This decision depends on the
implementation of the component by the SP. With regard to validity and
service (domain) restrictions, the delegation constraints Q defined by the
delegator are checked in 7© and 8©. Once a constraint verification fails,
the delegation fails as well and, similar to the failed delegation rights check
discussed above, possibly the entire authentication. Provided a successful
authentication and delegation, the delegate can perform the task using
the SP on the delegator’s behalf, as defined in Equation (5.4). Here, the
SP and the delegate might have access to the delegator’s personal data
to be used to perform task b by the delegate.
Monitoring a Delegation. Similar to other digital or traditional access
control procedures, it is possible that the delegate will face problems while
working on a task entrusted to him by the delegator. The delegate could
discuss these issues with the delegator to find an appropriate solution,
e.g., by adjusting the deadline associated to the delegation accordingly.
Under certain circumstances, however, it is important to know the progress
made by the delegate independently from personal status reports (cf. Sce-
nario 5.1). In addition to delegates, also delegators can authenticate to
SPs employing their own WebID identities. For instance, when a SP offers
status indicators or activity logs to customers, then a delegator could find
out about a delegate’s progress with respect to the task assigned to him.
Offering such mechanisms, however, is the responsibility of SPs.
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Terminating a Delegation. When completing the task on the delegator’s
behalf before the deadline, the delegate can optionally inform the dele-
gator about this success using a suitable communication channel possibly
outlined in the corresponding WebID profile. If the delegate could not
finish the task within the given time frame, then the authorization to act
in the delegator’s name is no longer valid. As a consequence, CAC will
not allow the delegate to work on the task after passing the deadline. Fur-
thermore, CAC also enables the delegator to terminate the delegation at
any time. This might be necessary when the task is expendable for some
reason like priority shifts. For the current task, the delegator can do so
by changing or removing the delegate’s WebID URI from the delegation
parameters. All these types of completing a delegation necessitate to be
aware of updates affecting the delegation. It is therefore required that a
SP implementing the CAC component either checks the authorization or
automatically authenticates the delegate again on a regular basis.
Having created the logical model from the conceptual one, the next sub-
section continues with detailing technical aspects of CAC.
5.2.3 Physical Model
In order to establish the basis for the technical implementation of the design
artifacts, this physical model further specifies the logical model.
For identifying the real entity which is using a service, CAC comprises adding
identifiers for both the delegator denoted by w1 and the delegate denoted
by w2 to a WebID certificate issued to the delegate. Figure 5.4 illustrates this
WebID certificate (top, left). The original semantics of the WebID certificate
remains unchanged, i.e., the SAN field of the certificate still contains the
WebID URI referring to the entity that will primarily employ this certificate
(cf. A© in Fig. 5.4). In the delegation context, this is the delegate. In
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addition to the rather common data contained in the delegate’s WebID
certificate, CAC exploits the Issuer and the Issuer Alternative Name (IAN)
certificate fields (cf. B©). These fields are used to denote the delegator
represented by i1 both by name and by WebID URI w1 referring to the
corresponding WebID profile T 1 (cf. Equation (5.1)).
The delegate’s WebID profile (bottom, left), represented by T 2, remains
as it is, whereas WebID profile of the delegator (top, right), represented
by T 1, needs to be extended for storing the delegation parameters (cf.
Equation (5.3)). This extension is necessary to prevent attackers to act
in the delegator’s name by creating such delegation-enabled WebID cer-
tificate (cf. Equation (5.2)) on their own. It is recommended to include
either the entire set of delegation parameters d or a reference to it in
the delegator’s WebID profile (cf. C©).
To specify a delegation in terms of task, associated constraints and potential
delegate, CAC makes use of the WebID Delegation Language (WDL) (Wild
et al., 2015), which is a semantic vocabulary based on RDF. In WDL, the
description of a task is a URI pointing to a resource containing further
information about the work to be done. Such description is not directly
included in WDL to separate concerns. Furthermore, the way tasks are
actually described is outside the scope of CAC, yet we recommend the use
of semantic vocabularies. WDL enables delegators to define constraints
regarding validity and domain of a delegation. Here, the validity is
represented by a time stamp indicating the end of a delegation and, thus,
the deadline of the assigned task. The WDL domain constraint defines a
restriction of services that a delegator authorizes a delegate to use. That is,
by specifying the domain name of a service, the delegate is only allowed to
perform the task within this particular domain. WDL involves another RDF
triple triple to refer a delegate by means of a WebID URI. Listing 5.1 shows
the structure of a WDL-based delegation specification in Turtle syntax:
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@prefix xsd: <http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#>.
@prefix rdfs: <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#>.
@prefix foaf: <http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/>.
@prefix cert: <http://www.w3.org/ns/auth/cert#>.
@prefix wdl: <http://vsr-demo.informatik.tu-
chemnitz.de/Sociddea/wdl#>.
@prefix profile: <https://example.org/alice#>.
profile:aa a foaf:Person;
foaf:name “Alice Anderson”;
foaf:knows <https://example.com/bob#me>;
cert:key [ 
a cert:RSAPublicKey;
rdfs:label “Made Monday, July 8, 2013 3:16”;
cert:modulus “00cb25e5...”^^xsd:hexBinary;
cert:exponent 65537;
];
wdl:delegate [
wdl:task <https://example.org/alice/tasks?id=314>;
wdl:delegatee <https://sample.org/casey#cc>;
wdl:constraints [
wdl:validity “September 20, 2013 5:00 PM”;
wdl:domain “service.com”;
]
].
WebID Profile
available at WebID URI https://example.org/alice#aa
@prefix xsd: <http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#>.
@prefix rdfs: <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#>.
@prefix foaf: <http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/>.
@prefix cert: <http://www.w3.org/ns/auth/cert#>.
@prefix profile: <https://sample.org/casey#>.
profile:cc a foaf:Person;
foaf:name “Casey Carlson”;
foaf:knows <https://example.com/bob#me>;
cert:key [ 
a cert:RSAPublicKey;
rdfs:label “Made Friday, May 3, 2013 1:16”;
cert:modulus “0067b5c9...”^^xsd:hexBinary;
cert:exponent 65537;
].
WebID Profile
available at WebID URI https://sample.org/casey#cc
…
Issuer: O=FOAF+SSL, OU=The Community of Self
Signers, CN=Alice Anderson
···
Subject: O=FOAF+SSL, OU=The Community Of Self
Signers, CN=Casey Carlson
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
Public-Key: (2048 bit)
Modulus: 00:67:b5:c9: …
Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
X509v3 Extensions:
X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name:
URI: https://example.org/alice#aa
X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
URI: https://sample.org/casey#cc
···
WebID Certificate
SAN links to 
WebID profile
of delegate
IAN links to 
WebID profile
of delegator
wdl:delegate statement 
links to WebID profile
of delegate
A
B
C
Figure 5.4: WebID Artifacts For Context-Aware Control in Delegations (Wild et al.,
2015)
Now that all artifacts relating to CAC have been described, the following
subsection outlines the implementation of the design.
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Listing 5.1: Template of Delegation Specification as per WDL
1 <WEBID URI OF DELEGATOR > wdl:delegate [
2 wdl:task <URI POINTING TO TASK DESCRIPTION >;
3 wdl:constraints [
4 wdl:validity DEADLINE;
5 wdl:domain SERVICE
6 ];
7 wdl:delegate <WEBID URI OF DELEGATE > ].
5.2.4 Implementation
To put the conceptual, logical and physical model into practice, we consoli-
dated all design artifacts in a self-contained component and exemplarily
integrated this CAC component into the Sociddea platform, which has
been initially introduced in Section 4.2.
With Sociddea integrating CAC, an entity can automatically create a new
identity consisting of WebID URI, WebID profile and WebID certificate.
Figure 5.5 depicts the GUI for identity creation presented to human entities.
Here, an HTML form permits human entities to enter their basic set of
personal data and their preferred WebID URI. In addition, human entities
can also create an identity for a web system or a web service, as shown in this
figure. Before initializing the provisioning of a new WebID certificate, users
are put in the position to express their individual preferences by making
certain selections with regard to privacy need, signing type, generation
mode, key strength and validity (cf. Figure 5.1).
The component for generating WebID certificates according to user prefer-
ences and context builds upon JavaScript and involves the Forge library
to execute cryptographic operations (Longley et al., 2014). Not only does
this enable creating certificates directly from within web browsers but also
on the server side. In compliance with (Barker et al., 2012), the com-
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Figure 5.5: WebID Certificate Creation with Sociddea
ponent uses 2048 bits as recommended key length, while also allowing
1024 bits (short) and 4096 bits (long) depending on the declared privacy
need. Furthermore, it defines a default validity of 1 year (short), but also
accepts 3 years (medium) and 10 years (long), even though the latter
options are not recommended for safe and productive use.
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Figure 5.6: Delegation Creation with Sociddea (Scholtz et al., 2015a)
In much the same way as during common identity creation, users can
benefit from this assistance in generating WebID certificates during dele-
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gation scenarios, as exemplarily shown in Figure 5.6. There, a delegator
initializes a delegation by specifying several parameters (cf. 1©19), which
are then stored in the corresponding WebID profile in 2©. Having received
the notification from the delegator, the delegate can address the delega-
tor’s WebID profile. When using a web browser to address this WebID
profile, Sociddea automatically informs the authenticated delegate about
the offer to act on the delegator’s behalf in 3©. In the event of agree-
ing with the offer, the delegate can create a delegation-enabled WebID
certificate with regard to known preferences in 4©.
After completing development, the next section is about evaluation of CAC.
5.3 Evaluation
For evaluating CAC, Subsection 5.3.1 first determines the characteris-
tics to be assessed. Subsection 5.3.2 then describes the evaluation pro-
cedure that takes account of these characteristics, and, finally, Subsec-
tion 5.3.3 discusses the evaluation results.
5.3.1 Characteristics
By defining five requirements on approaches for context-aware control
in Subsection 5.1.2, we created the foundation for a systematic analysis
of related work and a well-directed component development. Building
on this foundation, we reapply the requirements—compatibility, context-
awareness, controllability, scope-compliance and secrecy—as criteria for
evaluating our work in the context of context-aware control.
19The numbering in Figure 5.6 matches the numbering in Figure 5.2.
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5.3.2 Procedure
Relying on the success indicators and verification sources declared in Sub-
section 2.3.4, we employ the proof-of-concept implementation as well as
unit and operational acceptance tests to evaluate the component with re-
gard to the characteristics defined in Subsection 5.3.1. In order to assess
the degree to which each evaluation criterion has been fulfilled by CAC, the
four-level rating system, known from Subsection 3.2.3, suits our purpose.
5.3.3 Results
On the basis of the evaluation results obtained by applying the procedure
specified in Subsection 5.3.2, we discuss how CAC addresses each criterion
defined in Subsection 5.3.1. Building upon the discussion of each evaluation
criterion, we draw a conclusion involving a rating.
Compatibility While delegation according to CAC only involves existing
WebID artifacts except for a so-called delegation-enabled certificate, SPs
need to support it. A delegation-enabled certificate is standard-compliant
as per (Cooper et al., 2008). Compared to common WebID certificates, its
creation effort is almost the same, i.e., it requires an additional entry for
exactly referring to the delegator by a WebID URI. When unsupported by a
SP, a delegate can still employ a delegation-enabled certificate for default
authentication but not to obtain extended authority.
To conclude, CAC largely fulfills the compatibility criterion.
Context-Awareness Relying on already existing representations of dele-
gator and delegate through two different WebID identities facilitates their
distinguishability. Here, employing a delegation-enabled rather than a
common WebID certificate does not change the underlying identity but
enables assigning a role depending on the context provided through such
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special certificate. With regard to acquiring the individual conditions of a
user, CAC offers only limited capabilities. Although the component can de-
tect some incompatibilities, e.g., missing support of keygen element, more
advanced features, like estimated performance of client side, are missing
yet important for an optimized context-aware generation of certificates.
To conclude, CAC partially fulfills the context-awareness criterion.
Controllability Besides context-awareness, CAC enables entities to make
adjustments to recommended parameters for generating WebID certificates,
unless they conflict with the underlying model (cf. Figure 5.1). Further-
more, using JavaScript allows for offline generation of certificates, which
contributes to increase control. In terms of delegation, an entity can control
whether to act as a delegate via a distinct WebID certificate.
To conclude, CAC completely fulfills the controllability criterion.
Scope-Compliance By setting constraints, delegators can specify the scope
of a delegation with respect to validity and service domain. Yet, the com-
pleteness of this set of restrictions is to be questioned. Furthermore, the
verification of compliance requires capable SPs that potentially have to
perform such verification on a regular basis in case of changing conditions.
To conclude, CAC partially fulfills the scope-compliance criterion.
Secrecy With CAC, entities do not have to disclose private key data when
generating WebID certificates on the client side only. This is the default
setting offered by the component and the only valid options for entities with
a high need for privacy. As delegates employ one of their own identities
for delegation, they do not have to cope with personal data issues caused
by redundant repository. In consequence, delegators can control access
to personal data stored in their WebID profiles according to the identities
which potential delegates will use.
To conclude, CAC completely fulfills the secrecy criterion.
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By completing the component evaluation with results indicating
an overall large fulfillment of the criteria, the following section
sums up the outcome of CAC.
5.4 Summary
With delegations according to our approach to context-aware control, en-
tities are enabled to act on other entities’ behalves in scope-compliant
ways. By providing a component to prevent unwanted exploitation of
authority, we contributed to increase control for delegators in delegation
scenarios. Through context-aware control, entities also benefit from a
simplified and accelerated credential generation that takes account of the
individual context and stated preferences towards security and privacy.
Based on three scenarios, we derived five requirements to systematically
analyze related work and align the development of our contribution. Tak-
ing compatibility, context-awareness, controllability, scope-compliance and
secrecy into account, we conceptually, logically and physically designed
the contribution for context-aware control. Through focusing on reuse
of existing identity, the contribution allows for clearly distinguishing be-
tween delegator and delegate. To prove the concept for context-aware
control, we transferred the design artifacts into a self-contained compo-
nent, which we then exemplarily integrated into the Sociddea platform.
From the results obtained by evaluating the component, we concluded
an overall large fulfillment of the requirements, but with some justifiable
drawbacks in terms of context recognition.
Now that the component for context-aware control has been described, the
following chapter continues with detailing the second key component.
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6Tamper-Evidentness
To particularly address Problem Cause 3.2: “Risk of Identity Theft and Tam-
pering of Personal Data”, this chapter starts with analyzing requirements
and related work specific to the problem domain in Section 6.1. With
the obtained analysis results, Section 6.2 describes the development of
the tamper-evidentness (TE) component to completely meet the domain-
specific requirements. Employing the success indicators and verification
sources described as part of the strategy on page 61, Section 6.3 evaluates
our approach to tamper-evidentness to verify the compliance with the re-
quirements. Finally, Section 6.4 concludes this chapter by summarizing
the outcome of our contribution for tamper-evidentness.
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6.1 Analysis
With reference to Activity 3.2: “Mitigate Risk of Identity Theft and Tam-
pering of Personal Data”, Subsection 6.1.1 describes several scenarios to
highlight the necessity for tamper-evidentness as a recommended security
enhancement of the proposed solution. Using these scenarios, Subsec-
tion 6.1.2 then derives a set of requirements that we employ to analyze
related work, with results discussed in Subsection 6.1.3.
6.1.1 Scenarios
In addition to inherent features of the proposed solution, the capa-
bilities of tamper-evidentness play a key role in enhancing security,
as shown in the next three scenarios:
Scenario 6.1: Manipulation of Personal Data. WebID identity owner
Alice relies on a third-party IdP for managing her identity. When hosting
her profile on such IdP, Alice was aware of the risk that a third party
could access and disclose personal data contained in her WebID profile20.
However, Alice is unaware of the fact that Mallory operates the IdP that
also hosts Alice’s WebID profile. Mallory has malicious intentions, i.e., she
wants to impair Alice by manipulating her identity and associated personal
data. Even though Alice controls access to her WebID profile at the resource
level to avoid personal data disclosure by unwanted requesting entities
from outside, she cannot apply the same access control for the inside. Apart
from accessing Alice’s personal data, Mallory can also manipulate it, e.g.,
she can change Alice’s email address to point to one of her own or add
new social connections linking to strange guys or Alice’s enemies. That is,
Mallory can tamper Alice’s user profile data without her intent, knowledge
20This common risk affects all unencrypted files hosted on third-party operated servers.
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and notice. While a human entity is the attack target in this case, this
deficiency also applies to identities of other entity classes, like web services.
Scenario 6.2: Identity Theft. Based on Scenario 6.1, Mallory wants to
take full control of Alice’s WebID profile. For this purpose, Mallory adds her
own public key to Alice’s profile and creates a WebID certificate linking to
Alice’s profile. That is, Mallory’s WebID certificate contains the public key
that is also available in Alice’s WebID profile. As a consequence, Mallory is
enabled to authenticate herself using Alice’s identity and, thus, impersonate
Alice in her malicious actions. To make this even worse, Mallory may
remove all other public keys from Alice’s WebID profile, so that Alice cannot
authenticate herself to other subjects any longer. Alice would need to
inform all her social connections and services accessing her profile about
the forgery. Finally, Alice would need to choose a new WebID URI and
re-create both her certificates and her profile.
Scenario 6.3: Temporary Exploitation. Mallory permanently tampered
Alice’s personal data in Scenarios 6.1 and 6.2. Alice might find out about
such malicious manipulations sooner or later. To cover her tracks, Mallory
adjusted her approach and only tampers Alice’s WebID profile data on
special occasions, now. That is, her modifications to Alice’s profile are
temporary instead of permanently. As an example, before authenticating to
a service as Alice, Mallory adds her public key to Alice’s WebID profile (cf.
Scenario 6.2). After making use of this service as Alice, Mallory reverses
her malicious changes by removing her public key. In the time between
these events, Mallory could send emails, book or order something in Alice’s
name. In this case, Alice would probably not discover that a malicious
manipulation of her personal data was the reason for future events and
issues.
The next subsection outlines the requirements inferred from the scenarios.
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6.1.2 Requirements
By examining Scenarios 6.1 to 6.3, we derived accessibility, appli-
cability, integrability, non-impairment and public verifiability as five
essential requirements on approaches towards tamper-evidentness,
which are detailed in the following:
Accessibility Regardless of whether identity owners control access to per-
sonal data, we have to ensure the possibility to obtain certain data sets
without prior legitimization. By implementing the open silo model through
relying on WebID, the proposed solution enables arbitrary entities to make
data associated with their identities available. Only in this way, we can
benefit from discovery and description of identities, like detecting suitable
components, and contribute to the growth of the Linked Data cloud.
Applicability Protection against tampering and identity theft should be
universally and easily applicable to non-existing and existing identities, i.e.,
independent from a specific representation of personal data contained in a
WebID profile.
Integrability The fact that malicious manipulations of personal data in
WebID profiles can happen on a permanent as well as on a temporary basis
(cf. Scenario 6.3) requires a data integrity check on every access attempt to
a WebID profile. That is, an integrity verification must be integrated into
the WebID authentication process to allow identity owners for detecting
tampering of personal data stored in their WebID profiles. In order to
simplify integrating such protective measure, the process of authentication
and retrieval of WebID profiles should be modified as little as possible, with
modifications implying none or only few additional dependencies.
Non-Impairment Making use of tamper protection must not impair human
and non-human entities that rely on WebID-based identities to accomplish
their tasks. Such protective mechanism is a recommended yet optional
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enhancement. It must therefore also not impair entities that are not em-
ploying it, e.g., SPs or IdPs during authentication, attribute retrieval and
management.
Public Verifiability While identity owners cannot completely prevent ma-
nipulation of WebID profile data by malicious server operators or external
aggressors, we have to reduce the impact of attacks by making affected
entities aware of unintended changes to personal data. To detect tamper-
ing and identity theft, it must therefore be possible to publicly verify the
integrity of personal data contained in WebID profiles.
Having specified the requirements, we discuss related work next.
6.1.3 Related Work
Literature about file systems and database systems broadly deals with
the topic of ensuring data integrity, yet this discussion of related
work focuses on the suitability of approaches to detect tampering
attacks on web systems only.
Even though encryption can protect personal data in general, it is inappropri-
ate for WebID. Profiles have to be at least partially accessible for authentica-
tion of identity owners and for queries of requesting entities. Furthermore,
identity owners would need to distribute keys for decryption to an unknown
number of potential requesting entities, which also impairs public verifiabil-
ity. Alternatively, central authorities could consolidate the key management.
However, this does not match our proposal towards self-deterministic IdM.
When signing personal data by utilizing the public keys that are already
contained in WebID profiles, they would need to be protected from manip-
ulation as well. This could be accomplished by a PKI involving CAs or a
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WoT. By investigating the common domain model as part of the state of the
art analysis in Subsection 3.3.2, we discovered several general drawbacks
of PKIs as prime examples for IdMSs of this type, especially in terms of
openness and security. PKIs utilize so-called CAs to issue certificates after
a strong review process, i.e., the owner of a CA-signed certificate has to
prove intensely to be the identity claimed. Due to this validation process, a
PKI integration into WebID would not only increase the effort of creating
new WebID certificates by users, but also negatively affect applicability,
integrability and non-impairment. While a PKI associates certificates with
real world identities, a WebID identity is allowed to be more anonymous to
provide privacy. While WebID allows for adapting this model, e.g., similar
to signing WebID certificates by a trusted third party rather than by an
identity owner, it interferes with the decentralized approach of WebID that
intends to involve and empower individuals instead of authorities and,
thus, also contradicts our self-deterministic IdM vision.
By contrast to PKI, the WoT concept represents a flat hierarchy only re-
lying on individuals (Caronni, 2000). The WoT concept is more compat-
ible to the open silo model and, by implication, also WebID (cf. Subsec-
tion 3.3.2), but it needs member discovery and makes updating public
keys and signatures difficult due to their necessary distribution and in-
clusion in other data stores, e.g., user profiles. In consequence, the WoT
concept would cause additional efforts for identity owners, also by com-
plicating integration of signatures and keys.
As related work does not sufficiently fulfill the requirements,
the following section continues with presenting a distinct ap-
proach to tamper-evidentness.
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6.2 Development
For developing a component encapsulating our approach to tamper-
evidentness (TE)21 on the basis of (Wild et al., 2014; Wild et al., 2015),
we adopt the design procedure that has been applied to model the
artifacts of the solution in Section 4.1. That is, we involve three models,
each representing a different state of the design. Using the conceptual
model formalized in Subsection 6.2.1, we specify the logical model
in Subsection 6.2.2. By deriving the physical model from the logical
model in Subsection 6.2.3, we establish the technical foundation for
the implementation described in Subsection 6.2.4.
6.2.1 Conceptual Model
To improve the protection of personal data in WebID profiles against mali-
cious manipulation, TE has to enable a profound data integrity verification.
Being aware that data integrity of potentially third-party hosted profiles can-
not be protected, TE aims at making malicious manipulations recognizable
to identity owners and requesting entities. For guaranteeing authenticity
and integrity of personal data in WebID profiles, TE needs to involve digital
signatures. Signing the underlying RDF attributes ensures that personal
data provided in the profile originates from the real identity owner22. Fur-
thermore, to prevent malicious change of public keys, TE has to accomplish
a binding key(s) and WebID profile in an unchangeable manner.
As serializations of RDF triples can express personal data within WebID
profiles in various ways using different syntaxes, TE relies on RDF graphs
21For the sake of brevity, we refer to this “component encapsulating our approach to tamper-
evidentness” simply as TE.
22Here, we intentionally use the term identity owner and not the entity described by personal
data.
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that represent WebID profiles, with this equivalence formalized in Equa-
tion (4.2). To address different orders of RDF triples and blank nodes23,
TE performs a canonicalization by utilizing the one-step deterministic la-
beling method proposed in (Carroll, 2003) and the methodology described
in (Tummarello et al., 2005). Without changing semantics, it transforms
G representing the WebID profile data into its canonical representationeG ∈ G using function η, as formalized in Equation (6.1).
η(G) = eG ∼ eT eT ∈ T (6.1)
To sign a WebID profile in canonical representation eG, TE combines the
hashes of each statement θ(t) into a single value. The hash of a state-
ment is computed by concatenating the hashes of each subject, predi-
cate and object, which then will be hashed again, as formalized in Equa-
tion (6.2). While (Kasten and Scherp, 2013) creates an overall hash of
the sorted hashes, TE deterministically canonicalizes WebID profile data.
So, the hashes of all statements can be concatenated again and a new
hash can be calculated from them.
mdig = θ (eT ) = θ ∑θ (t)∀t ∈ eT (6.2)
For the purpose of signing the hash obtained above, identity owner i has to
choose a main asymmetric key pair (k′∗, k′∗
−1), where both keys k′∗, k′∗
−1 ∈ K
are in possession of this particular identity owner. While the main key pair
is specially used for signing and verifying the WebID profile represented by
T , the identity owner can employ it as a WebID certificate for authenticating
as usual. Equation (6.3) formalizes the creation of signature msig ∈ M
using function β with main private key k′∗
−1 and hash mdig as parameters.
msig = β(k
′∗
−1, mdig) (6.3)
23Blank nodes in RDF are nodes without a URI reference and they aggregate concepts like a
person’s address (Schreiber and Raimond, 2014).
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Signature msig is attached to the WebID profile of identity owner i so
that requesting entities can retrieve certain personal data sets as well as
corresponding signature data. In addition to signing WebID profiles per se,
the means for verifying signatures have to be accessible without requiring
unreasonable efforts by requesting entities. As signing a WebID profile is
insufficient to protect it against identity theft (cf. Scenario 6.2), signature
verification of the WebID profile would fail as well. An attacker could sign
the WebID profile once again with an own private key that is associated to
the public key that has been added recently to the attacked WebID profile.
To address this matter, TE binds an identity owner’s main public key
k′∗ ∈ K to the corresponding WebID URI w′ ∈ W . Using WebID URI
w′, function ζ yields k′∗, as formalized by Equation (6.4). That is, chang-
ing the main public key would invalidate the owner’s WebID identity
i = (w′, T) (cf. Equation (4.5)).
ζ(w′) = k′∗ (6.4)
Building on this conceptual model for TE, the next subsection pro-
ceeds with specifying the logical flow.
6.2.2 Logical Model
For ensuring requesting entities that personal data within a WebID
profile data is as intended by the corresponding identity owner, we
derive three main activities from the conceptual design: signing
personal data, storing/retrieving a signature, and verifying data in-
tegrity of profiles. Figure 6.1 illustrates these activities using BPMN,
while we describe them in the following.
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Signing WebID Profile Data. By signing a WebID profile, an identity owner
(cf. top of Figure 6.1) proves that personal data stored in the profile is valid
and was not changed by another party. In order to avoid signing tampered
data, the data integrity of the WebID profile needs to be checked (cf. 1© in
Figure 6.1) prior to updating relevant data (cf. 2©) and creating a signature
(cf. 3©). Algorithm 6.1 specifies in pseudo code notation the signing of
WebID profile data. As per conceptual design, TE employs a canonicalized
RDF graph representation of WebID profile data for computing hash values
independent from specific data serializations, e.g., RDF/XML or Turtle.
To avoid disclosing an identity owner’s private key to a third party, the
signing process is divided into server side and client side. The server side
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Figure 6.1: Tamper-Evidentness Process Model
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computes hash values of each minimum self-contained graph (MSG) (Tum-
marello et al., 2005) found in the graph representation of the WebID
profile. It combines all hash values to a signing request afterwards (cf. lines
3 to 7). The client side analyzes this request and signs the content. It
creates the signatures through encrypting each hash value with a pri-
vate key (cf. lines 8 to 11). The identity owner has to select the cor-
responding private key beforehand.
Once received by the server side (cf. lines 12 to 15), TE verifies the signed
response containing the signatures. Provided that the verification was
successful, it then stores the signatures in the identity owner’s WebID
profile in 4©. When storing (cf. middle of Figure 6.1), TE applies the
method proposed in (Sayers and Eshghi, 2002). This method closely links
a public key stored in the profile with the WebID URI and, thus, assists in
detecting attacks that aim at removing profile data and signatures.
Discovering WebID Identity Theft. Following the principle of empower-
ing individuals instead of authorities, we could not solely rely on attaching
signatures to personal data24. By creating a binding between public key
and WebID URI, TE therefore ensures that this key cannot be changed
without losing personal relationship data such as incoming social connec-
tions expressed via foaf:knows WebID URIs. Having the public key stored
in the WebID URI allows detecting the same key inside the profile. This
facilitates not only discovering identity theft done by detecting malicious
key manipulation, but also using the public key for verifying signatures.
Verifying WebID Profile Data Integrity. To make signed WebID profiles
easily verifiable for requesting entities, we integrate the verification process
into the WebID authentication routine. It is triggered when the WebID
24By gaining access to the system storing the WebID profile, an attacker could tamper identity
data and manipulate signatures stored in the profile. Due to this vulnerability to attacks,
an external authority would be required to provide proof of correctness.
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Algorithm 6.1: Digitally Signing Personal Data Stored in WebID Profiles
Input : WebID URI w′, Private Key k′∗
−1
// on server side
1 get WebID profile G from w′;
2 generate canonicalized graph eG from G as per (Carroll, 2003; Tummarello
et al., 2005);
3 repeat
4 delete MSG eG∗ from eG;
5 create hash value mdig of eG∗;
6 add mdig to server inquiry minq;
7 until eG is empty;
// on client side to avoid private key disclosure
8 foreach hash value mdig in server inquiry minq do
9 create signature msig by encrypting mdig with k
′∗
−1;
10 add msig to client response mres;
11 end
// on server side
12 foreach signature msig in client response mres do
13 if signature msig is invalid then stop;
14 end
15 add all signatures in client response mres to graph G;
profile has been loaded. For verifying signed profile data (cf. bottom of
Figure 6.1), TE involves receiving a WebID profile via a WebID URI in 5©. It
tries to detect a plausible public key25 inside the profile. Such public key has
to correspond to the key representation stored in the WebID URI. As soon
as a valid public key has been found, TE computes hash values of WebID
profile data as mentioned in the signing process. It then compares the hash
values with the hash values retrieved by decrypting the signatures using the
public key, as indicated by 6©. The data integrity of WebID profiles cannot
be guaranteed in case a detection or verification step has failed. Handling
25A public key with a common length, e.g., 2048 bit.
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failed verifications depends on the scenario and authentication target. It is
therefore not part of this contribution and needs to be addressed separately.
To allow a closer look, Figure 6.2 details TE within the authentication
sequence as per proposed solution, denoted by 6© in Figure 4.7.
For reasons of clarity, the UML sequence diagram just depicts the
WebID verifier, the security enhancements by TE and the WebID
profile of identity i stored on another server.
Verification begins with invoking the WebID verifier to check the credential
supplied by the owner of identity i. As usual, the identity owner uses a
WebID certificate as a potential proof of identity i. The WebID verifier
passes the supplied WebID certificate to TE, represented by a dedicated
component, for validating the integrity of the WebID profile associated
with i (cf. 1© in Figure 6.2). TE obtains the WebID URI from the SAN
property of the WebID certificate and tries to extract the key representa-
tion from inside the obtained WebID URI in 2©. If there is no such key
representation available inside the WebID URI, the WebID profile is not
integrity-protected using TE. Consequently, TE falls back to the WebID au-
thentication sequence as per our proposed solution in 3© and either abort
or proceed with the common verification of identity i in 7©26. Otherwise,
the component requests the WebID profile referred to by the WebID URI
in 4©. By transmitting personal data including possibly available signatures,
the server hosting the WebID profile responds to the request.
TE then transforms each public key listed in the retrieved WebID profile
into a key representation according to an agreed method and compares
it with the key representation from the WebID URI in 5©. If a public
key matches the key represented in the URI, this is the main public key,
26While depending on the actual implementation, this allows for making tamper-evident
WebID profiles a mandatory requirement for authentication.
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Figure 6.2: Sequence of Detecting Tampering and Identity Theft
which the component uses to verify the signatures in the identity owner’s
WebID profile. No match would be an indication for manipulation of
personal data and cause a failed integrity verification. In this case, the
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component sends a failure notification to the WebID verifier, which, in
turn, declares the WebID verification as failed in 6©.
Using the main public key, TE verifies the signatures contained in the re-
trieved WebID profile by means of the hashes created from personal data in
the way described before (cf. 5©). If the signature verification fails, it sends
a failure notification to the WebID verifier. Depending on the implementa-
tion and other protective measures, the component passes either a success
notification or the integrity-verified WebID profile data to the WebID verifier.
Having created the logical model from the conceptual one, the next sub-
section continues with detailing technical aspects of TE.
6.2.3 Physical Model
In order to establish the basis for the technical implementation of the design
artifacts, this physical model further specifies the logical model.
TE involves binding a representation of a main public key k′∗ to a WebID
URI w′ that denotes an identity i (cf. Equation (6.4)). As the length of
such public key, e.g., 2048-bit or 4096-bit, makes it inconvenient to store it
directly inside a WebID URI, TE utilizes general-purpose hash algorithms
for generating a representation of the main public key. In comparison to
public keys per se, hash values allow for much shorter variants, e.g., 160-bit
or 256-bit, without sacrificing security. For attaching key representations
to WebID URIs, the approach converts the hash value of a main public key
via Base64 encoding with Uniform Resource Locator (URL) and filename
safe alphabet (Josefsson, 2006). Relying on the Secure Hash Algorithm
(256 bits) (SHA-256) extends a WebID URI only by 44 characters.
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To transform WebID profile data represented by RDF graph G into a canon-
ical form, as defined in Equation (6.1), TE first converts it into N-Triples
notation. Since transforming an RDF graph into N-Triples notation does not
imply any fixed sequence, TE then has to perform a sort in lexicographic
order to enable computing the same hash values for the same graph. As
one and the same blank node might have different identifiers27 without
changing semantics, TE applies the one-step deterministic labeling method
that names blank nodes in a deterministic fashion (Carroll, 2003).
Now that all artifacts relating to TE have been described, the following
subsection outlines the implementation of the design.
6.2.4 Implementation
To put the conceptual, logical and physical model into practice, we
consolidated all design artifacts in a self-contained component and
exemplarily integrated it into the Sociddea platform, which has
been initially introduced in Section 4.2.
When creating an identity according to the IdM life cycle, we allow users for
choosing protection against tampering and identity theft through tamper-
evident WebID profiles. In case, a user selects this option, Sociddea issues
an identity i = (w′, T) consisting of a WebID URI, which accommodates
the encoded hash value of the main public key, an unsigned WebID profile,
which contains almost no personal data at this point in time, and a WebID
certificate, which includes the WebID URI and the main public key.
Producing a tamper-evident WebID profile necessitates signing personal
data worth protecting. In line with the process description for the client
27Different identifiers would infer calculating different hash values from the same personal
data stored in a WebID profile.
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side in Subsection 6.2.1, we rely on a client-side signing tool at the moment.
It assists human entities in transforming a signing request into a signed
response, which is then sent back to the server side. Figure 6.3 depicts the
GUI of this tool. Here, an identity owner first selects a WebID certificate.
The tool verifies that the selected certificate contains a WebID URI that
refers to a WebID profile and is prepared for tamper-evidentness, i.e.,
the URI involves a representation of a public key that is also available
in the referred WebID profile. If this is the case and the selected WebID
certificate is valid, the thus authenticated identity owner can trigger the
automatic signing of personal data stored in the associated WebID profile.
For signature creation, the tool employs the private key that corresponds
to the public key stored in the selected WebID certificate. After verifying
generated signatures found inside the signed response of the client, the
Figure 6.3: Client-Side Tool Support for Creating Tamper-Evident WebID Profiles
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server side of the component automatically inserts all signatures into the
WebID profile of the identity owner that triggered the signing process.
Figure 6.4: Results of Tamper-Evidentness Component in Sociddea (Top/Left:
Successful Verification Shown to Identity Owner; Top/Right:
Successful Verification Shown to Requester; Bottom/Left: Possible
Tampering Indicated to Identity Owner; Bottom/Right: Possible
Tampering Indicated to Requester) (Wild et al., 2014)
For verifying tamper-evident WebID profiles, we do not only implement
tamper detection for checks during the authentication sequence that apply
to diverse classes of entities, but also support human requesting entities
in discovering anomalies in visual representation of personal data. Even
though verification is primarily intended for SPs, the Sociddea platform as
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an IdP also utilizes the component for tamper-evidentness. When human
requesting entities take a look at tamper-evident WebID profiles managed
using the Sociddea platform, they receive information on the integrity
of personal data contained in such WebID profiles. Figure 6.4 illustrates
four different scenarios: identity owner Alice’s view on her valid profile
data (top/left), ’Lastname’ changed - tampering detected (bottom/left),
requesting entity Bob’s view on Alice’s valid profile data (top/right), Bob’s
view on Alice’s tampered profile (bottom/right). While the figure visually
highlights data manipulations caused by changing a personal data attribute
of an identity owner, the component for tamper-evidentness also detects
data integrity breaches caused by adding or removing RDF triples.
After completing development, the next section is about evaluation of TE.
6.3 Evaluation
For evaluating the component for tamper-evidentness, Subsection 6.3.1
first determines the characteristics to be assessed. Subsection 6.3.2 then de-
scribes the evaluation procedure that takes account of these characteristics,
and, finally, Subsection 6.3.3 discusses the evaluation results.
6.3.1 Characteristics
By defining five requirements on approaches for tamper-evidentness in
Subsection 6.1.2, we created the foundation for a systematic analysis of
related work and a well-directed component development. Building on
this foundation, we reapply the requirements—accessibility, applicabil-
ity, integrability, non-impairment and public verifiability—as criteria for
evaluating our work in the context of tamper-evidentness.
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6.3.2 Procedure
Relying on the success indicators and verification sources declared in Sub-
section 2.3.4, we employ the proof-of-concept implementation (Wild et al.,
2014; Wild et al., 2015) as well as unit and operational acceptance tests
to evaluate the component with regard to the characteristics defined in
Subsection 6.3.1. In order to assess the degree to which each evaluation
criterion has been fulfilled by our contribution, the four-level rating system,
known from Subsection 3.2.3, suits our purpose.
6.3.3 Results
On the basis of the evaluation results obtained by applying the pro-
cedure specified in Subsection 6.3.2, we discuss how the component
for tamper-evidentness addresses each criterion defined in Subsec-
tion 6.3.1. Building upon the discussion of each evaluation criterion,
we draw a conclusion involving a rating.
Accessibility Both common and tamper-evident WebID profiles share sim-
ilar qualities, with attributes inside tamper-evident WebID profile constitut-
ing a superset of the attribute set contained in the same common WebID
profile featuring no measures for tamper-detection. While tamper-evident
WebID profiles consist of additional RDF-based signatures, existing personal
data remains untouched. Here, signatures are loosely coupled statements
about personal data. Removing all RDF triples relating to signatures would
consequently reveal the original payload of a WebID profile. By refraining
from encrypting personal data in WebID profiles, the component does not
impair the accessibility of tamper-evident WebID profiles. Even though
signatures and personal data contained in tamper-evident WebID profiles
are accessible per se, view filters can assist in concealing particular RDF
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triples, e.g., excluding all signatures might be beneficial for presenting
personal data only. Such filtering, however, requires some modifications of
the signing process, as detailed in Chapter 7.
To conclude, TE completely fulfills the accessibility criterion.
Applicability WebID profiles involve RDF for representing personal data
in a machine-readable way, with appropriate RDF-based vocabularies en-
abling to describe and interlink new contents. This facilitates extending
WebID profiles by additional RDF triples. It is consequently well applicable
to represent and associate signatures to personal data attributes. Through
directly operating on RDF graphs that represent WebID profiles, the com-
ponent cannot only manage different orders and structures of RDF triples,
but also diverse types of serialization. This allows for dealing with a high
heterogeneity of vocabularies and attribute sets, and, thus, for covering
identities from different types of entities. However, TE is only applicable
to new identities because it requires appending cryptographic means to
WebID URIs.
To conclude, TE partially fulfills the applicability criterion.
Integrability For accomplishing an extensive protection against malicious
manipulation and identity theft through early detection, the component
needs to be integrated into both IdPs and SPs. This is necessary for signature
creation via IdP and for signature verification via SP. Yet, we simplify
integrating the contribution for tamper-evidentness by a self-contained
component hiding its complexity through offering an API. The component
does not involve exotic dependencies for operation, but it requires access
to an identity owner’s WebID URI, WebID profile, and WebID certificate
including the private key for signing hashes generated by general-purpose
algorithms. In order to avoid disclosing the private key to a third party, we
depend on a client-side signing tool, which entails requirements for system,
platform and device support.
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The backward-compatibility of the component is an advantage in terms
of integrability. Despite comprising a key representation, a WebID URI
referencing a tamper-evident WebID profile, as per our contribution, is
still a valid WebID URI. SPs, which do not integrate the component, are
therefore still enabled to perform the default WebID authentication of
users, as specified in Subsection 4.1.2. Furthermore, the WebID verifier
can request a tamper-evident WebID profile as usual and ignore included
signatures without losing necessary personal data. In the opposite case, i.e.,
when a common (non-tamper-evident) WebID profile needs to be verified,
the component detects this and falls back to the WebID authentication
sequence as per proposed solution (cf. Figure 4.7).
To conclude, TE partially fulfills the integrability criterion.
Non-Impairment Combining the key representation—an encoded SHA-
256-based hash value of the main public key—with the WebID URI creates
a universal mean to detect tampering in WebID profiles. While other hash
algorithms generate much shorter outputs, e.g., message-digest algorithm 5
(MD5) (22 characters) or SHA-1 (27 characters), they are either classified
as insecure today or considered to be unsafe in the next years. In contrast,
(Barker et al., 2012) estimate SHA-256 as secure until 2030.
Attaching cryptographic means to WebID URI comes at the cost of some
implications. Losing or compromising the main public/private key pair
requires creating a new WebID identity. That is, an identity owner would
need to create a new main public/private key pair for signing the WebID
profile. Due to the fact that the main public key is encoded inside the WebID
URI, also the new main public key needs to be stored there. While changing
a tamper-evident WebID URI results in creating a different and therefore
new identity, we consider this as a common shortcoming of WebID. Not only
is it impossible to transform common WebID URIs to tamper-evident ones,
but also to change tamper-evident WebID URIs without invalidating all
links that point to the underlying personal data, e.g., incoming connections
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from social contacts expressing their relationships. Moreover, storing a
hash value inside a WebID URI makes it difficult for human entities to
memorize such identifiers (Halpin, 2014).
Unlike automatic data integrity verification, modifying a WebID profile
demands that the identity owner recreates signatures for updated personal
data using the main private. While not an issue for non-human entity,
human entities need to be supported in this task. To ease signing for human
entities, the component involves a client-side tool, which is, however, an
additional mean users have to employ to enhance security.
To conclude, TE partially fulfills the non-impairment criterion.
Public Verifiability Verifying a tamper-evident WebID profile does not re-
quire human interaction, i.e., the component automatically verifies integrity
of personal data contained in a WebID profile by checking the WebID URI
and by validating stored signature. Although interpreting the results of the
data integrity check rests on requesting entities as well as service providers,
especially human entities can benefit from visual presentation of results,
as exemplarily done by Sociddea (cf. Figure 6.4). Consider an attacker
would remove signatures stored in a tamper-evident WebID profile, there is
still the hash-included WebID URI publicly indicating that personal data in-
side the corresponding tamper-evident profile has to be integrity-protected.
While there are other ways of using hash values in URIs (Sauermann et al.,
2007), the component just appends an encoded hash value to a common
WebID URI, for the sake of simplicity and conformity.
Signing WebID profiles facilitates detecting malicious manipulation of con-
tained personal data. When an aggressor changes personal data in another
user’s WebID profile, verifying the signature of this profile fails because
the aggressor cannot sign the manipulated WebID profile with the main
private key safeguarded by the actual identity owner. In case of implanting
an own public key in another user’s WebID profile, an aggressor could sign
the WebID profile with the corresponding private key, but not change the
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hash value of the public key in the WebID URI. Since we use algorithms
considered as safe, it is unlikely to find a collision to the hash value encoded
in a WebID URI or to create a private key from a given public key. Conse-
quently, changing the hash value would change the identifier of an attacked
user’s WebID identity and, thus, create a new WebID identity rather than
hijack the user’s one. This protection also secures a WebID profile against
temporary manipulation and temporary identity theft (cf. Scenarios 6.2
and 6.3).
To conclude, TE largely fulfills the public verifiability criterion.
By completing the component evaluation with results indicating
an overall large fulfillment of the criteria, the following section
sums up the outcome of TE.
6.4 Summary
With tamper-evident WebID profiles, requesting entities and identity owners
are enabled to verify that stored personal data was not tampered, neither
on systems that make profiles available nor during transmission. By pro-
viding a component to detect temporary and permanent integrity breaches
in personal data caused by malicious manipulation and identity theft, we
contributed to increase trustworthiness in self-deterministic IdM by human
and non-human entities. Through tamper-evidentness, identity owners can
verify that they are in control of the resources representing their WebID
profiles and even manage their personal data on potentially untrusted or
insecure systems, in case data disclosure would not be an issue. Based
on three scenarios, we derived five requirements to systematically ana-
lyze related work and align the development of our contribution. Taking
accessibility, applicability, integrability, non-impairment and public veri-
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fiability into account, we conceptually, logically and physically designed
the contribution for tamper-evidentness. Through focusing on empower-
ing individuals instead of authorities, we enabled the verification without
requiring prior knowledge, except for already known WebID identifiers.
To prove the concept for tamper-evidentness, we transferred the design
artifacts into a self-contained component, which we then exemplarily inte-
grated into the Sociddea platform. From the results obtained by evaluating
the component, we concluded an overall sufficient fulfillment of the re-
quirements, but with some justifiable drawbacks. Security comes at a cost.
Even though we are aware that tamper-evident WebID URIs and profiles
complicate the management especially for human entities, we claim that
most issues can be successfully addressed through utilizing techniques
such as URI drag and drop, quick response (QR) codes or WebID URI
embedded into other objects like WebID certificates.
Now that the component for tamper-evidentness has been described, the
following chapter continues with detailing the third key component.
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7Fine-Grained
Filtering
To particularly address Problem Cause 3.3: “Incomplete Range and Granu-
larity of Access Control”, this chapter starts with analyzing requirements
and related work specific to the problem domain in Section 7.1. With the
obtained analysis results, Section 7.2 describes the development of the
fine-grained filtering (FGF) component to completely meet the domain-
specific requirements. Employing the success indicators and verification
sources described as part of the strategy on page 61, Section 7.3 evaluates
our approach to fine-grained filtering to verify the compliance with the
requirements. Finally, Section 7.4 concludes this chapter by summarizing
the outcome of our contribution for fine-grained filtering.
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7.1 Analysis
With reference to Activity 3.3: “Increase Range and Granularity of Ac-
cess Control”, Subsection 7.1.1 describes several scenarios to highlight
the necessity for FGF as a recommended security enhancement of the
proposed solution. Using these scenarios, Subsection 7.1.2 then derives
a set of requirements that we employ to analyze related work, with re-
sults discussed in Subsection 7.1.3.
7.1.1 Scenarios
In addition to inherent features of the proposed solution, access
control capabilities play a decisive role in enhancing security, as
shown in the next three scenarios:
Scenario 7.1: Protection of Privacy. WebID identity owner Alice intends
to restrict access to her personal data. She wants to do this because all
data available inside her WebID profile could be easily retrieved, if not
properly addressed by appropriate access control mechanisms. Sensitive
personal data could be used for purposes she does not agree with, e.g.,
social network analysis, personalized advertisements or product marketing.
Although restricting access to her entire profile would be an option, Alice is
not interested in losing advantages like authenticating to new yet unknown
services. To keep associated services up-to-date, Alice therefore wants to
permit third-party entities, like other persons or web services, to monitor
specific parts of her personal data for changes. Furthermore, Alice wants
to allow anyone to access personal data she marked as public, even if Alice
is currently unavailable or unauthenticated.
Scenario 7.2: Trust Relationships. Bob, who also maintains a WebID
identity, wants to retrieve Alice’s current address data. Compared to the
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anonymous subjects in Scenario 7.1, Alice knows and trusts Bob. She
therefore granted him extended privileges some time ago. While Bob is
allowed to see Alice’s private address data as part of the personal data
contained in her WebID profile, Alice does not want to share this kind of
data with her co-worker Casey. Instead of private address data, only Alice’s
office address data should be visible to Casey.
Scenario 7.3: System Migration. Alice’s WebID profile is hosted on a
third-party server she trusted in the past. For justifiable reasons, she does
not trust the server operator any longer and, thus, plans to switch the server
hosting her WebID profile. Alice has distributed her WebID profile data to
separate resources in order to apply access control at the resource level. For
migrating to a new hosting server, Alice has to find, consolidate and transfer
all her personal data being scattered among various resources. Additionally,
she has to adjust access control lists (ACLs) for these resources due to
issues like different hosting locations or naming conventions/restrictions.
As an identity owner, Alice must be aware of all resources relevant to the
migration. Depending on Alice’s setup used for securing her personal data,
this migration might be a complex undertaking.
The next subsection outlines the requirements inferred from the scenarios.
7.1.2 Requirements
By examining Scenarios 7.1 to 7.3, we derived accessibility, main-
tainability, portability, range and specificity as five essential re-
quirements on approaches for FGF incl. underlying specifications,
which we detail in the following:
Accessibility The requirement of accessibility, which we inferred for ap-
proaches to tamper-evidentness in Subsection 6.1.2, also applies for FGF.
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WebID-based authentication requires an at least partially accessible public
WebID profile because it contains an identity owner’s public keys. Not only
to ensure authenticatability of identity owners, but also to facilitate moni-
toring and retrieval of personal data by allowed SPs and by entities identity
owners maintain relationships with (cf. Scenario 7.1), WebID profile data
must remain accessible according to specified preferences. This furthermore
implies refraining from encryption, as explained in Subsection 6.1.3.
Maintainability The preferences identity owners specify to control access
to their personal data must be maintainable by human and machine (cf.
Scenario 7.3). Relying on standard-compliant specifications and tools eases
maintenance, enables reliability and avoids introducing too much overhead
through adjustments, additional support or training efforts.
Portability Without making major adjustments, access control preferences
must be portable to other systems by identity owners (cf. Scenario 7.3).
Processors to interpret preferences and editors to declare them have to be
either available or easy to implement. In line with maintainability, standard-
compliant specifications and tools foster portability and are therefore a part
of this requirement.
Range Identity owners must be enabled to express whom exactly they
want to make certain personal data sets available to. Conforming with the
preferences they have specified, access control of personal data contained
in their WebID profiles must universally apply for anonymous requesting
entities, groups of identities and specific identities of different entity classes,
covering both human and non-human requesting entities (cf. Scenarios 7.1
and 7.2). That is, it has to be possible to treat each requesting entity
authenticated via WebID differently, when attempting to access personal
data inside a WebID profile.
Specificity In order to prevent unwanted retrieval, identity owners have
to restrict access to certain (sensitive) personal data stored within their
profiles (Scenario 7.2). They must therefore be enabled to precisely define
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which parts of their WebID profile data has to be filtered out. Taking RDF
graph representations of WebID profiles for granted (cf. Equation (4.2)),
specifications must be expressive enough to enable fine-grained access
control at the level of individual attributes, i.e., per RDF triple.
Having specified the requirements, we discuss related work next.
7.1.3 Related Work
While many proprietary implementations feature discretionary, role-based
or mandatory access control, their underlying ACLs are neither seman-
tically interpretable by machines nor universal in the sense of identify-
ing the entities that request access as well as the resources to be pro-
tected (Wild and Gaedke, 2014). For this reason, we focus the discussion
of related work on approaches involving RDF-based ACL specifications
and means for identifying entities via URI.
As unprotected WebID profiles are potential information sources for known
and wanted but also for unknown and unwanted requesting entities, iden-
tity owners can protect their personal data by defining access control
rights at the level of (URI-addressable) resources (Hackett and Hawkey,
2012). While resource-based access control mechanisms allow for shield-
ing from unwanted access, retrievals or tracking attempts (Bonneau et
al., 2009), they typically offer only coarse-grained protection, without
further intervention by identity owners.
With focus on resources rather than underlying data, identity owners
that employ such mechanisms would need to outsource their personal
data to separate resources and set proper permissions in order to
enable a less coarse-grained protection. The number of resources
required for a less coarse-grained protection increases with the extent
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and heterogeneity of data to apply access control to, which, in turn,
would cause a rise in complexity, and complicate modifications and
transfers to other systems (Heitmann et al., 2010).
Being a vocabulary to define access rights, Web Access Control (WAC) en-
ables discretionary access control and facilitates protecting URI-addressable
resources against unauthorized access by anonymous requesters as well as
subjects or groups, which are also identifiable by URIs (Hollenbach et al.,
2009). ACLs specified by WAC are machine-readable through RDF and
can be stored independently from the resources they protect. As described
in (Chudnovskyy, Wild, et al., 2012), WAC is well-suited for scenarios in-
volving many resources to control access to. Even though WAC does not
support directly controlling access to specific data within resources, it is
compatible with outsourcing particular personal data sets as self-contained
resources. Such data distribution and related definition of correspond-
ing ACLs comes along with declining maintainability and portability. For
instance, a fine-grained control at its best would result in outsourcing
each RDF triple within a WebID profile to a separate resource. When
applying changes, this approach is impracticable.
The Access Control Ontology (ACO) and the User Access Ontology (UAO)
are similar to WAC, but add support for roles and enable directly mapping
permissions to HTTP verbs (Tomaszuk et al., 2011; Tomaszuk and Rybin´ski,
2011). Like WAC, ACO and UAO can only control access to resources.
To protect data within resources, both approaches require outsourcing
of relevant data to separate resources. ACO, UAO and WAC share the
same maintainability and portability issues.
The data perspective approach customizes WebID profile data for specific
identities of requesting entities by introducing sets of triples as alternative
data sources (Tramp, Story, et al., 2012). It thus allows for manipulating
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data represented by resources. For each combination of requested data,
identifier and public key, a view is defined in terms of the set of triples
to be returned. These view definitions increase flexibility by providing
improved filter expressiveness, e.g., new triples can be directly added to a
profile view. While the data perspective approach represents a promising
work towards fine-grained filtering, it lacks maintainability. The approach
distributes relevant data across view definitions and the actual WebID
profile, which decreases maintainability as updates necessitate adjustments
in several places. View definitions offer alternative information sources
relative to existing WebID profile data, but require further processing to
prioritize, merge or replace specific triples. If view definitions are used
as an additional layer of information, the approach would store personal
data in two different places, which causes a decrease in maintainability
through redundancy and bears the risk of creating conflicts. Moreover,
the approach does not support group-wise views and involves a custom
vocabulary, which limits expressiveness and portability.
As related work does not sufficiently fulfill the requirements, the
following section continues with presenting a distinct approach
to fine-grained filtering.
7.2 Development
For developing the component for fine-grained filtering on the basis of
(Wild, Chudnovskyy, et al., 2013a; Wild, Chudnovskyy, et al., 2013b; Wild
et al., 2015), we adopt the design procedure that has been applied to
model the artifacts of the solution in Section 4.1. That is, we involve
three models, each representing a different state of the design. Using the
conceptual model formalized in Subsection 7.2.1, we specify the logical
model in Subsection 7.2.2. By deriving the physical model from the logical
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model in Subsection 7.2.3, we establish the technical foundation for the
implementation described in Subsection 7.2.4.
7.2.1 Conceptual Model
To avoid unwanted retrieval of personal data stored within WebID profiles,
we enable identity owners to apply fine-gained filtering of sensitive personal
data. Here, a WebID profile acts as filter input. Graph G = (V , L) ∼
T represents such profile, as formalized in (4.2). The graph-to-graph
transformation function γ maps graph G onto graph G′ ∈ G depending
on identity i r ∈ I, as defined by Equation (7.1).
γ :G× I→G (7.1)
Graph G′ represents the WebID profile of an identity owner i filtered by sensi-
tive data a requester denoted by identity i r ∈ I is not allowed for retrieving.
Relying on Equation (7.1), Equation (7.2) formalizes such filtering.
γ(G, i r) = G
′ = (V ′ ⊆ V , L′ ⊆ L) (7.2)
While all personal data is available in graph G, requester i r is only granted
the privilege to see a particular subset of the identity owner’s data. Graph G′
represents this particular subset. Filter function δ defines a mapping of
triples on {0,1} depending on the identity. While “0” means sensitive
data and, therefore, that the corresponding RDF triple is not present in
graph G′, “1” means the opposite. Consequently, we can achieve blacklisting
or whitelisting of sensitive WebID profile data for particular requesters
using filter function δ, as defined by (7.3).
δ : I× {t} → {0,1},∀t ∈ T (7.3)
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The graph-to-graph transformation γ(G, i r) uses δi r to create a filtered
graph G′ based on G for a requester denoted by identity i r . For an identity
owner i acting as a requester i r , function δi yields “1” for each RDF triple
in graph G, i.e., graph G′ = G. RDF triples T ′ ⊆ T span graph G′ =
(V ′, L′), T ′ ∼ G′, as defined in Equation (7.4).
T ′ = {t|δi r (t) = 1, t ∈ T} (7.4)
To relieve identity owner i from the need to define filter function δi r
for each potential requester, we introduce fallback function ε(i r) that
yields the best possible fallback identity i f ∈ I for a given requester
denoted by identity i r . In order to facilitate grouping possible requesters,
we introduce the following four identity sets:
• requesters authenticated using WebID: I z ⊆ I,
• specific requesters defined by the identity owner: I s ⊆ I z ,
• requesters who are friends of the identity owner: I p ⊆ I z , and
• anonymous requesters: I o ⊆ I, I o ∩ I z = ;.
A fallback identity yielded by ε(i r) is equatable to diverse identities as a
function of both group membership and filters created by identity owner i.
That is, if identity owner i created a filter for a requester denoted by iden-
tity i r , then the fallback identity matches the identity of this particular
requester. In case there is no such filter defined, but the identity owner
is connected with the requester (i r ∈ I p) and has created a filter for
friends, then the fallback identity matches the friend identity ip ∈ I p.
When a requester is authenticated yet not known to the identity owner
who has created a filter for authenticated users, then the fallback identity
matches the identity of an authenticated user iz ∈ I z . With the identity
owner having created a filter for anonymous users, unauthenticated re-
questers are assigned with a fallback identity matching the identity of an
anonymous user io ∈ I o. Finally, for dealing with the case of the iden-
tity owner not having any filter defined, the fallback identity corresponds
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to a theoretical null identity inull ∈ I. As a consequence, we can also
refine the set of possible fallback identities to i f ∈
 {ip, iz , io, inull} ∪ I s.
Equation (7.5) formalizes fallback function ε(i r).
ε(i r) = i f =

i r if ∃δi r
ip if ∃δip ∧ i r ∈ I p ∧ i r /∈ I s
iz if ∃δiz ∧ i r ∈ I z ∧ i r /∈ I s ∧ i r /∈ I p
io if ∃δio ∧ i r ∈ I o
inull if >δi r ∧ >δip ∧ >δiz ∧ >δio
(7.5)
Here, filter function δinull implements a behavior as if no filtering is active
and, thus, enables accessing profiles not having predefined filters (cf. Equa-
tion (7.6)). To make creating filters a requirement for identity owners,
we could revise δinull to result in 0 ∀t ∈ T .
δinull(t) = 1 ∀t ∈ T (7.6)
To use ε(i r) as part of γ(G, i r), we adjust Equation (7.4) as
shown in Equation (7.7).
γ (G,ε(i r)) = G
′ ∼ T ′ = {t|δε(i r )(t) = 1, t ∈ T} (7.7)
Representing the certain views an identity owner i can create for a
WebID profile T depending on a requester denoted by identity i r ,
Gi ∈ G is the set of all filtered graphs for this particular profile,
as formalized in Equation (7.8).
Gi = {G′|G′ = γ(G, i f ), i f ∈
 {ip, iz , io, inull} ∪ I s} (7.8)
Adjustments to tamper-evidentness. Filtered graphs entail adjustments
to the tamper-evidentness model presented in Subsection 6.2.1. Since this
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conceptual model for tamper-evidentness relies on certain operations on
RDF graph representations of WebID profiles, each filtered representation
creates a new graph to be signed. The procedure we applied for signing
so-called MSGs, as per (Tummarello et al., 2005), does no longer fit to our
approach because the filters could exclude some blank nodes of a MSG.
So, an agent verifying the data integrity of a WebID profile could receive a
filtered representation of that profile, where some blank nodes of a MSG are
missing. Verifying the signature of the filtered profile would fail because
it was generated with blank nodes inside the RDF graph (Tummarello
et al., 2005). Nevertheless, contained personal data still originates from
the actual identity owner and not an aggressor.
As a consequence, the actual signing has to happen for each filtered graph
out of Gi , which has been specified by an identity owner. When an identity
owner modifies personal data, each existing filter needs to be applied
and each resulting filtered graph G′ ∈ Gi has to be signed once again,
as formalized in Equation (7.8). Adapting Equation (6.1), we therefore
transform filtered graph G′ into its canonical representation eG′. Adapting
Equation (6.2), we use the equivalent canonical representation of the
filtered RDF triple set eT ′ ∼ eG′ instead of eT . According to Equation (6.3),
the hash value of an entire filtered representation of a WebID profile and
the main private key k′−1 of the identity owner are used to create signature
msig of a filtered WebID profile. Finally, we attach each signature msig to its
corresponding filter so that the original WebID profile remains unchanged
and the existing signatures of other filters are still valid.
Building on this conceptual model for fine-grained filtering, the next sub-
section proceeds with specifying the logical flow.
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7.2.2 Logical Model
To orchestrates the elements of the conceptual model in their primary usage
sequence, we derive a logical model, as illustrated in Figure 7.1. When
a requesting entity identifiable through i r tries to retrieve personal data
from the WebID profile of identity owner i, an appropriate filter is searched
using ε(i r). To protect sensitive data, identity owner i has to specify
eligible filters prior to this step. Filters are stored as filter specifications in
the identity owner’s WebID profile. Filter specifications are hidden from
anyone but identity owner i. Otherwise, this information is a potential
subject to social engineering, e.g., profile analyzers could conclude group
affiliations utilizing knowledge about δi r or ε(i r). Each filter specification
consists of fallback identity i f and filter γ. Having detected a specification
for i f using ε(i r), the filter γ(G, i f ) converts graph G into graph G′ that
represents a WebID profile filtered by data marked as sensitive by i. That
is, the profile retrieved by requester i r contains only data which satisfies
the constraints defined by filter function δε(i r ).
γ(G,if)
Retrieve identity if
best matching to
ir using ε(ir)
Graph G representating 
requested profile
Graph G  representing 
filtered profile
Fallback identity if 
with filter specified
Filtering of 
requested profile
Serialization of 
filtered profile
Requesting entity
employing ir
Profile
response
Profile 
request
Fine-Grained Filtering of Sensitive Personal Data
ε(ir)
Filter 
specs.
Figure 7.1: Fine-Grained Filtering Process Model
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Having created the logical model from the conceptual one, the next sub-
section continues with detailing technical aspects of FGF.
7.2.3 Physical Model
In order to establish the basis for the technical implementation of the design
artifacts, this physical model further specifies the logical model.
The approach for fine-grained filtering makes use of the semantic WebID
Profile Filter Language (WPFL) (Wild, Chudnovskyy, et al., 2013a) and
the SPARQL CONSTRUCT query form (Harris and Seaborne, 2013) for
technically representing the transformation and filter function. WPFL
allows for defining filter specifications that involve three basic elements:
entity name for i f , filter command for γ(G, i r) and a specification element
to bind them together and connect the filter to the WebID profile. The
specification element allows storing filter specifications either in an identity
owner’s WebID profile, represented by graph G, or separately as linked
resources. Only three RDF triples describe the basic elements of WPFL,
as exemplarily shown in Turtle syntax in Listing 7.1.
Listing 7.1: Template of Filter Specification as per WPFL
1 <WEBID URI > filter:specification [
2 filter:entity ENTITY;
3 filter:command COMMAND
4 ] .
The SPARQL CONSTRUCT query form facilitates constructing a new graph
G′ based on an existing graph G, as required by Equation (7.2). According
to Equation (7.4), it can include or exclude personal data during con-
struction of G′ ∼ T ′. A whitelisting28, as defined by this equation, men-
28Blacklisting data is also supported by SPARQL CONSTRUCT queries via MINUS statements.
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tioning all personal data to be available in graph G′ is described by the
generic filter command shown in Listing 7.2.
Listing 7.2: Generic Filter Command Specification Using SPARQL CONSTRUCT
Query Form
1 CONSTRUCT { ?s ?p ?o } FROM <WEBID URI > WHERE { ?s ?p ?o .
2 FILTER (?s in (Subject1 , Subject2 , [...])) .
3 FILTER (?p in (Predicate1 , Predicate2 , [...])) .
4 FILTER (?o in (Object1 , Object2 , [...]))
5 }
As an example, all contact references would be copied from G to G′, if solely
the foaf:knows predicate is mentioned (cf. line 3). To increase filtering
granularity, it is beneficial to also refer to subjects or objects of RDF triples
(cf. lines 2 and 4), e.g., in order to include/exclude specific contacts. While
this all together defines exactly one filter directive, the UNION keyword in
SPARQL enables to employ several filter directives in one filter command.
To cover filtering of context-dependent personal data, we utilize SPARQL
Property Path, as specified in (Harris and Seaborne, 2013). For instance, a
street attribute could be context-dependent as it is element of an address,
which in turn could be element of either private or business contact data.
Property paths facilitate to address relevant elements in graph G by speci-
fying the routes between them. For example, a filter command to construct
a new graph by including name and image of identity owner i as well as
city and country of the owner’s home—but not street, postal code etc.—is
described in Listing 7.3. Here, lines 3 and 4 create the context needed
to include city and country (cf. lines 5 and 6) as part of the address data
described using the contact ontology (Berners-Lee, 2001).
To select the best-matching available filter specification based on
the retrieved filter entity, as formalized in Equation (7.5), the ap-
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Listing 7.3: Exemplary SPARQL CONSTRUCT Query with Property Paths
1 CONSTRUCT { ?s ?p ?o } FROM <WEBID URI > WHERE {
2 {?s ?p ?o . FILTER (?p in (foaf:name , foaf:img))} UNION
3 {?s ?p ?o . ?t con:home ?o} UNION
4 {?s ?p ?o . ?t con:home/con:address ?o} UNION
5 {?s ?p ?o . ?t con:home/con:address/con:city ?o} UNION
6 {?s ?p ?o . ?t con:home/con:address/con:country ?o}
7 }
proach relies on a dedicated SPARQL query that uses the identifier
possibly provided by the requesting entity.
Now that all artifacts relating to FGF have been described, the following
subsection outlines the implementation of the design.
7.2.4 Implementation
To put the conceptual, logical and physical model into practice, we
consolidated all design artifacts in a self-contained component and
exemplarily integrated it into the Sociddea platform, which has
been initially introduced in Section 4.2.
The contribution for fine-grained filtering enables identity owners to create
filters on their WebID profile data not only for anonymous and specific
requesting entities, but also for groups of requesting entities, with group
affiliations predefined through roles or declared manually. For assisting
human entities, like identity owners or web service administrators, in cre-
ating and configuring filters for profile data, Sociddea provides them with
an appropriate GUI accessible via the common profile authoring mode
(cf. Figure 4.10). Here, they can use all identity attributes presented in
the profile authoring mode to specify filters, i.e., each personal data at-
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tribute can be marked as either visible or hidden. Using the GUI shown
in Figure 7.2 on the left side, Sociddea allows for predicate-based filter-
ing, e.g., by first name or by service endpoint. By selecting a known
requesting entity, represented by a particular identity, role or group affil-
iation, Sociddea can visualize the preferences that have been previously
defined in an already existing filter specification.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
<rdf:RDF […]> 
  <foaf:Person rdf:about=“https://vsr-
demo.informatik.tu-
chemnitz.de/sociddea/profiles/alice#aa“> 
    <filter:specification> 
      <filter:entity>anonym</filter:entity> 
      <filter:command>CONSTRUCT […]       
      </filter:command> 
    </filter:specification> 
    […] 
  </foaf:Person> 
</rdf:RDF> 
CONSTRUCT { ?s ?p ?o }  
FROM <https://vsr-demo.informatik.tu-
chemnitz.de/sociddea/profiles/alice#aa>  
WHERE {  
  ?s ?p ?o  
  FILTER(?p in ( 
    foaf:name,  
    foaf:img,  
    foaf:homepage,  
    [...] 
  ))  
} 
Creation of 
Filter Specification 
Detailed View on Value of filter:command    
Filter Specification 
Figure 7.2: Creation of Filter Specification Based on User Selection (Wild et al.,
2015)
To enable machines to semantically process this yet informal filter config-
uration, the component for fine-grained filtering automatically creates a
SPARQL CONSTRUCT statement corresponding to specified preferences.
As the component implements a whitelisting of attributes, the resulting
SPARQL statement contains references to all personal data attributes de-
clared as visible for a particular requesting entity. All three RDF triples,
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which denote filter specifics, are directly stored within the WebID profile
they are intended to be applied to. Figure 7.2 schematically depicts the
process of creating such personal data filter.
Beyond supporting rather unskilled users by a GUI, more experienced
users can employ an advanced profile editor offered by Sociddea in or-
der to express more complex customized views on personal data through
creating SPARQL CONSTRUCT statements manually. Not only does this
allow for filtering even personal data attributes unsupported by the GUI,
but also for maxing out the full potential of SPARQL, like dealing with
special cases including conditional filtering.
Once a filter specification has been created, our implemented contribution
considers it automatically during all future attempts to access the particular
profile containing the data to be filtered. When a requesting entities tries to
retrieve WebID profile data, the component searches for an appropriate filter
specification using the possibly provided identity and the filter:entity
triples in the WebID profile. Having found a matching filter entity, the
component extracts the filter:command triple belonging to the same
filter:specification and directly passes it to a SPARQL processor,
i.e., no modification is made to the command. While Sociddea renders
results produced by the SPARQL processor as defined in the request of
a requesting entity (cf. Section 4.2), rendering per se is not part of the
component for fine-grained filtering. Figure 7.3 exemplifies the filtering
of a WebID profile in Sociddea for an anonymous requesting entity. Here,
the component detects and employs a previously defined filter specification
to create a customized view, which is then rendered according to the
requesting entity’s preferences as an HTML representation.
After completing development, the next section is about evaluation of FGF.
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 <rdf:RDF […]> 
  <foaf:Person rdf:about=“https://vsr-
demo.informatik.tu-
chemnitz.de/sociddea/profiles/alice#aa“> 
    <filter:specification > 
      <filter:entity>anonym</filter:entity> 
      <filter:command>CONSTRUCT […] 
      </filter:command> 
    </filter:specification> 
    […] 
  </foaf:Person> 
</rdf:RDF> 
? 
Figure 7.3: WebID Profile Data Filtered for Anonymous Requesting Entities (Wild
et al., 2015)
7.3 Evaluation
For evaluating the component for fine-grained filtering, Subsection 7.3.1
first determines the characteristics to be assessed. Subsection 7.3.2 then de-
scribes the evaluation procedure that takes account of these characteristics,
and, finally, Subsection 7.3.3 discusses the evaluation results.
7.3.1 Characteristics
By defining five requirements on approaches for fine-grained filtering in
Subsection 7.1.2, we created the foundation for a systematic analysis of
related work and a well-directed component development. Building on
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this foundation, we reapply the requirements—accessibility, maintainabil-
ity, portability, range and specificity—as criteria for evaluating our work
in the context of fine-grained filtering.
7.3.2 Procedure
Relying on the success indicators and verification sources declared in Subsec-
tion 2.3.4, we employ the proof-of-concept implementation as well as unit
and operational acceptance tests to evaluate the component with regard to
the characteristics defined in Subsection 7.3.1. In order to assess the degree
to which each evaluation criterion has been fulfilled by our contribution, the
four-level rating system, known from Subsection 3.2.3, suits our purpose.
7.3.3 Results
On the basis of the evaluation results obtained by applying the pro-
cedure specified in Subsection 7.3.2, we discuss how the component
for fine-grained filtering addresses each criterion defined in Subsec-
tion 7.3.1. Building upon the discussion of each evaluation criterion,
we draw a conclusion involving a rating.
Accessibility Personal data stored in WebID profiles remains fully acces-
sible for authorized requesting entities. The component for fine-grained
filtering does not involve encryption, yet it facilitates hiding particular
personal data sets, which the actual data owner considered as too sensitive
for public disclosure. As a consequence, the component can also conceal
filter specifications from requesting entities, so that these entities remain
unaware of having possibly received just a constrained view on the identity
owner’s complete personal data set.
To conclude, FGF completely fulfills the accessibility criterion.
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Maintainability Contrary to related work (cf. Subsection 7.1.3), our con-
tribution does not require outsourcing personal data to separate resources
for implementing a fine-grained access control. Although the component
allows for separating personal data and filter specifications, we recommend
storing the latter in the WebID profile to be filtered. Thus, all necessary
information can remain at one place, which simplifies updating, replacing
or removing already existing filter specifications. With a minimal overhead
of three additional RDF triples, we enable to define a specification for fine-
grained filtering with regard to a certain requesting entity. Nevertheless,
introducing a new vocabulary, like WPFL, reduces maintainability as it
requires interpretation support. Depending on extent and specificity of
fine-grained filters, the underlying commands may get complex and hard
to maintain by human entities. Assistance by a GUI can mitigate this issue,
as shown in Sociddea.
For the sake of homogeneity to the underlying profile data representation
as RDF triples, the component demands using SPARQL (Subsection 3.3.3).
This allows for directly passing a WPFL-based filter command to a SPARQL
processor to create a new filtered graph. SPARQL is a standardized and
widely adopted language with extensive tool support by optimized pro-
cessors (Pérez et al., 2009). For operation, the component depends on
only two input parameters: the graph representing an unfiltered WebID
profile incl. a filter specification and the identity of the requesting entity.
Using SPARQL rather than an own proprietary language ensures reliable
processing and maintainability.
To conclude, FGF largely fulfills the maintainability criterion.
Portability In many cases filtering mechanisms depend on proprietary
interpreters to apply access control (cf. Subsection 7.1.3). In contrast, our
component features SPARQL with adequate processors existing for many
platforms and architectures. This contributes to interoperability of the
component and, thus, to a reasonable portability of filter specifications.
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The effort to transfer specified filters to new systems is furthermore reduced
by enabling identity owners to store necessary filter specifications within
their WebID profiles. Despite these advantages, systems that utilize our
contribution have to be capable of interpreting WPFL-based specifications
and processing SPARQL queries.
To conclude, FGF largely fulfills the portability criterion.
Range Related work tries to reduce complexity by defining restricted vocab-
ularies, whereas SPARQL allows for expressing complex queries. Restricted
vocabularies offer advantages in terms of usability, but they also limit the
possibilities of filtering and cause workarounds, like the necessity of out-
sourcing sensitive user profile data. To create a customized view on a
WebID profile, the component automatically selects a filter specified for a
requesting entity. If no filter specification is available, a fallback mechanism
selects the most appropriate filter based on availability and provided iden-
tity. Not only is the component capable of handling anonymous and specific
requesting entities that employ identities but also groups and simple roles
like known contacts.
To conclude, FGF completely fulfills the range criterion.
Specificity While the component for fine-grained filtering focuses on select-
ing the most specific filter according to the identity supplied by a requesting
entity, it also manages situations where a specific filter is unavailable.
There, the procedure falls back to an available, more unspecific filter which
matches at least some characteristics of the identity of the requesting entity.
In contrast to other mechanisms, our contribution enables real fine-grained
filtering at the level of attributes and beyond. Not only do we facilitate
filtering of specific RDF triples representing personal data attributes, but
also individual elements of RDF triples, i.e., subject, predicate and object.
In addition, our contribution allows for modeling specific contextual de-
pendencies among RDF triples to be filtered, like address data, through
SPARQL queries involving property paths. The component for fine-grained
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filtering can handle both whitelisting and blacklisting of RDF triples, but we
recommend whitelisting because exposed filters do not contain any informa-
tion on hidden personal data. Moreover, whitelisting eases constructing an
empty or sparse graph representation of a profile, which might be relevant
for identity owners having stringent requirements for privacy and, thus,
want to forbid anonymous profile requests. Utilizing whitelisting, identity
owners must actively unlock personal data attributes to be accessible for
requesting entities, which also contributes to protection.
To conclude, FGF completely fulfills the specificity criterion.
By finishing the component evaluation with results indicating an
overall complete fulfillment of the criteria, the following section
sums up the outcome of FGF.
7.4 Summary
With customized views on WebID profiles, identity owners are enabled to
keep control about amount and nature of personal data being presented
to requesting entities. By providing a component to filter sensitive data
in a fine-grained manner, we contributed to ensure privacy of identity
owners. Through fine-grained filtering, we can mitigate data disclosure
attempts of unwanted parties and facilitate migration to potentially more
trustworthy systems. Based on three scenarios, we derived five require-
ments to systematically analyze related work and align the development of
our contribution. Taking accessibility, maintainability, portability, range and
specificity into account, we conceptually, logically and physically designed
the contribution for fine-grained filtering. To cover almost all scenarios of
hiding and showing specifics within WebID profiles, we utilized SPARQL
and defined a small semantic filter vocabulary. Through whitelisting WebID
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profile data per requester or group, we can exclude all filter specifications
and make only particular non-sensitive personal data sets available. A
fallback mechanism integrated into the component allows for automatically
selecting the best-matching filter depending on the identity of a requesting
entity. To prove the concept for fine-grained filtering, we transferred the
design artifacts into a self-contained component, which we then exemplar-
ily integrated into the Sociddea platform. From the results obtained by
evaluating the component, we concluded an overall complete fulfillment
of the requirements, only with minor drawbacks in terms of portability
and maintainability of complex filter setups.
Now that the component for fine-grained filtering has been de-
scribed, the following chapter continues with evaluating the pro-
posed solution as a whole.
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8Overall Evaluation
To holistically evaluate the work done in Chapters 4 to 7 towards enhanc-
ing the security in managing personal data by web systems, this chap-
ter first describes the characteristics to be validated in Section 8.1. On
the basis of the characteristics, Section 8.2 then shows the consideration
of an eligible procedure in order to specify relevant evaluation prereq-
uisites including environment, method and setup. Having applied this
procedure on the proposed solution including the components for context-
aware control, tamper-evidentness and fine-grained filtering, Section 8.3
discusses obtained results. Finally, Section 8.4 briefly summarizes the
outcome of the overall evaluation.
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8.1 Characteristics
By considering this dissertation as a project directed toward the purpose
defined in Section 1.4, we could utilize LFA for a systematic investigation
of the challenges in Chapter 2. There, we derived a hierarchy of objec-
tives from the results obtained by analyzing the prevalent problems in
greater detail. Beyond identification and formulation of objectives, LFA
also assists in assessing the degree of objective achievement during eval-
uation (cf. Subsection 2.1.1, Figure 2.1). For this reason, we employ the
objectives described in Section 2.3 as criteria for the overall evaluation.
As Research Questions 1 to 5 operationalize the purpose, we associate
them with this particular objective.
Having specified the characteristics to be assessed, the next section deter-
mines a suitable evaluation procedure that takes them into account.
8.2 Procedure
With the objectives of Section 2.3 providing “a summary record of what
was planned” (Miklicˇ, 2008) and, therefore, the set of evaluation crite-
ria, it is the next logical step to assess how well this plan has been put
into practice by employing an eligible procedure on that basis. While
such assessment is typically conducted as an independent examination by
external collaborators (NORAD, 1999), this overall evaluation is solely
to be treated as a self check made available as an essential part of the
dissertation project. This procedure then allows for rendering external
expert opinions that potentially review the findings acquired by the self
check. “To provide decision makers with sufficient information [for mak-
ing] an informed judgment about the past performance of the project, to
232 Chapter 8 Overall Evaluation
document lessons learned and to provide practical recommendations for
follow-up action” (EC, 2004), we conduct an objectives-based study in
consideration of the characteristics defined in Section 8.1, where inferred
recommendations are outlined in the following chapter.
An objectives-based study is not only the most prevalent approach in pro-
gram evaluation, but it is also suitable to be performed internally by engi-
neers or program leads (Stufflebeam, 2001). Furthermore, such approach
to evaluation is “especially applicable in assessing tightly focused projects
that have clear, supportable objectives” and can be “strengthened by judg-
ing project objectives against the intended beneficiaries’ assessed needs,
searching for side effects, and studying the process as well as the out-
comes” (Stufflebeam, 2001). By setting the usual purpose toward verifying
that the objectives of a project have been reached (Stufflebeam, 2001), the
objectives-based study consequently fits well to this dissertation project.
As the “methods used in objectives-based studies essentially involve speci-
fying operational objectives and collecting and analyzing pertinent infor-
mation to determine how well each objective was achieved” (Stufflebeam,
2001), it is adequate to rely on already available objective specifications
in terms of activities, results, purpose and overall objective. With regard
to analyzing collected information, it is furthermore appropriate to utilize
key assumptions, success indicators and verification sources as significant
elements of the evaluation framework (Miklicˇ, 2008). Reapplying the
bottom-up strategy of Subsection 2.3.4 then enables to systematically con-
duct the evaluation. In line with Figure 2.12, it verifies that 1) all activities
have been carried out, 2) all results have been delivered, 3) the purpose of
this work has been achieved, and 4) the work contributed to attain the over-
all objective. Although the latter29 is not profoundly verifiable within the
29The achievement of the overall objective represents a joint long-run effort outside the direct
control of an individual project.
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scope of this dissertation, we provide indications for estimating the impact
of our contributions. For each objective shown in Figure 2.12, we verify
that assumptions hold true and success indicators are positive in addition to
summarizing the actual contribution for achieving this particular objective.
In order to perform the verification as specified, the evaluation makes
use of the sources declared in Section 2.3. On the basis of the Sociddea
platform and the three components for enhanced security in managing
personal data, we are enabled to incorporate the findings obtained from a
variety of tests including integration tests, operational acceptance tests and
proof-of-concept implementations. With this evaluation environment in
place, it requires only a small setup consisting of Sociddea being equipped
with some managed identities and integrating the components for context-
aware control, tamper-evidentness and fine-grained filtering.
After outlining the evaluation procedure, the next section discusses obtained
results.
8.3 Results
According to the procedure outlined before, we report on the findings
in a bottom-up way, beginning with the execution of activities in Subsec-
tion 8.3.1, over the delivery of results in Subsection 8.3.2, the achievement
of the purpose in Subsection 8.3.3 and the contribution to the overall ob-
jective in Subsection 8.3.4. Using these reports of objective attainment,
Subsection 8.3.5 briefly puts our contributions in relation to the state-
of-the-art technologies analyzed in Chapter 3.
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8.3.1 Execution of Activities
The following evaluation results outline how well this work ad-
dressed the secondary causes of the central problem by executing
five consolidated activities:
Activity 1.1: Extend Means for Modeling Secure Web Systems
To carry out this objective, our contribution built upon the solid foun-
dation established through CBWE. Focusing on fast composition rather
than complex a priori modeling, CBWE is not only in line with agile and
lean development methodology, but facilitates the systematic development,
maintenance and evolution through involving sets of reusable building
blocks. For addressing deficits of CBWE approaches in terms of inter-
pretability and interoperability at the individual and composite level (cf.
Subsection 3.3.1), this work contributed a dedicated process model that
specifies an IdM life cycle for compositions of web systems and underlying
components, like web applications and web services. While it is a common
practice to support identification and description of users through iden-
tities, our proposal towards self-deterministic IdM extended this practice
by forcing the use of identities for adequately representing all relevant
entities existing in web systems as an essential element to increase the
overall quality and security. By employing a semantically-enriched variant
of WAM and WebID, this work enabled semantic description, universal
identification and linkage for compositions of web systems and individual
components in a holistic way (Wild and Gaedke, 2014). It utilizes semantic
vocabularies, like WSDL 2.0 RDF mapping, for modeling underlying com-
ponents at design time and modify models during runtime. For carrying
out this activity, we furthermore contributed a web-accessible WAM dia-
gramming tool (Scholtz et al., 2015a), which supports web engineers in
describing compositions of web systems, and dedicated input masks, which
ease specifying components, like web services (Braune et al., 2014; Wild
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and Gaedke, 2014). On the basis of universal identification and semantic
description of identities from entities of a web system, our contribution
allows for authentication via WebID-TLS and for both resource-based and
fine-grained access control with WAC and FGF (Wild, Chudnovskyy, et al.,
2013b). Moreover, we outlined in (Ast et al., 2013; Ast et al., 2014) how
to consolidate also security-related parts of web systems to relieve web
engineers from modeling and implementing them redundantly.
By assuming that companies are willing to use such extended means for
modeling web systems, this contribution possibly interferes with existing
technologies and processes they already employ. While relying on standard-
compliant technologies and enabling a homogeneous way of modeling
heterogeneous web systems and involved entities, it also requires additional
efforts for making use of the means provided.
Despite the overall sufficient contribution to address Problem
Cause 1.1: “Lack of Means for Modeling Secure Web Systems”, there is
further work required, especially in terms of discovery and selection of
eligible components, and the automatic code generation.
Activity 2.1: Offer Alternative to Customer Lock-in
To carry out this objective, our contribution reinforced a self-deterministic
IdM that empowers individual identity owners and not authorities. Com-
pliant with user-centric IdM, identity owners are put in control of their
personal data directly or through sufficiently trusted entities. To support
entities in managing their identities and associated personal data, this work
contributed an IdM life cycle that is applicable to entities of arbitrary type.
Identity owners keep real ownership of their personal data and can grant
access to interested parties, like service providers or individual entities,
without distributing their data among a variety of SPs. That is, interested
parties may still access personal data of users, yet to the conditions of the
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corresponding real data owners and not to those of SPs. With identity
owners having to maintain a largely reduced set of identities, it is easier to
keep associated personal data up-to-date for their own benefit as well as
the benefit of companies, which built their business model on exploitation
of social capital. Through reclaiming ownership and consolidating personal
data, identity owners are no longer dependent on varying SP-centric IdM
facilities and potentially offered migration options.
Recalling Scenario 2.1: “Online Shopping” and 2.2: “Password Trouble”,
entities like Alice can easily make use of different service providers without
having to enter personal data over and over again. By relying on one or a
small set of identities representing her in several contexts, Alice is not only
relieved from maintaining multiple copies of her data with the management
facilities provided by different SPs, but also from creating and remembering
complex passwords. So, changing her data or updating her credential at a
single place would have an immediate effect for all parties involved.
On the basis of WebID, our proposition not only includes an increased and se-
mantically enriched descriptiveness of identity attributes but also universal
identification, recognition, discovery and linkage of identities representing
entities of arbitrary class. This paved the way for a unified management,
use and access of identities and associated personal data by both human and
machine across web systems and independent from application-, domain- or
usage-specific limitations. Along with facilitating reusability and exchange-
ability of UGCs through allowing for consolidation and ownership, this also
contributed to an open social web including open social networking.
By assuming that persons are willing to regain ownership and self-manage
their personal data, this contribution might interfere with old habits and
inadequate technical skills of potential identity owners, yet this work pro-
poses a set of tools (cf. Sociddea) for supporting them in respect of IdM.
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Consolidation of personal data bears the risk of creating a single point of
failure. Identity owners would therefore have to ensure the reliability and
protection of their data and underlying system. Depending on their needs,
however, they have to do this for only one or few systems and no longer
need to worry about reliability, protection and use of their personal data by
different third-party SPs, which also contributes to more transparency for
identity owners. Building upon WebID might furthermore hinder adaption
by persons because they would need to turn away from today’s widely
adopted knowledge-based authentication in favor of ownership-based au-
thentication. As especially knowledge-based authentication is, however, in-
creasingly challenged today (cf. Section 1.2) and will be further challenged
in the future due to utilization of advanced computational capabilities for
malicious purposes, ownership-based authentication represents a capable
alternative. Not only does it enable enhanced cryptographic strength owing
to more entropy compared to usual passwords, but it is also applicable
for non-human entities and relieves human entities from creating and re-
membering complex passwords (cf. Subsection 3.3.2). These developments
towards more self-determined control about personal data for individual
persons are also in line with the endeavors of governments to support
established legal frameworks and legally enforceable rights of citizens.
By furthermore assuming that companies are willing to open up for univer-
sal identification, linkage and discovery across web systems and to settle
with just obtaining access to personal data and user-generated contents,
this contribution possibly interferes with current business models that in-
volve SP-centric management and storage of UGC and personal data. Yet,
companies may still maintain access to consolidated, domain-independent,
extensive and probably more up-to-date personal data of users, in addition
to having the opportunity of analyzing the behavior of users that employ
provided services. Without the need for providing facilities for managing,
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storing, migrating and protecting identities and related data, companies
can focus on offering rich and inviting feature sets to attract more users.
Despite the overall sufficient contribution to address Problem
Cause 2.1: “Customer and Data Lock-in”, including 2.1.1: “Restricted
Scope of Identity Data”, 2.1.2: “No Universal Identification, Linkage and
Discovery of Identities” and 2.1.3: “Lack of Reusability, Openness and
Exchangeability of UGCs”, there is further work required, especially in
terms of governments urging companies, which are not yet convinced by
the benefits described above, to open up for a more self-deterministic IdM of
individual persons by providing means for ownership-based authentication
and for making use of personal data stored in distributed user profiles.
Activity 3.1: Improve Control of Identity Based on Individual Context
To carry out this objective, our contribution enabled both scope-aware
delegations and context-aware creation of credentials on the basis of self-
deterministic IdM. Rather than relying on third-party asserted identities,
where SPs predetermine associated contexts and restricted attribute sets,
self-deterministic IdM allows identity owners for employing an open, ex-
tensible and more descriptive set of attributes across different application
fields. Without requiring multiple identities to cover different scenarios and
application fields, this work put entities into the position to use few consoli-
dated identities combined with customized views on personal data in order
to respect their specific privacy needs (Wild, Chudnovskyy, et al., 2013a).
To furthermore assist in creating identities according to privacy needs, this
work simplified the credential generation through taking account of the
individual contexts defined by user preferences and conditions, and through
providing an interface for human entities (Wild, Ast, et al., 2013). For
mitigating risks towards exploitation of authority and personal data beyond
original intentions in delegation scenarios, this contribution also enabled
delegators to control the scope of delegates through a set of constraints. By
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contributing a dedicated delegation approach (Scholtz et al., 2015a; Wild
et al., 2015), all entities present in a delegation can maintain their already
existing identities and, thus, reuse their personal data. Complementary to
the contributions for enhanced security through fine-grained filtering and
tamper-evidentness, this work allowed delegators to protect their personal
data against data disclosure and unnoticed manipulation.
With regard to Scenario 2.3: “Holiday Replacement”, the proposed solution
enables delegators like Alice to precisely specify the scope a delegate like
Casey is permitted to operate in. Employing the CAC key component as
part of the solution, it is no longer necessary that Alice shares her credential
with her co-worker Casey in order to enable him to act on her behalf or to
access her data. Through relying on two distinct identities for delegator
Alice and delegate Casey, she can protect her personal data from unwanted
disclosure and modification by Casey using the FGF and TE components.
Moreover, all activities Casey performs on Alice’s behalf are accountable.
By assuming that persons permit obtaining their individual contexts, this
contribution possibly interferes with identity owners which have stringent
requirements towards privacy, though it is an optional feature solely re-
sponsible for properly factor in user conditions and preferences in order to
enhance security. Here, identity owners must accept to make an additional
effort for safeguarding their personal data through employing measures for
context-aware control. By furthermore assuming that companies are willing
to settle with just obtaining access to personal data and to integrate means
into SPs for delegated access whilst obeying the scope defined by delegators,
this contribution possibly interferes with current business models (cf. find-
ings for Activity 2.1). However, a single component implementing the secu-
rity-enhanced WebID authentication sequence (cf. Figure 4.7) encapsulates
the protective means that SPs must integrate to ensure basic features of CAC.
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Despite the overall sufficient contribution to address Problem Cause 3.1: “In-
sufficient Control of Identity Based on Individual Context”, including
3.1.1: “Inadequate Consideration of Individual User Conditions”,
3.1.2: “Risk of Improper Use of Identity Data in Delegation Scenarios”
and 3.1.2.1: “Missing Control of Delegation Conditions by Delegators”,
there is further work required, not only in terms of advanced detection
of individual conditions and improved consideration of preferences of
identity owners, but also with regard to specification of constraints to
determine a delegate’s scope in delegation scenarios.
Activity 3.2: Mitigate Risk of Identity Theft and Tampering of Personal
Data
To carry out this objective, our contribution facilitated to detect malicious
manipulation of personal data and even identity theft through tamper-
evidentness. In addition to identity owners, it also enabled requesting
entities of arbitrary type, like persons or SPs, to discover anomalies in
personal data as an indication of tampering by aggressors. It therefore
contributed to enhance security during WebID profile access and authenti-
cation. Without relying on prior knowledge through centralized authorities,
this work created a foundation for public verification via URI with signa-
ture data being attached to personal data of individual identity owners.
Even though the proposed tamper-evidentness mechanism cannot prevent
malicious manipulations, it implements the preliminary stage to protec-
tion, i.e., the discovery of such attempts regardless of whether tampering
happened temporarily or permanently (Wild et al., 2014)
Recalling Scenario 2.3: “Holiday Replacement”, entities like Alice do not
have to fear malicious manipulations of her personal data when employing
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the proposed solution for tamper-evidentness, even though she explicitly
allowed other entities, like delegate Casey, to act on her behalf30.
By assuming that persons are willing to make an additional effort for pro-
tecting their personal data through tamper-evidentness, this contribution
possibly interferes with existing conducts of persons to mainly entrust third
parties with safeguarding their personal data. Similar to monetary capital,
management and protection of personal data—as part of the social capi-
tal—should be chiefly the responsibility of the entities the personal data
actually describes and belongs to. By furthermore assuming that compa-
nies are willing to settle with just obtaining access to personal data and to
utilize means for integrity protection, this contribution may also interfere
with current business models (cf. findings for Activities 2.1 and 3.1). Yet,
companies are relieved from integrating extensive protective measures
to ensure integrity of user data on their own.
Despite the overall sufficient contribution to address Problem
Cause 3.2: “Risk of Identity Theft and Tampering of Personal Data”
and 3.2.1: “Lack of Means to Detect Identity Theft and Manipulation”,
there is further work required, especially with regard to simplification
of applying means for tamper-evidentness on personal data and of
memorizing the identifiers which hold the key representation.
Activity 3.3: Increase Range and Granularity of Access Control
To carry out this objective, our contribution reinforced the responsibility of
identity owners for their personal data and, thus, also for controlling access
of requesting entities. Instead of utilizing heterogeneous access control
measures offered by individual SPs, this work enabled a holistic user-centric
authorization throughout different web systems, web applications and web
30This does obviously not include the case, in which a delegator, like Alice, permits a delegate,
like Casey, to make adjustments to her personal data on her behalf.
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services. According to self-deterministic IdM, identity owners control access
to personal data stored on their own or on sufficiently trusted systems by
employing resource-based authorization as well as customized views (Wild,
Chudnovskyy, et al., 2013a). Through fine-grained filtering on the basis of
RDF triples and individual elements (Wild, Chudnovskyy, et al., 2013b),
customized views protect against unwanted data disclosure through specific
requesting entities or groups. While semantic resource-based access control
is applicable to contents of arbitrary types, fine-grained filtering focuses on
white-/blacklisting semantic data described using RDF. When combined,
both measures allow for largely reducing the diversity of access control facil-
ities, for increasing scope and granularity of access control, and for creating
more standard-compliance. Identity owners can store all filter specifications
at a single place, which eases migration of access control settings.
With reference to Scenario 2.1: “Online Shopping” and 2.3: “Holiday Re-
placement”, the proposed solution enables entities like Alice to create
fine-grained filters on her personal data in order to provide requesting enti-
ties, like SPs for online shopping or delegate Casey, only with the data they
are allowed to retrieve. That is, Alice can reduce maintenance efforts while
protecting her data by managing only one repository containing all rele-
vant personal data, but with multiple views customized to the particular
trust relationships she has with different requesters.
By assuming that persons are willing to employ measures for extended
access control, this contribution possibly interferes with the initial effort
that is necessary to transfer and consolidate the distributed access con-
trol preferences that identity owners set up on diverse SPs. Yet, mak-
ing this sacrifice would reduce the dependency of individual entities on
different access control mechanisms offered by SPs. Moreover, identity
owners would benefit from a holistic protection of their data, which they
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can control from a single place yet with an effect on multiple request-
ing entities, like service providers.
By furthermore assuming that companies are willing to settle with just
obtaining access to personal data, this contribution may also interfere with
current business models (cf. findings for Activities 2.1 to 3.2). As identity
owners can directly control access to their data from a single place, compa-
nies do not have to integrate such means into their products any longer and,
thus, are—at least partially—relieved from attacks that normally would
have caused data disclosure. Turning away from own application-specific
facilities for controlling access to personal data of users would also shift
more responsibility from companies towards individual persons.
Despite the overall sufficient contribution to address Problem Cause 3.3: “In-
complete Range and Granularity of Access Control” and 3.3.1: “Limitation
of Access Control Facilities to Specific SPs”, there is further work required,
especially in terms of reducing the maintenance efforts of customized views
when identity owners make adjustments to their personal data.
Having carried out all required activities, the next subsection continues
with discussing the evaluation findings in terms of result delivery.
8.3.2 Delivery of Results
The following evaluation results outline how well this work addressed the
primary causes of the central problem by delivering three results:
Result 1: Improved Modeling of Security Aspects for Web Systems
To deliver this objective, our contribution built upon the successful exe-
cution of Activity 1.1 to extend the means for modeling secure web sys-
tems (Ast et al., 2014; Braune et al., 2014; Scholtz et al., 2015b; Wild and
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Gaedke, 2009; Wild and Gaedke, 2014). With the thus provided means,
this contribution enabled companies to treat security in web systems more
as a first thought or at least with the same care as other parts of their
business. That is, it puts companies into the position for taking greater
account of security in the engineering of web systems. Here, employing
the IdM life cycle and WAM allows for conciseness, review and simplicity
when engineering and making architectural adjustments to web-based so-
lutions. It furthermore assists web engineers in creating machine-readable
architecture descriptions of SOA-based web systems. The proposed mod-
eling facilities established a basis for simplifying activities such as search,
recollection and security-compliant integration of components into web
system architectures, regardless of initiators being human or machine.
By assuming that companies are willing to use extended means for modeling
web systems with special focus on security-related aspects, this contribution
possibly interferes with the development methodologies companies are cur-
rently employing (cf. findings of Activity 1.1). While this contribution relies
on CBWE for rapid composition of web systems from reusable building
blocks, our proposal is combinable with other approaches through mak-
ing use of standard-compliant technologies and enabling a homogeneous
way of modeling heterogeneous web systems.
With overall largely addressing Problem Cause 1: “Security of Web Systems
Treated as Afterthought”, we successfully delivered the result.
Result 2: Reduced Need for Accumulation of Personal Data by Third
Parties
To deliver this objective, our contribution built upon the successful execu-
tion of Activity 2.1 to offer an alternative to customer lock-in (Chowdhury
et al., 2013; Chudnovskyy, Wild, et al., 2012; Satzger et al., 2014; Tschud-
nowsky et al., 2013). Self-deterministic IdM empowers individual entities
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to manage their personal data independently from SPs on their own or
trusted premises. Through fostering distributed personal data reposito-
ries under control of the corresponding identity owners rather than some
centralized authorities, this contribution helps to reduce the accumula-
tion of personal data and, thus, to decrease the attractiveness for attacks.
Requesting entities, such as service providers, might maintain access to
personal data as usual31 but to the conditions specified by individual iden-
tity owners. Moreover, companies can independently obtain metadata
when users employ their SPs. This furthermore reduces the necessitation
for companies to aggregate larger amounts of individual persons’ data
as part of their business model and to spare with export functions for
preventing drain of social capital to competing product offerings. Due
to the fact that identity owners manage their personal data themselves,
the latter functions are even no longer required.
By assuming that companies are willing to employ enhancements towards
reducing necessitation of personal data accumulation, this contribution
possibly interferes with old and strict ways of thinking how IdM should
be implemented and creates fears concerning the very existence of some
businesses. Nevertheless, we believe that the benefits of self-deterministic
IdM outweigh these issues and bear hard to foreseen value for companies,
like potential access to extensive, cross-domain personal data of users.
With overall largely addressing Problem Cause 2: “Accumulation of Personal
Data by Third Parties”, we delivered the result successfully.
Result 3: Extended Means for Control and Protection of Personal Data
To deliver this objective, our contribution built upon the successful exe-
cution of Activities 3.1 to 3.3 to a) improve control of identity based on
31This is a controversial issue, yet if identity owners entrusted parts of their personal data
to some SPs in the first place, they would probably grant them also access to data that is
self-managed by them.
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individual context (Scholtz et al., 2015a; Wild, Ast, et al., 2013; Wild
et al., 2015), b) mitigate risk of identity theft and tampering of personal
data (Wild et al., 2014; Wild et al., 2015), and c) increase the range
and granularity of access control (Wild, Chudnovskyy, et al., 2013a; Wild,
Chudnovskyy, et al., 2013b; Wild et al., 2015). With self-deterministic
IdM in place, identity owners do not need to rely on SP-specific safeguard
measures anymore. The contribution enabled them to holistically apply
protection preferences beyond specific service providers, applications or
domains. User-centric protection of personal data increases both control
and transparency of safeguard measures, but also transfers responsibilities
from companies to the entities the personal data actually belongs to.
By assuming that persons are willing to apply security enhancements for
personal data management, this contribution possibly interferes with their
existing conducts (cf. findings for Activity 3.2), yet when treating social
capital similar to monetary capital, management and protection clearly
becomes a responsibility of individual persons. By furthermore assuming
that companies are willing to employ enhancements towards protecting
personal data, this contribution may also interfere with existing business
models and safeguard measures (cf. findings for Activities 2.1 to 3.2). How-
ever, self-deterministic IdM also largely relieves companies from adopting
complex measures in their service providers.
With overall completely addressing Problem Cause 3: “Incomplete Control
and Protection of Personal Data”, we successfully delivered the result.
Having delivered all required results, the next subsection proceeds with
discussing the evaluation results in terms of purpose achievement.
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8.3.3 Achievement of Purpose
To enhance security in managing personal data by web systems, this disser-
tation successfully produced three results for a) an improved modeling of
security aspects for web systems, b) a reduced need for accumulation of
personal data by third parties, and c) extended means for control and protec-
tion of personal data. Through prototypically integrating these results into
the Sociddea proof-of-concept platform, we could demonstrate and verify
the operational acceptance as well as the integral character of the solution.
Rather than burden web system providers with securing accumulated per-
sonal data of their users, the proposed solution built upon an open, system-
independent approach to empower individual human and non-human enti-
ties to make their consolidated personal data publicly accessible through
decentralized, self-maintained repositories. The proposed solution further-
more supported individual human and non-human entities with means
to manage and protect their data from 1) unauthorized use, 2) unno-
ticed tampering, and 3) unwanted access. While Research Contributions 1
to 4 taken by themselves do not represent entirely novel approaches or
means, their particular field of application, their reliance on existing se-
curity artifacts as well as a proven technological foundation, and their
synergistic nature drives the innovation beyond the current state of the
art, as described in the next four paragraphs.
Research Contribution 1 for “enhanced security in managing personal
data” relies on the open silo approach, which fosters self-deterministic
IdM. By enabling identity owners to self-manage their personal data in
individual, decentralized repositories, attackers would need to deal with
multiple distributed targets. According to our solution, identity owners
are only responsible for their very own personal data, which lowers the
attractiveness and lucrativeness for attackers because they would need to
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adjust to the specific preferences and weaknesses of separate systems that
host the data. Avoiding accumulation of data from many users in only few
silos distributes the central problem and, thus, reduces its severity. The
solution architecture and process showed that advantages of the open silo
approach in general and WebID in particular do also apply to identities of
non-human entities through sharing a common IdM life cycle. This allows
for universal identification, semantic description, discovery, linkage and
authentication of identities from arbitrary entity classes, including com-
positions and components of web systems, in a holistic manner and eases
utilizing the same protective measures to enhance security in managing
associated data (cf. Research Contributions 2 to 4). Not only does the
solution facilitate modeling web systems and components at design time
using WAM, but it also considers personal data management of user during
runtime by taking advantage of the same technologies. This fosters high
maintainability and, therefore, assuring quality of our solution.
Research Contribution 2 for “context-aware control” introduced an inno-
vative delegation approach that allows a delegate to perform an assigned
task using a web application on behalf of a delegator within a defined
scope. All involved entities keep their common identities and can access
personal data associated with the other identities, i.e., delegator, delegate
and web application, as proposed by Research Contribution 1. There is no
need for sharing credentials among involved entities. To separate concerns
and make all actions accountable, the web application clearly distinguishes
between delegator, delegate and delegate acting on behalf of delegator.
The solution implements the actual delegation using the same artifacts as
in the original authentication, i.e., WebID certificates. Furthermore, the
delegator may grant controlled access to additional personal data to be
used by the delegate in order to work on the task within the scope defined
by the delegator (cf. Research Contribution 4). Making use of constraints,
the delegator can restrict the scope of a delegate’s actions, where the web
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application enforces this scope. A delegator does not need to fear unnoticed
personal data tampering, even though the web application to be used is
an IdM system and a delegate has read/write access to the delegator’s
profile data (cf. Research Contribution 3). The collaboration of the CAC
component with both the TE and the FGF component illustrates the syn-
ergies among our research contributions. By removing references to a
delegate from the semantic identity description, a delegator can revoke a
delegation at any time, yet the corresponding delegate may use the web
application as usual, i.e., not on behalf of the delegator.
Research Contribution 3 for “tamper-evidentness” represents a novel ap-
proach to make manipulations of personal data publicly recognizable with-
out requiring a certifying third party like a certificate authority. In the open
silo model to IdM, entities store consolidated personal data associated to
their identities in distributed, self-managed and web-accessible repositories.
These repositories also include public key data for authentication purposes,
when using WebID as a representative of the open silo model. By including
an inherent source of verification in the public identifier, identity owners
can self-certify the authenticity of personal data associated to their identi-
ties and store the proof together with the proven data. Although aggressors
might tamper personal data, public key data or proof data, they cannot
alter the inherent source of verification without changing the identifier.
Modifying a WebID identifier would not only cause loss of identification or
creating a new identity respectively, but also impair discovery and render
existing incoming links useless. As aggressors cannot certify once tam-
pered data without having access to the real identity owner’s private key,
the research contribution for “tamper-evidentness” also assists requesting
entities and identity owners in detecting identity theft.
Research Contribution 4 for “fine-grained filtering” introduced an innova-
tive mechanism for creating highly customizable, requester-specific views
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on personal data. It enables identity owners to keep control about amount
and nature of personal data being presented to requesting entities. Sup-
ported human and non-human requesting entities are anonymous users,
individual identified entities and groups. By relying on SPARQL as an open
standard, view specifications are system-independent, portable, widely sup-
ported and directly executable. The granularity of view specifications is only
limited by the expressiveness of SPARQL, i.e., fine-grained views can include
or exclude distinct elements of RDF triples. The mechanism is not restricted
to filter personal data only, but applicable to all RDF-based data sources.
The proposed security enhancements, however, necessitate that individual
persons make additional efforts to protect their personal data against un-
wanted data disclosure, unnoticed tampering, identity theft and prohibited
use in delegation scenarios. Enhanced security comes at a price individual
entities must be willing to pay or, otherwise, live with the negative con-
sequences. Furthermore, it is required that companies rethink the way of
handling and protecting personal data they actually do not own. While our
contributions enable a simplified and semantically enriched modeling of
web systems with focus on security aspects, an accumulation of social capital
outside the direct control of identity owners bears avoidable risks. Distribut-
ing and associating personal data with the actual owners, as specified in our
proposal for self-deterministic IdM, helps to reduce the target characteristic
of web systems for attacks. That is, aggressors probably will not jeopardize
criminal prosecution, when the potential reward of a successful attack is
obviously low. Finally, governments have to continue supporting individual
persons to exercise more sovereignty and control about their personal data,
if necessary, with measures for undiscerning companies.
In Section 1.4 we operationalized the purpose by narrowing it into Re-
search Questions 1 to 5, with answers given on the basis of Research
Contributions 1 to 4 in the following:
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Research Question 1 dealing with the topic of “how to model web systems
at different abstraction levels in an appropriate, interoperable, interpretable
and supportive way that also puts a strong emphasis on security involving
trust and invocation relationships” has been addressed by delivering Re-
sult 1. The result includes a dedicated process model to specify an IdM
life cycle for compositions of web systems and associated components.
While the contribution supports modeling web systems including trust and
invocation relationships at the composition level using WAM, it also en-
ables describing individual entities at the component level via specialized
RDF-based vocabularies like WSDL 2.0 RDF mapping. Furthermore, the
proof-of-concept platform Sociddea shows how to assist web engineers in
their modeling tasks by offering user interfaces like the web-based dia-
gramming tool to describe compositions with the graphical WAM notation
and components by means of a graphical editing tool. No matter the
tool employed for creation, all resulting models are interoperable and
machine-interpretable due to their semantic heritage.
Research Question 2 dedicated to the topic of “how to describe and iden-
tify web systems, applications and services, as a basis for applying protective
measures, by means adequate to describe and identify other entities like
individual persons” has been addressed by our contribution that focuses
on self-deterministic IdM. Here, identities and related management fea-
tures are not limited to particular systems or domains. Building upon
open standards, Research Contribution 1 and Result 2 enabled universal
identification and semantic description of identities from entities of ar-
bitrary class. The contribution allows for identification and description
of heterogeneous entities related to web systems, including web services
and individual persons, in a homogeneous way. The openness, integra-
bility and extensibility of chosen technologies also established a foun-
dation for providing protective measures.
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Research Question 3 linked to the topic of “how to enable individuals to
maintain ownership about their personal data, especially personally identi-
fiable information, and allow controlled access for third parties incl. other
users, web applications and web services” has been addressed by deliv-
ering Research Contribution 1 in association with Results 2 and 3. They
foster self-deterministic identity management to empower individual en-
tities rather than authorities and provides means for an enhanced secu-
rity. The contribution enables individual entities to take responsibility
of their personal data and store it at self-defined, sufficiently trusted lo-
cations. The underlying user-centric approach puts identity owners in
control of their personal data, so that they can define the conditions to
which requesting entities can access the data.
Research Question 4 approaching the topic of “how to authorize entities,
including individuals as well as web applications and web services, to
use web applications and web services within a defined scope on behalf
of other entities in highly distributed environments” has been addressed
by delivering Research Contribution 2 in association with Result 3. They
introduce a dedicated delegation approach, which clearly distinguishes
between the roles of delegator, delegate and web application, while permit-
ting all involved entities to keep their identities and reuse related personal
data. Not only does the delegation approach support entities of arbitrary
class to fulfill the role of the delegator or the delegate, but also to restrict
a delegate’s scope of action using constraints.
Research Question 5 covering the topic of “how to protect personally
identifiable information against data disclosure without the corresponding
individual’s knowledge or intent, against tampering and (identity) theft,
and against misuse by third parties including users, web applications and
web services” has been addressed by delivering Research Contributions 2
to 4 in association with Result 3. They provide three key components for
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fine-grained filtering, tamper-evidentness and context-aware control that
extend the proposed solution architecture. Fine-grained filtering allows
for creating customized views on an identity owner’s personal data for
different requesting entities and, consequently, for restraining unwanted
parties from accessing sensitive data. Tamper-evidentness enables both
identity owners and requesting entities to detect manipulations of personal
data and, thus, also indications of identity theft. Finally, context-aware
control assists in preventing unauthorized exploitation of identities and
associated personal data in delegation contexts.
With answering all research questions successfully, we implicitly prove the
underlying Hypotheses 1 to 5, as outlined on page 15. Having achieved
the purpose, the next subsection continues with discussing the evaluation
results in terms of our contribution to the overall objective.
8.3.4 Contribution to Overall Objective
To contribute to increase the protection of privacy and reduce the risk
of personal data disclosure through successful attacks on web systems,
Research Contributions 1 to 4 partially addressed also several effects of
the central problem, as described next:
By 1) implementing a user-centric, self-deterministic approach to IdM,
2) putting identity owners in charge of managing personal data on their
own, and 3) providing means for data protection, we made a contribu-
tion to improve the overall control of personal data by individual persons
throughout web systems (countermeasure for Problem Effect 2). Rather
than relying on central authorities or specific SP-centric facilities for iden-
tity data management, identity owners only have to maintain and control
access to one or few individual repositories containing their consolidated
personal data. This does not only lower efforts in terms of handling cre-
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dentials (countermeasure for Problem Effect 1.3.1), but also supports to
accomplish the privacy by default initiative and helps to realize the privacy
by design vision because achieving the purpose put identity owners in the
position to set safe defaults regarding access to their consolidated personal
data (countermeasures for Problem Effects 3 and 4). Here, the FGF and TE
components allow for hiding sensitive data from unauthorized requesting
entities in a fine-grained manner and for certifying the authenticity of data
requested by authorized entities (countermeasure for Problem Effect 1.3).
Through separating service offerings from IdM and distributing personal
data repositories according to the preferences of the real data owners, we
also contributed to relieve companies from making investments for secur-
ing and storing personal data they do not own. Making identity owners
responsible for managing their personal data enabled companies to focus
on their core businesses. By minimizing the necessity to store and, thus,
to accumulate large amounts of user data, we made a contribution to
reduce the attractiveness for aggressors that target data disclosures and,
therefore, partially mitigated risks for companies originating from data
breaches made public (countermeasure for Problem Effect 1.1). Without
potential access to large sets of accumulated personal data, aggressors
cannot reach high returns on investment, which potentially has a positive
bearing on cutting down today’s high number of attacks on web systems
and reducing risks associated with monetization of personal data (coun-
termeasures for Problem Effects 1 and 1.2).
8.3.5 Contribution Beyond the State of the Art
Benefiting from the openness of WebID, we contributed to increase control
and protection of this lightweight user-centric approach to IdM by three ded-
icated yet complementary components. Utilizing existing security artifacts
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and semantic facilities, we non-invasively extended WebID by machine-
readable means for control (component for context-aware control) and
protection (components for fine-grained filtering and tamper-evidentness).
All extensions are optional, i.e., their addition or removal does not interfere
with regular IdM procedures. Furthermore, the use of semantic languages
for specifying identities of human and machine entities supported address-
ing the interoperability issues of the chosen web engineering approach.
Enabling homogeneous identification, description and linkage of heteroge-
neous entities contributed to holistically model web systems at both the
composite level and the level of individual building blocks. Not only does
this include web applications and web services, but also involved human
and non-human users. Besides bearing advantages in assuring quality and
maintainability through limiting the set of necessary methods, languages
and tools, it also allowed for opening an integral perspective on security
for both human and non-human entities. This is because all descriptive
and protective measures are applicable to all WebID-compliant identities,
which can represent arbitrary characteristics of arbitrary entities.
With finishing the discussion of the evaluation results, the next section
sums up the outcome of this chapter.
8.4 Summary
In accordance with LFA, an objectives-based study matched the needs for an
evaluation procedure that facilitates to “determine how well each objective
was achieved” (Stufflebeam, 2001). For specifying the evaluation charac-
teristics, it was therefore reasonable to reuse the objectives of Chapter 2
also as assessment criteria. By defining a bottom-up strategy to evaluation,
the discussion of retrieved findings started with verifying the execution
of five consolidated activities to tackle secondary causes of the central
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problem, before continuing with assessing the production of three results
to approach primary problem causes. With the successful result delivery,
we evaluated the achievement of the purpose of this work to address the
central problem. It has been apparent that this work included several con-
tributions to improve the protection in handling personal data. Applying
these contributions, however, requires that a) individual persons are willing
to invest additional efforts, b) companies rethink their business models of
locking customers in and accumulating their personal data, and c) govern-
ments continue with their support towards strengthen the rights of persons
for more control about their data. By overall successfully enhancing secu-
rity in managing personal data by web systems, the discussion of findings
completed with evaluating to which extent this dissertation contributed to
achieve the overall objective and to advance beyond the state of the art.
Based on the obtained evaluation results, the next chapter concludes this dis-
sertation.
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9Conclusion
To conclude this dissertation, the final chapter begins with summarizing
the major research contributions in Section 9.1. By reviewing what has
been accomplished, Section 9.2 then critically reflects this work also by
taking the results of the overall evaluation into account. Finally, Section 9.3
provides an outlook towards future work to highlight links for a systematic
evolution from the current state of achievement.
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9.1 Contributions
Leveraging the logical framework approach, this dissertation systematically
investigated the challenges that emerged from an insufficient consideration
of security in today’s web systems for the amount of accumulated personal
data (cf. Chapter 2). By analyzing the central problem stated in Section 1.2
and breaking it down into more manageable causes and effects, we first
created a problem hierarchy from which we then derived a consolidated set
of objectives representing the means necessary for achieving the purpose
declared in Section 1.4. With the results retrieved by reviewing state-of-
the-art technologies related to web engineering and identity management
(cf. Chapter 3), our proposal for enhancing security in managing personal
data by web systems built upon the foundation of self-deterministic identity
management for both human and non-human entities.
Rather than entities having to distribute their personal data among vari-
ous SP-centric repositories in order to make use of provided services, the
solution proposed in Chapter 4 involves consolidated personal data reposi-
tories in control of individual identity owners or entities they sufficiently
trust. In consequence, service providers and other interested parties, like
persons and web services, may still maintain access to personal data yet
under the terms of the real data owners, and not those of the service
providers. This empowers the majority of individual identity owners in-
stead of the minority of authorities. To support owners in managing their
identities, the proposal includes an IdM life cycle that is applicable to
persons, compositions and components of web systems. Through relying
on WebID, the proposed solution features semantic RDF-based descrip-
tion of personal data as well as ownership-based authentication, which is
compatible with arbitrary entity classes. According to our proposal, both
human and machine entities can therefore access and interpret personal
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data associated with identities – also with the chance to understand under-
lying concepts that are part of the Linked Data cloud. Each identity that
represents an entity within a particular context is furthermore universally
identifiable via a URI that refers to personal data.
Not only does universal identification allow for linking and connecting
among human entities, but also for qualifying the relationships between
non-human entities that constitute web systems. Here, WAM facilitates mod-
eling web-based solutions by employing introduced concepts at the level of
both web systems and underlying entities, like web services. Holistically
enabling semantic description, identification and linkage for architecture
models of web systems and involved web entities paved the way for a sim-
pler and well-directed management and evolution. The proposed solution
hereby assists web engineers in creating machine-readable big pictures of
SOA-based web systems with a web-accessible WAM diagramming tool.
In order to substantiate architectural blueprints, the solution permits uti-
lizing semantic vocabularies, like the WSDL 2.0 RDF mapping, to specify
underlying entities, like web services, at design time and refining them
at runtime, e.g., updates to interface definitions. Through authentication
via WebID-TLS and resource-based access control via WAC, our proposal
supports taking account of elementary security aspects.
To enhance security beyond elementary measures for authentication
and authorization, three contributions complement the fundamental
solution in respect of fine-grained filtering, tamper-evidentness and
context-aware control (cf. Chapters 5 to 7).
A dedicated component against unwanted retrieval enables identity owners
to create customized views on their personal data, with the capability to
apply a detailed filtering of personal data at the level of RDF triples and
individual elements for specific requesting entities or groups. In addition
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to controlling the way personally identifiable information is exposed to
third parties by white- and blacklisting of data subsets, the FGF compo-
nent also enables to harness the full expressiveness of SPARQL, e.g., to
hide filter specifications from requesting entities via filters. For ensur-
ing accessibility, portability and maintainability of filter preferences by
human and non-human entities, associated specifications remain unen-
crypted, are self-contained and fit into the existing semantic ecosystem
by relying on SPARQL and adequate vocabularies.
A second component against malicious manipulation allows both iden-
tity owners and requesting entities for discovering personal data integrity
anomalies that potentially indicate tampering or even identity theft. With-
out the need for prior knowledge through centralized authorities, the TE
component enables public verification of personal data integrity via URI.
That is, the verification happens without external dependencies because
signature data is stored as part of the personal data of an identity owner.
Combined with the complementary FGF component, integrity checks are
performed on customized views rather than on personal data per se.
Finally, a third component against misuse of authority in delegation scenar-
ios facilitates verifying the scope of delegates that act on behalves of other
entities, with delegators being enabled to control the scope through a set of
constraints. With our dedicated approach to delegation, entities keep their
common identities, like manager and secretary in a business context, also
in delegation scenarios. This fosters reuse of already available personal
data. Relying only on existing WebID artifacts with RDF-based delegation
specifications inside a delegator’s profile, a delegate enters a delegation
context by using a particular enabling credential, yet the delegate main-
tains the desired identity and related personal data. For assistance and
simplification of credential creation, the CAC component takes account of
user preferences including individual conditions, privacy need, signing type
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and cryptographic strength. Combined with the FGF component, distinct
identities for delegator, delegate and service permit creating customized
views on delegator’s personal data for a delegate or an employed service.
Combined with the complementary TE component, delegators can make
sure that unauthorized modifications of personal data by delegates go not
without notice by concerned delegators and services.
For proof-of-concept implementations and acceptance tests, the Sociddea
integration platform holistically put the constituents of the entire solu-
tion, including the key components for enhanced security, into effect. The
complementary character of these components enables synergies through
combination, which contributes to enhance security beyond utilizing each
security feature separately on its own. Rather than breaking with proven
methods, languages, frameworks or tools, our proposal assists in assur-
ing a high level of quality and maintainability by building upon already
existing security artifacts of WebID and seamlessly integrating into the
given semantic landscape established through RDF.
With results retrieved from the overall evaluation (cf. Chapter 8), the
following section critically reviews the research contributions of this work.
9.2 Review
While the evaluation of the solution as whole indicates an overall positive
effect on enhancing security in managing personal data by web systems, it
also points towards a number of drawbacks related to the research contri-
butions. By enabling to identify, describe and interlink web systems and
underlying components via WAM and other eligible semantic vocabularies,
this dissertation contributed to establish a foundation for a systematic engi-
neering of web-based solutions with focus on security aspects, yet further
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efforts are required in terms of discovery and selection of suitable compo-
nents, and automatic generation of software building blocks from semantic
specifications of compositions and components. Moreover, companies must
be willing to engage in this kind of modeling in accordance with the IdM life
cycle, which may interfere with process models already employed by them.
Placing reliance upon WebID as part of the proposed solution necessitates
to embark on a not yet widely adopted IdMS and to turn away from to-
day’s common knowledge-based authentication for the sake of 1) ensuring
compatibility with machine entities, 2) resolving the password fatigue
issue, and 3) providing a higher cryptographic strength of credentials. De-
spite the research contribution for CAC, ownership-based authentication
still implies some overhead in creating, exchanging and using credentials
especially when identity owners rely on miscellaneous user agents, op-
erating systems, platforms or devices. Here, human entities may benefit
from physically outsourcing credentials to external devices they can carry
with them, like regular keys or key cards.
The proposal reinforces a self-deterministic, user-centric IdM. With focus
on individual identity owners, it does therefore not make use of central
authorities to intensively prove identities claimed by entities before allowing
for creating corresponding credentials. While self-asserted identities enable
to imitate entities through illegitimately taking over specific attribute sets,
this problem also occurs in SP-centric identity management systems, when
aggressors exploit unclaimed identities or reuse identities after associated
owners have permanently left specific service providers. However, our
proposal prevents aggressors from proclaiming already used identities for
themselves without having profound skills and technical capabilities. As in
the proposed solution a single identifier refers to all personal data of an
identity owner independently from service providers and other entities, an
identity owner has to manage only one personal data repository per identity.
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Self-deterministic IdM as per our proposal involves personal data reposito-
ries that are either in full control of the corresponding identity owners or in
control of sufficiently trusted entities. In contrast, distributed management
of personal data by service providers bears risks that are out of control of
the entities concerned, i.e., every new aspect outsourced to a third party
adds to the attractiveness for data disclosure, tampering and unauthorized
use. The proposed solution consequently redistributes personal data man-
agement from the service providers to the individuals that actually own
the data. Although this makes it more difficult for aggressors to obtain a
large set of personal data by exploiting a specific vulnerability, the issue of
protecting personal data is also outsourced to individual identity owners.
By not relying on third parties any longer, identity owners are now held ac-
countable to secure their personal data on their own, e.g., through keeping
their systems up-to-date. It is our conviction that this increases not only
the sense of responsibility of individual entities in managing and protecting
their personal data but also their awareness about quality and quantity of
the data they have aggregated and potentially provide requesting entities
with. Both the high heterogeneity of systems and the low risk-reward ratios
of potential attacks contribute to restrict the endeavors of aggressors, yet
such heterogeneity and the varied skills among identity owners may make it
difficult for identity owners to establish an appropriate level of protection.
Three dedicated components extend the proposed solution in order to
support identity owners to reach such an appropriate level of protection
through offering means for fine-grained filtering, tamper-evidentness and
context-aware control. However, all security enhancements proposed in
this dissertation entail additional efforts by concerned entities. The filters
identity owners can specify to create customized views on their personal
data using the FGF component may require maintenance once attributes
are added, changed or removed. Furthermore, the TE component involves
special identifiers that include key information. They are therefore diffi-
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cult to memorize for human entities—using different representations for
identifier, like QR codes, may alleviate this issue. For producing tamper-
evident personal data, identity owners must employ particular user agents
responsible for signature creation. Similar to FGF, modifications to personal
data make it necessary to update signatures. Finally, the CAC component
allows for detecting only some contextual conditions at the moment and
users have to manually specify their preferences, even though they might
already stated them as part of their identity data.
To conclude, security comes at a cost concerned entities must be will-
ing to invest. The potential impact through direct effects and afteref-
fects of successful attacks (cf. Section 1.2) exceeds the effort necessary
for identity owners to properly protect their personal data. Conduct-
ing an exhaustive evaluation beyond the overall evaluation of Chapter 8
might facilitate precisely assessing the level of contribution of this dis-
sertation to attain the overall objective.
9.3 Outlook
Based on the research contributions and the results obtained by critically
reflecting the work accomplished, there is a multitude of ways to drive
the evolution from this point of achievement. For this reason, we just
present an exemplary set of selected paths, starting with tangible ones
and then approaching towards more visionary ones.
In this work, identities are characterized by rather static personal data, yet
this ignores important variable aspects of entities. More dynamic identities
would allow for covering current conditions of entities as part of their
personal data, e.g., human mood, health data or utilization in case of non-
human entities. Data from sensors specific to a particular entity can hereby
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provide the necessary foundation for dynamic identities representing this en-
tity in different contexts. It would furthermore enable dynamic adjustments
of web systems and involved components, like web services, on the basis of
identity data updated by SPs or the entities themselves, e.g., when reaching
certain thresholds in utilization. Not only would this facilitate systemati-
cally propagating data on dynamic reconfigurations of machine entities, like
interface adjustments due to protocol changes, but also retrieving an always
up-to-date big pictures of web systems. Monitoring and analyzing data on
compositions could assist in predicting the evolution of web systems and,
consequently, enable to proactively make profound decisions to guide the
evolution in a suitable direction. Here, researching the topic of dynamically
replacing components or delegating their tasks to compatible ones might be
beneficial for automating activities related to the evolution of web systems.
Enabling delegation across entity classes might support a closer coopera-
tion between human and machine provided services, e.g., in maintenance
scenarios. To manage delegating tasks to a large yet undefined group of
individual entities via an open call, like in web-based crowdsourcing sce-
narios, the proposed delegation procedure needs to relax the restriction
of assigning a task to a particular delegate. Involving groups of known as
well as unknown delegates while protecting a delegator’s personal data
increases the demands on context-aware control, tamper-evidentness and
fine-grained filtering. In addition to more precise scope specifications
and advanced detection of dynamic conditions during credential creation,
cascades of filters and morphing views on personal data might become nec-
essary. Moreover, making tamper-evidentness an essential element of the
WebID authentication sequence would increase trust in personal data be-
cause requesting entities could publicly verify the binding between personal
data and identifier that denotes a claimed identity. Therefore, a simplifi-
cation of the hard-to-memorize identifiers, like short URLs, and applying
protective means from within common user agents, like web browsers, are
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desired contributions of future work. Similar to anti-virus software, special-
ized tools could assist individual entities in various matters concerning the
protection of their personal data, such as checking that 1) the system offer-
ing their data has the latest security patches installed, 2) tamper-evidence
measures and customized views are up-to-date and according to the identity
owner’s preferences, and 3) scope specifications are obeyed by delegates.
Only when reaching a critical mass of identity owners that employ WebID,
it becomes possible to obtain sustainable validation results, like in terms
of scalability, and to benefit from a plethora of universally identifiable,
linkable and semantically described identities that represent entities of
diverse classes. As a consequence, it is important to add further stimuli
for users beyond mere security enhancements in managing personal data,
e.g., through services that provide convincing feature sets.
By making semantic identity data on persons, web systems and com-
ponents available in line with the security needs of individual identity
owners, the proposed solution contributes not only to the growth of the
Linked Data cloud in a controlled way but also to enlarge the basis of
semantic information to perform cognitive computing on. Supporting
machine learning through open data repositories allows for a variety of
promising applications in the future.
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ALFA Artifacts
To describe the basis for the systematic discussion of the challenges con-
ducted in Chapter 2, this appendix contains the relevant LFA artifacts. While
Sections 1.3 and 2.2 present the outcome of the LFA stakeholder analysis,
we detail the underlying findings in Table A.1. This table, named stake-
holder analysis matrix, outlines the stakeholders which are affected by the
central problem (cf. Section 1.2) and thus by possible endeavors for solving
it, such as this dissertation project. Furthermore, we describe the stakehold-
ers by 1) their basic characteristics, 2) their interests and concerns in terms
of the problem, 3) their capacities to overcome the problem, and 4) possible
actions to attract their interests in order to address the problem (EC, 2004).
Maintaining the same structure as the discussion in Chapter 2, we con-
tinue with illustrating the problem tree. This problem tree originates
from interlinking the cause-effect relationships between all problems ex-
plained in Section 2.2. That is, Figure A.1 depicts both the problem
causes, which pile up to the central problem, and the problem effects,
which arise from the central problem.
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Similar to the problem tree, the objective tree visualizes the interlinked
means-ends relationships between all objectives presented in Section 2.3.
Consequently, Figure A.2 illustrates the means, which enable to achieve
the purpose, as well as ends, which contribute to reach the overall ob-
jectives. Figure A.3 represents a consolidated version of Figure A.2, in
which closely related objectives have been combined.
The so-called Logframe matrix represents the documented product
of the objective analysis. Represented by Table A.2, the Logframe
matrix does not only show all identified objectives at different lev-
els in the means-ends hierarchy, but also lists associated success
indicators, verification sources and assumptions.
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Glossary
Access Control Process of determining which principals have what kind
of access to which resources based on a set of rules.
Agent “Entity that acts on behalf of another entity” (ITU, 2010).
Anonymity State of being unable to identify a particular entity among
other entities.
Attack Malicious attempt to compromise security.
Attribute Contextual characteristic of an entity specified through a type/-
value statement.
Authentication Process of achieving “sufficient confidence in the binding
between the entity and the presented identity” (ITU, 2010).
Authorization Process of granting a principal the privilege to pass through
safeguard measures taken against entities having insufficient permis-
sions.
Breach Incident resulting in exposure of data.
Company Organization that provides something, e.g., goods or services,
in exchange for a compensation, e.g., money.
Context “Environment with defined boundary conditions” (ITU, 2010).
Credential Evidence for a claimed identity.
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Data Disclosure Breach with confirmed data revelation to an unautho-
rized party.
Delegate Agent entrusted with authority, responsibility or a function.
Delegation Process of assigning a delegate to do something on behalf of a
delegator.
Delegator Entity that initiates a delegation.
Entity “Something that has a separate and distinct existence and that can
be identified in context” (ITU, 2010).
Government Political organization which exercises control and makes
decisions for persons, called citizens, who usually occupy and legally
belong to a specific territory, called state.
Identification Process of entity recognition within context by a set of
attributes.
Identifier Particular subset of attributes enabling to distinctly recognize
an entity.
Identity Representation of an entity within context using a set of attributes.
Identity (Service) Provider Service provider that manages identities for
other entities or puts them in the position to do so on their own.
Identity Management “Set of functions and capabilities used for assur-
ance of identity information [. . . ] and supporting business and secu-
rity applications” (ITU, 2010).
Identity Management System System that allows identity management.
Identity Owner Entity an identity is issued to.
Incident Security event compromising an information asset.
Information Security “Protection of information and information systems
from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification,
or destruction in order to provide confidentiality, integrity, and avail-
ability” (CNSS, 2010).
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Ontology “[C]omplex, and possibly quite formal collection of terms”, yet
not clearly distinguishable from vocabulary that refers to a possibly
less formal or more loose collection of terms (W3C, 2015b).
Organization Entity formed by a group of persons to pursue a collective
purpose.
Personal Data Any information, including PII as well as information on
social capital, relating to a human entity, where this particular entity
is either identified or identifiable without unreasonable effort (cf.
identification).
Personally Identifiable Information Any information that allows for de-
tecting the identity of an individual entity.
Principal “Entity whose identity can be authenticated” (ITU, 2010).
Privacy Privilege to control what personal data may be accessed by third
parties for which purposes.
Privilege Right that allows an entity to perform an action.
Project “Temporary endeavor undertaken to create a unique product, ser-
vice, or result” (PMI, 2009).
Protection State of keeping something safe from adverse effects.
RDF Triple Descriptive statement about a resource using subject-predicate-
object logic.
Relying Party Service provider that relies on the identity claimed by a
requesting entity.
Requesting Entity Entity that claims an identity to a RP in the context of
a request.
Resource Entity that provides something of use for someone.
Security Cf. information security (for a definition of security specific to
the domain of this work).
Security Assertion “Assertion that is scrutinized in the context of a security
architecture” (Hodges et al., 2005).
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Self-Asserted Identity Identity that an entity declares to be its own.
Service Provider Entity that offers a service via web-based means (cf.
resource, web application and web service).
Single Sign-On Option that allows a user for plausibly identifying to a
federation of multiple web applications and web services with a single
authentication.
Social Age Age characterized by the adoption of the outcomes of the in-
formation age with a strong emphasis on social interactions between
entities over the WWW.
Social Capital Type of capital resulting from an entity’s position within
a social network as well as the quantity and the quality of social
relationships an entity maintains.
Social Media Set of resources human entities bear social relations to.
Social Web Set of social relationships among entities over the WWW.
Stakeholder Entity that has a stake in something, e.g., outcome of a
project.
Third-Party Asserted Identity Identity that a trusted authority assigns an
entity after successfully confirming relevant identity claims made by
this particular entity.
Trust “The firm belief in the reliability and truth of information or in the
ability and disposition of an entity to act appropriately, within a
specified context” (ITU, 2010).
User “Entity that makes use of a resource” (ITU, 2010).
User Agent Entity that acts on behalf of another entity in order to make
use of resources.
User-Generated Content All kinds of social media content produced by
users of social web applications.
Vocabulary Cf. ontology.
Web Cf. WWW.
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Web Application Entity that runs on a web server and is accessible over
networks via standardized interfaces by user agents including web
browsers and other services.
Web Engineering “Application of systematic and quantifiable approaches
(concepts, methods, techniques, tools) to cost-effective requirement
analysis, design, implementation, testing, operation, and mainte-
nance of high-quality web applications” (Kappel et al., 2006).
Web Service Entity that is “designed to support interoperable machine-to-
machine interaction over a network” (W3C, 2004).
Web System Entity that orchestrates other (web) entities, like web appli-
cations and web services, to provide one or multiple more complex
services with extended functionality.
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